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Abstract
Three Essays on the Financial Contracting of Corporate Debt
Steven M. Fortney
2021
My dissertation examines the financial contracting of corporate debt. One theme that runs
through every chapter is the importance of covenants to the debt contracting process. Chapters 1 and 2 explore the way that covenants are used differentially by junior and senior debt
both in practice and in theory. Chapter 3 looks at different classes of covenants and the
distinct roles they play in the modern corporate debt contract.
In the first chapter, I investigate the relative covenant usage of private bank loans and
public bonds. I examine a novel dataset (created by machine-learning) of comparable debt
contracts matched by firm and time and find that, between comparable contracts, there exists
significant variation in which class of debt is better protected by covenants. This variation
is driven by the way and the degree to which the debt capital structure is subordinated
between senior and junior debt. As firms finance themselves with more senior debt, the
expected recovery rate of both classes of creditor falls. Loans respond to an increase in
recovery risk by increasing covenant protections while bonds demand higher credit spreads.
This chapter shows that in a subordinated debt setting, debt contracting does not happen
in a vacuum but depends on the protections and composition of adjacent debt contracts.
In the second chapter, I use an adjusted structural model of subordinated default in the
spirit of Merton (1974) to show that the debt capital structure of the firm is an important
driver of relative protections between creditors. An important assumption in this model is
the assumption of higher expected recovery rates for the senior creditor. This assumption is
consistent with bank lenders’ documented revealed preference for the recovery of principal
over interest payments and this is what generates the increased covenant sensitivity of senior
creditors that I also document in the data. In this model, relative covenant demand is only
sensitive to changes in debt capital structure, not distance-to-default. This chapter shows
that the specific mix of debt a firm uses to finance itself turns out to be an extremely relevant
factor in the way it chooses to contract as well.
In the third chapter, I use a novel source of data on the contracts of lending originations as
well as their renegotiations to examine the role that affirmative covenants play in corporate
debt contracts. From the data on originations, I conclude that affirmative covenants constitute a monitoring technology that banks use to keep tabs on their borrowers. Compared
to negative covenants which are assumed to be a form of tripwire for lenders, affirmative
covenants can be conceptualized as setting the sensitivity of these negative covenant tripwires. Using these observations, I form a working theory that banks monitor loans on an
1

‘information-first’ basis, first asking for additional information before imposing more restrictions on firm actions. I test this in a sample of lending renegotiations and find that
affirmative covenants are renegotiated first in time, first in default and first after technical
defaults which are waived. The results suggest that affirmative covenants are a monitoring
tool which is frequently adjusted to help banks manage the information asymmetry that
develops over the life of a loan.
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Chapter 1
Inter-Creditor Contracting
1.1

Introduction

One of the foundational insights of the literature on debt contracting is that debt contracts help to resolve the agency conflicts that naturally arise between equityholders and
debtholders. These agency conflicts arise because debt contracts and equity contracts have
very different payoff structures and this, combined with a division of control, creates the
potential for equityholders to take actions which might be to the detriment of debtholders.
Debtholders in such models are generally assumed to be monolithic. The presumption
being that, since debtholders are identical, they should recover on their debt claims at exactly
the same rate. Of course, in reality, subordinated debt capital structures are extremely
common in finance. Bank lenders, who are typically senior secured lenders, have first priority
in bankruptcy to collect on their claims before senior unsecured bondholders.
In this paper I explore how this act of subordinating the debt capital structure between
junior and senior debt differentially affects the incentives of debtholders to contract on the
dimensions of covenant protections and credit spreads. I consider senior secured bank lenders
to represent the highest priority tranche and senior unsecured bondholders to represent the
second highest priority tranche. I show that the specific way in which the debt capital

1

structure is divided into these priority tranches redistributes recovery risk among the parties and this redistribution of risk is reflected in the contracts of each class of debtholder.
Importantly, this redistribution of risk can happen while holding entirely constant the total
level of agency risks between debt and equity. The results of this paper show that for large,
sophisticated firms, debt contracting does not only reflect the absolute level of debt-equity
agency concerns but the structure and composition of adjacent debt contracts as well.
The way that bonds and loans choose to comparatively construct their debt contracts is
a less studied area of the literature. Many papers examine the theoretical1 and empirical2
interplay between public and private debt markets. However, most of these papers put more
of an emphasis on the structure of these markets and macro-level factors which drive this
interplay and less on the actual contracts themselves. Papers that do consider the debt
contracts of bonds and loans typically do so for one type of contract in isolation.3 Breaking
these trends, and of particular relevance for this paper, Schwert (2020) fills a gap in the
literature by examining the relative pricing of comparable bonds and loans (by the same
firm and at the same time). This paper attempts to fill an analogous gap in the literature by
using a novel set of data to examine the relative protections of comparable bonds and loans.
The results of Schwert (2020) also help inform the results I present in this paper. Schwert
notes the ‘puzzling’ fact that the relative credit spreads of comparable bonds and loans
exhibit significant variation over the cross-section of credit quality, even as the relative
expected payoffs should be constant. In this paper I find a complementary puzzling result;
for comparable bonds and loans, there is similarly a large amount of unexplained variation
in which contract is better protected by debt covenants. I hypothesize that these facts are
related and point to the debt capital structure of the firm to explain this variation I observe.
To perform a clean examination of these debt-debt contracting relationships, in this paper
1

Black and Cox (1976), Diamond (1991), Rajan (1992), Rajan and Winton (1995), Carey and Gordy
(2016), Bao (2009)
2
Faulkender and Petersen (2006), Rauh and Sufi (2010), King Kahn and Nguyen (2011), Becker and
Ivashina (2014)
3
See Section 2 for a detailed discussion of this.

2

I construct my sample so that the debt-equity relationship is the same for both debt contracts
I examine. I accomplish this by considering pairs of debt contracts which are issued by the
same firm at very close to the same time (maximum difference is one year but average in
the sample is 6 months). I conduct my analysis in a sample of 1,283 bond-loan pairs issued
by 359 firms. In each of these pairs, I examine a matched set of 16 debt covenants which
are common to both bonds and loans4 and see how bonds and loans make use of the same
basic types of covenants.5 I also compare the credit spread of the publicly traded bond with
that of its matched loan counterpart on the same day the loan is issued.6 In this sample of
comparable debt contracts, differences in relative contracting should largely be due to either
1) relative recovery rates between different classes of debtholders or 2) the relative features
of the two contracts themselves. I attempt to see how a variable which proxies for the former
explains relative protections while controlling for the latter by including all of the observable
characteristics of the respective contracts as controls.
Data on syndicated lending covenants comes from a novel database of loan covenants
created with a machine learning technique that is unique to this paper. Intuitively, the
technique can be seen as a clustering exercise which uses contextual information from the
contract to ensure quality of the clusters according to some intuitive criterion.7 Where overlapping covenant data exists in alternative datasets, I compare my data against it covenantby-covenant and in almost all cases find that my data compares favorably with them. My
database has three distinct advantages over previous efforts and existing databases, all of
which lack some or all of these features. First, my database captures the universe of covenants
4
Specifically, I use the universe of bond covenants reported by Mergent FISD and a subset of the universe
of loan covenants reported by my own data. As I discuss later in the paper, most of my results will be driven
by variation in loan covenant usage so this selection procedure represents at worst a potential bias against
finding a result.
5
I define my relative protections outcome variable as the unweighted sum of the number of bond covenants
included divided by the unweighted sum of the number of loan covenants included in a bond-loan pair.
6
This is also expressed as a ratio so relative protections and relative spreads can be readily compared.
7
A more technical description of my technique is that I use a two-step K-means clustering approach to
first classify clause vectors of (up to) tri-grams into 10,000 overly-fine clusters which in a second step are
then re-combined into larger clusters using contextual information about the titles of each section. I describe
the technique in more detail in the Data section and in Appendix A.

3

used by syndicated loans to public borrowers. LPC DealScan, the most commonly used
source used of data on loan covenants, only has accurate data on financial loan covenants
(commonly referred to as tripwires). These are the exact types of covenants eschewed by
bonds.8 Second, my database is historical in that it covers the vast majority of time since
SEC filings were required to be digital (1996-2016). And third, my technique is reproducible
and assembled from public data so it can be made available to other researchers. In total,
my database represents one of the most complete (in terms of both size and scope) databases
on loan covenants ever assembled. My database contains about 30K contracts, each containing hundreds of potential covenants.9 About 10K of these loan contracts match to LPC
DealScan for data on pricing and other loan observables.
This paper has two main empirical findings. The first finding is that the debt capital
structure of the firm is a key determinant of both relative and absolute covenant protections
for bonds and loans. I establish these results by considering fixed-effect regressions that
control for within-firm and within-year variation in relative contracting. Since bank dependent firms are more likely to also be of lower credit quality, I further show that variation in
credit quality alone cannot explain variation I find in relative protections and show that all
results are robust to the inclusion of controls for credit quality. I propose that the reason
this result holds is because the tranching of the debt capital structure determines how debtequity agency risk is distributed between debtholders. Consistent with this story of shifting
risk exposures, I find that as firms finance themselves more with bank loans, the types of
covenant packages used by bank loans increasingly cover risks that are normally covered by
bonds (namely, unsecured assets too).
The second main empirical finding is that, in equilibrium, contracting happens between
debt contracts instead of just inside of them. When bank loans demand relatively more
covenant protections, bonds demand relatively higher credit spreads. I again establish this
8

This can be seen in Figure 1
The database actually includes the measurable universe of all clauses employed by syndicated credit
agreements but for the sake of simplicity I only focus on the covenants in this paper.
9

4

result via fixed-effect regressions. The intuitive thought experiment behind the regression is
to compare two pairs of debt contracts (a bond and a loan) issued by the same firm at the
time. Compared to the first pair, if the second pair of contracts has more relative protections
for the loan, then it will also have higher relative credit spreads for the bond. This generates
the interesting result that for firms that are majority bond financed, bond and loan contracts
look broadly similar in terms of spreads and covenant protections. The reverse is true for
bond and loan pairs that are issued when the firm is majority bank financed. In this case,
credit spreads for bonds are about twice as high as they are for loans and loans use covenants
twice as intensely as bonds.
To further establish the theoretical consistency of the proposed mechanism, in Chapter
2 I show that this relationship (between debt capital structure and relative contracting) I
document is predicted by an adjusted version of the workhorse Merton model of default with
subordinated debt. The adjustment I make in this paper is to let the default threshold of the
(potentially subordinated) debt contract be freely variable. This allows me to accommodate
covenant strictness into the model following the intuition of Black and Cox (1976). In
their model, covenant strictness is equated with the default threshold of the contract.10 I
calibrate this model to an average firm in the data and consider what patterns of relative
covenant usage are consistent with the historical recovery rates of senior and junior creditors.
The key intuitive takeaway of this model is that because senior creditors expect high rates
of recovery they tend to contract in a region where the marginal recovery benefit of an
additional covenant is low and so they need to include many covenants (compared to the
bond) to meet their desired recovery threshold. This is significantly and asymmetrically
relaxed when there is a larger junior tranche to absorb losses and so the model predicts that
relative protections for loans should be weaker as the firm relies more on bonds to finance
itself. This is the exact result I find above.
Finally, as an additional robustness check, I show that a commonly accepted assumption
10

Intuitively, contracts with higher default thresholds (i.e. they default sooner going into bankruptcy)
should use more covenants and have tighter covenant packages.

5

in the literature– that junior debt is equally protected by cross-default/acceleration clauses–
is not supported by the data. At the surface level, only 12% of bonds have true cross-default
protections. On the other hand, 72% of bonds have the much weaker cross-acceleration provisions.11 I show that bonds protected by a cross-default provision contract very differently
than bonds which contain a cross-acceleration provision. The former include marginally less
covenant protections in their bonds and the former include significantly more. By revealed
preference, junior creditors which have a cross-acceleration provision do not behave as if they
have equal protection as senior creditors and in fact seem to ‘hedge their bets’ by including
more covenants in their bond contracts.12
In terms of contribution, this paper extends the existing literature on a number of dimensions. This paper is arguably the first to examine covenant protections of both bonds
and loans at a truly granular level. Though other papers have considered relative protections
in the aggregate, the advantage of my data is that I only compare debt contracts with the
exact same covenants written on almost the exact same fundamental asset (priority claims
to said asset notwithstanding). The key insight that comes out of this granular analysis is
that the debt capital structure of the firm allocates recovery risk between creditors and this
allocation of risk between creditors drives changes in contracting. Importantly, these changes
can occur even if the agency concerns between debt and equity are held completely constant.
I show that the puzzling patterns of bond-loan spreads documented in Schwert (2020) can
at least partially be explained by a countervailing pattern of bond-loan covenant usage. An
important implication of this paper is that contracting may happen in equilibrium between
debt contracts instead of just inside of them. The main covenant dataset used to answer
11

Cross-default provisions imply that if senior debt defaults first, then the junior debt should default as
well. Cross-acceleration provisions work in a similar fashion but allow junior debt to default only when senior
debt accelerates, or when the senior debt demands full and immediate repayment of the entire loan. Many
firms default without accelerating their loans but acceleration rarely happens outside of bankruptcy (the
action or threat of accelerating a loan generally initiates the bankruptcy process). Because of this, crossacceleration clauses can be thought of as providing very little added protection compared to the standard
automatic stay which affects all creditors at the declaration of bankruptcy in the US.
12
They also relatively protect bonds more which implies that this result is not driven by bonds including
cross-default/acceleration clauses when the firm has high levels of idiosyncratic risk.
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these questions is both new to this paper and created via a novel machine learning method
which is reproducible and tests well out-of-sample. Finally, I contribute to the theoretical
understanding of this mechanism by extending a Merton model of subordinated default to
accommodate a freely variable default threshold (which proxies for covenant demand). This
allows me to generate predictions of relative covenant usage which line up well with those
observed in the data.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 describes the economic mechanism which explains how tranching the debt capital structure affects the incentives of debtholders. Section
2 discusses related literature. Section 3 describes my data-sources and sample construction.
Section 4 describes the main findings of the paper. Section 5 explores an alternative story
that the above results above are driven by cross-default provisions for bonds and shows that
this cannot be the case. Section 7 concludes.

1.2

Economic mechanism

To illustrate how tranching the debt capital structure affects the incentives of debtholders,
I consider a simple numerical example. This numerical example can be thought of as a
deterministic case of the structural model I will present at the end of this paper. This
example will imagine a simple subordinated debt arrangement and show that recovery rates
(defined as the amount recovered divided by the amount invested) for both classes of creditor
are decreasing in the size of the senior tranche. The bank lender will represent the senior
creditor and the bondholder will represent the junior creditor.
In this example, I assume that the total combined value of both debt claims is one
dollar (1 ≡ KT = KS + KJ ) and the value of the firm which is entering bankruptcy is
deterministically set to be 50 cents (V ≡ 0.5) . This means at least one party (and possibly
both) will incur some losses as a result of the bankruptcy. Fixing the value of the defaulting
firm to be 50 cents can be conceptualized as fixing the level of agency concerns between
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equity and debt as a whole to a level that incurs this amount of loss in bankruptcy.
The other assumption I make to characterize the problem is that borrowing demand is
completely elastic so if creditors want to lend more they can always find willing borrowers
to lend to at no penalty.13 Under this assumption, the important consideration for creditors
becomes the rate of recovery, not the absolute value of any one investment. This assumption
makes sense given the generally diversified investing behavior of both banks lenders and
bondholders.
Generally, the recovery rates (per dollar invested) of the senior bank lender and junior
creditors can be written as,



V
RS = min
,1
KS

and,





 
V − KS
RJ = min max
,0 ,1
KT − KS

Included Figure 1 considers the raw recoveries and recovery rates for each class of creditor
under two cases of debt capital structure. The first debt capital structure considers a firm
financed by 75 cents of bonds and 25 cents of loans, and the second structure considers the
reverse.
13

Alternatively, one can assume that the lenders in this problem have no market power and so can lend
infinitely at no penalty.
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Included Figure 1:
Impact of Debt Capital Structure on Creditor Recovery
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As the figure above shows, when the majority of the firm’s debt is financed by bank
loans, the recovery rates (per dollar invested) for both classes of creditors falls.14 Recovery
rates for bank loans fall from 100% to 66% and recovery rates for bonds fall from 33% to
0%. If creditors can diversify their holdings and are primarily concerned with with the rate
of return, this represents a decrease in utility for both parties.
As in reality, in this example the priority of the bank lender’s claim is guaranteed by
the security interest it takes in the firm’s collateral. Thus it is worthwhile to note that
this economic mechanism still holds even a portion of the debt is unsecured. Compared to
the completely secured case, the decrease in utility from this mechanism is smaller for the
junior debtholder while senior debtholders see even greater losses if a portion of the debt is
unsecured.15
The key takeaway from the above example is that the recovery rates of both parties are
14

This will strictly hold in any case where the recovery value of the firm is less than the total combined
value of all debt claims.
15
Figure D1 in Appendix E shows an example this.
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decreasing in the proportion of senior debt. While this fact may initially seem counterintuitive, I borrow the analogy of junior and senior creditors as people “in line” to collect on
their claims to explain. In the event of bankruptcy, senior creditors would prefer to have less
people jointly at the front of the line with them and junior creditors would like there to be
less people ahead of them in line, even at the expense of there being more people jointly at
the back of the line with them. Because of this, as firms shift their debt capital structure to
include more senior bank loans, both classes of creditor will have lower rates of recovery and
so demand more (creditor-favorable) concessions from equityholders in their debt contracts.
The exact sorts of concessions demanded will depend on the preferences of the creditor.
As a stylized fact, bond indentures typically tend to favor credit spreads over increased
recovery rates in bankruptcy. Loan contracts are the opposite. This can be seen in Table
2 which compares the average covenant protections and credit spreads for comparable pairs
of matched bonds and loans. Thus, given these revealed preferences, it makes sense to
assume that in the face of falling rates of recovery, senior creditors would primarily demand
more covenant protections while junior creditors demand higher credit spreads. This result
is exactly what I find in the data. When firms are financed with senior bank loans, the
expected recoveries of both classes of creditor falls and loans contracts adjust by using more
covenants while bond indentures have higher credit spreads.

1.2.1

Crumple zone analogy

The question of how best to jointly design a pair of subordinated debt contracts can be
thought of as analogous to designing a car with a crumple zone. The idea behind a crumple
zone is that, in the event of a crash, the crumple zone absorbs all of the force of the crash
and completely deforms before transferring any of the force of the crash to the structural
frame or the occupants of the car. Junior debt functions in an analogous fashion by being
the first to ‘crumple’ and absorb any losses incurred as a result of bankruptcy.
Before the invention of crumple zones, the frame of the car itself was designed to bear
10

all of the force of a crash. In addition to being less safe for passengers and more expensive
to repair, these designs necessitated strong, heavy frames to protect passengers inside the
’survival cell’. This design ethos is perhaps best expressed in the boxy car designs built
by automakers in the 1990’s. Typically, the only nominally deformable part of the such
designs tended to be in the bumper. On the other end of the spectrum, modern cars contain
relatively large crumple zones and this in turn allows the frame of the car itself to have
relatively less reinforcement.
These two extreme paradigms of automobile design can be thought of as representative
of the two extremes of joint contract design. The reinforced boxy designs of the 1990’s
are akin to fully bank financed firms. If there is no junior debt to absorb potential losses,
then senior debt needs to be negotiated to a more exacting standard – i.e. having more
covenants and/or higher credit spreads. Similarly, the modern automobile design paradigm
which includes crumple zones can be thought of as akin to a fully bond financed firm. When
junior debt absorbs virtually all the losses (in expectation), senior debt does not need to
include as many protections. This explains intuitively the result shown in Figure 4. Bond
financed firms have very similar debt contracts between bonds and loans while the opposite
is true for bank financed firms.
One final way in which this analogy is appropriate concerns the general efficiency inherent
a tiered design. Just as tranching damage allows cars to be made much safer while retaining
the same general footprint and weight16 , tranching bankruptcy losses is valuable because
it allows each tranche to specialize its design to best meet its purpose. In the financial
realm, DeMarzo (2005) notes that tranching is valuable because it “allows the [firm] to take
advantage of the risk diversification effect of pooling to create a low risk and highly liquid
security.’ This asset is more liquid because it avoids the lemon’s problem associated with
16

Using ratings from the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety frontal offset crash test (which proxies
for crumple zone effectiveness), Farmer (2005) notes “a clear trend for better-rated vehicles to have lower
driver fatality risk”. In both cases, having a crumple zone helps ensure the safety of the asset behind the
crumple zone. Ryb, Dischinger, McGwin, Griffin (2011) note that in cars built from 2005-2008 you are 62%
likely to survive a crash than in cars built from 1994-1997.
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selling it. In the language of Dang, Gorton and Holstrom (2019), tranching is valuable
because it takes a pool of assets and creates an information insensitive asset whose extra
value derives from the money-like qualities it has. Under either explanation, tranching a
pool of assets creates valuable social efficiencies just as tranching structural damage in a car
creates valuable safety efficiencies.

1.3

Related literature

In this section I discuss previous related literature and how the contributions of this paper
can be understood in this context.

1.3.1

Debt covenants

Broadly speaking, this paper fits into a wider stream of literature that looks empirically
at covenant usage in debt contracts and broadly tries to understand the design of them.
In the space of private bank debt, Nini et al. (2009) and Nini et al. (2012) show that
covenants are used by creditors to prevent firms from taking actions that might adversely
affect them and also as a form of governance. Demiroglu and James (2010), Murfin (2012),
Demerjian and Owens (2016) and Wang (2017) attempt to measure the “slack” inherent
in included covenants and find that the intensive margin of covenant inclusion matters in
addition to the extensive margin. Roberts and Sufi (2009) and Roberts (2015) establish that
covenant packages are frequently renegotiated.17 Chodorow-Reich and Falato (2019) show
that covenant violations are a channel by which banks can ratchet down loan obligations
or demand concessions. Covenant protections and security interests can differ even within
the same loan package. Berlin, Nini and Yu (2019) show that institutional tranches of loans
have far less control rights than the non-institutional tranches. There is also a smaller body
of literature examining covenant usage in debt contracts which are not bank loans. Smith
17
Gorton and Kahn (2000) theorize that the potential for renegotiation of these control rights makes
contractual terms reflect this possibility as well as the true risk of default.
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and Warner (1979), Berlin and Loeys (1988), Deng, et. al. (2016), Green (2018), De Franco,
et. al. (2020) all consider the use of covenants in bonds. Gompers (1998) and Kaplan and
Stromberg (2003) consider their use in venture capital debt contracts.
One thread that unites nearly all of the above papers is the idea that covenants provide
a degree of control for creditors which helps mitigate agency conflicts between equityholders
and debtholders. Bradley and Roberts (2015) call this idea the Agency Theory of Covenants
(ATC) and note that because including covenants remedies a fundamental inefficiency, this
should lead creditors to accept lower credit spreads in exchange for more covenants.

18

Bradley and Roberts (2015) test this hypothesis and find that covenants and credit spreads
are substitutes once you condition on the fact that the unobserved quality of borrowers who
use covenants is lower.19 Notably, under the ATC, this substitution is always implicitly
assumed to happen inside the same contract. In this paper I show how these equilibrium
trade-offs can happen between debt contracts as well. In addition to covenant protections,
senior debt can protect its recovery rates in bankruptcy by having an ample amount of junior
debt to absorb first losses. This lets loan contracts include less covenants, even if the level
of agency risks between debt and equity remains the same.
This paper is also one of the first to examine the universe of covenants used by senior
bank debt. Bank debt typically uses two types of negative covenants, financial covenants
and capital restrictions covenants. The vast majority of papers in this space consider only
the financial covenants.2021 Two of the first papers which attempt to consider the universe of
covenants in a comprehensive manner are Ganglimir and Wardlaw (2017) and Ivashina and
Valle (2019). Ganglimir and Wardlaw (2017) construct their data in an analogous manner
to my own using machine learning techniques on the sample of loan contracts collected by
18

As Bradley and Roberts (2015) note, one of the “important implications of the ATC [is]...a negative
relation between the promised yield on corporate debt and the presence of covenants”.
19
Matvos (2013) performs a similar exercise of trying to estimate the strength of this negative relationship.
20
All of the above papers use DealScan as their main source of data on loan covenants so this fact is
almost certainly a reflection of the fact that DealScan only has comprehensive data on financial covenants.
21
In addition to this, my data also collects the Affirmative covenants which I do not explicitly consider
in this paper but are the primary mechanism by which banks monitor their loans.
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Sufi (2009). On the other hand, Ivashina and Valle (2019) look at the capital restrictions
covenants from a proprietary sample of about 1000 loans from industry data source, Street
Diligence.22 As I discuss in Section 2, both of these sources of data are insufficient either in
terms of precision (the former) or history (the latter) for the analysis of relative contracting
I conduct in this paper.

1.3.2

Debt capital structure

Though this paper is the first (to this author’s best knowledge) to consider how changes in
a firm’s debt capital structure allocate risk between borrowers, this is not the first paper to
consider the general effects of a firm’s debt capital structure on firm outcomes. An important
paper related paper on debt capital structure is Rauh and Sufi (2010). They compare the
usage of bond covenants (4 types) with loan covenants (2 types) in the unidentified aggregate
(they compare bonds and loans by grouping by credit quality) and find that low credit
quality firms use “bank debt with tight covenants and subordinated non-bank debt with
loose covenants.” I find the same basic patterns at a granular level but my covenant data
is more comprehensive and granular23 so I can make much stronger inferences. Low quality
borrowers simultaneously use bank debt with lots of covenants and bonds with few covenants
and the types of covenants used by each party suggest very different goals. Because my data
identifies truly comparable bonds and loans, I can infer what is actually driving this pattern.
Within-firm variation in relative protections seems to actually be driven by changes in the
debt capital structure that occur concurrent with a deterioration in credit quality. Though
Rauh and Sufi note that low quality firms also have a multi-tiered debt capital structure,
they do not make the connection (or cannot test this because of the aggregate nature of their
data) that it is precisely this multi-tiered debt capital structure that is a key driver of these
22

Ivashina and Valee show that negative covenants are frequently weakened by ‘carve-outs’ which let the
borrower engage in a limited amount of the restricted action.
23
I compare 16 covenants, all of which are mutually common to both types of debt
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covenant patterns.24
Another important paper in this space is Lou and Otto (2018) who consider how financial
covenants usage for (only) loans varies with heterogeneity in the debt capital structure. They
find that firms with more concentrated debt capital structures25 use less loan covenants.
They do not consider bond covenant usage. In contrast (and consistent with Rauh and Sufi
(2010)), I find no relation with debt capital structure concentration per-se but instead I
find the directional result that the type of concentration matters. Firms with debt capital
structures concentrated around bank debt use more loan covenants overall (both absolutely
and relatively) but firms with debt capital structures concentrated around bond debt use
less loan covenants overall. I also use a formal structural model to motivate my results and
show that my results are consistent with this model. Other notable distinctions are that I
consider a much more comprehensive database of covenants26 and my results also extend to
explaining within-firm variation in covenant usage.

1.3.3

Textual analysis

This paper adds to the literature on textual analysis of financial documents by describing
a new textual analysis technique which is uniquely suited to parsing contractual data (or
any document with titled subsections where one expects some degree of standardization in
the language). Though initial papers in this space restricted themselves to considering one
covenant of interest which could be scraped (Nini et al. (2009) is an example of this), textual
analysis techniques have become increasingly more sophisticated in recent years. From the
cosine similarity methods used to quantify textual difference27 to the more advanced topic
24

As further evidence which is consistent with this story, Carey and Gordy (2016), examine the impact
of debt capital structure on the firm-wide recovery rate in bankruptcy and find that debt capital structure
“has a more economically material empirical influence on recovery rates than all other variables we try taken
together”.
25
As measured by the HHI of seven classes of debt.
26
Lou and Otto (2018) use DealScan as their data source.
27
Hanley and Hoberg (2010), Brown and Tucker (2011), Hoberg and Phillips (2015), Lang and SticeLawrence (2015) and Cohen et al. (2020) all do some version of this.
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modeling style techniques used to taxonomize textual similarity28 , textual analysis techniques
are becoming more widely-used and accepted tools in the literature. My technique uses one
of the simplest forms of off-the-shelf machine learning (K-means clustering) and combines it
with an intuitive criterion specifically designed for legal contracts (namely, that lawyers like
to use descriptive titles and these can be used to refine the clusters), to create a database
of loan covenants that is larger in both scope and size than any such database before it. I
describe the details of the technique below in Section 3 and in Appendix A.

1.3.4

Theory

The canonical view of why covenants are included in debt contracts, referred to by Bradley
and Roberts (2014) as the Agency Theory of Covenants (ATC), emanates from the works
of Jensen and Meckling (1976), Myers (1977), Smith and Warner (1979), and Aghion and
Bolton (1992) (among others). In these papers, it is assumed that covenants are a contracting
tool which mitigates the agency conflicts that arise as a result of the relationship that exists
between debtholders and equityholders.
Within this larger theoretical literature considering conflicts between different stakeholders of the firm (discussed above), there is also a much smaller stream of literature examining
the interactions between different classes of debtholders. Black and Cox (1976) is perhaps
the first paper to do so.29 In their paper, the agency conflicts between equity and debt are
held constant to examine how the competing interests of the different classes of creditors
impact contracting. Thus, instead of trying to model incomplete contracting and who will
have control in various states of the world, such models typically take the flavor of relative
valuation. Black and Cox (1976) and be seen as an extension of Merton (1974) debt valuation model to include subordinated debt claims.
28

30

To accommodate covenants in their

Ganglimir and Wardlaw (2017) and Kelly et al. (2019) both employ this type of technique.
Bao (2009), and Carey and Gordy (2016) also follow in this framework.
30
The valuation of each claim can roughly be defined as the expected discounted present value of principal
recovered plus the expected present value of any interest payments. In their model, to accommodate interest
payments, Black and Cox need to consider perpetual consol bonds. For this reason I use an adapted version
of the model of relative valuation posed by Schwert (2020) which has a finite maturity and no coupon.
29
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model, Black and Cox equate the default threshold of the debt contract with the level of
covenant restrictions it contains. The model I present makes the same assumptions as Black
and Cox (1976). Agency conflicts between the equity and debt are held constant and the
choice to include relatively more or less covenants in the bond or loan equates to choosing
the default threshold. This, in turn, affects the relative valuations of each class of creditor
and these differences in relative valuations are the source of the agency conflicts between
debt-holders. For this reason the model I present has more of a flavor of relative valuation
rather than the the standard control rights-based explanations of covenant inclusion.

1.4

Data

To create a database of the relative covenant protections and relative spreads of both public
bonds and private banks loans, this paper uses a number of data sources. One of them
is created with machine learning and is completely new to this paper. Another is a novel
combination of existing data. Data on relative covenant protections comes from combining
data on bond covenants from Mergent FISD with a new dataset of historical loan covenants
created via machine learning (I refer to this dataset as the Historical dataset for brevity).
Data on relative spreads comes from combining Loan All-in-Drawn Spread data from LPC
DealScan with a public proxy of Schwert’s proprietary Bond Swap Spread data from Bank
of America Merrill-Lynch (BAML). I reconstruct a public proxy of Schwert’s proprietary
BAML Bond Swap Spreads data by using data from WRDS Bond Returns as well as well
as data on Treasury Swaps from the Chicago FRB plus data on TED Spreads from FRED.
Data on relative protections/spreads is identified by considering pairs of bonds and loans
matched by issuer and time of issuance. The goal behind the sample selection procedure is
to find clean pairs of debt contracts which are identical in the agency conflicts between debt
and equity and as close as possible in the observable characteristics of the debt contracts.
In this section I begin by discussing the details of my sample selection procedure and how
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I match bonds and loans together. This is followed by a discussion of my data sources and
how I define relative protections and relative spreads. Finally, I discuss two test variables of
interest, debt capital structure and distance-to-default.

1.4.1

Sample selection

Table 1 describes the process of constructing my sample which I detail in this section. I start
with a sample of 434,810 bonds from Mergent FISD and a sample of 10,204 loans from my
historical loan covenant database31 merged with LPC DealScan. Since contracting largely
occurs at the package level for loans and the series level for bonds, I only use one facility
from each loan package and one bond issue from each series of notes (identified by multiple
bonds issued by the same firm on the same day). Facilities in a package are chosen by
taking the facility in a package with the longest maturity (since bonds are almost uniformly
longer maturity than loans). Bonds in a series (where applicable) are chosen by maturity
matching to the loan.32 After dropping (in both datasets) observations with no covenant
data, restricting both datasets to the same sample period (1996-2016) and dropping financial
firms (SIC code 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC 4900-4999), I am left with two samples. These
are a sample of 18,305 bonds to 5,158 firms and a sample of 7,705 loans to 3,615 firms.
I then match together pairs of bonds and loans from the two samples based on two
criteria. First, the bond and loan must be issued by the same firm and second, the bond and
the loan must be concurrently active. This gives me a matched sample of 10,904 bond-loan
pairs to 1,053 firms.33 However, there remains the problem that even within the same firm,
the level of agency concerns between equity and debt might change over time. Because of
this, I only consider bond-loan pairs which were issued within a maximum one year of one
31

Details of the construction of this historical loan covenant database are found in Section 3.2 and in
Appendix A.
32
Since covenants generally apply to all facilities in a package and bond in a series of bonds, the specific
facility/bond that is chosen is not of foremost importance for the analysis of this paper. Nonetheless, I include
both loan-type fixed effects for loans and maturity controls for bonds for to account for any systematic effect
that the choice of one specific facility or bond might have on my outcome variables.
33
In this paper, an observation will refer to a bond-loan pair meeting these criteria.
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another. This leaves me with a sample of 2,392 bond-loan pairs issued to 721 firms. While
1 year is the maximum allowed difference, the average difference in issuance dates is much
closer to six months. This allows me to be much more confident that I am capturing a pair
of contracts which have almost exactly the same level of agency concerns. At this point I
also match observations to Compustat by using the closest quarterly observation before the
first issuance date in the bond-loan pair.

34

For 72 of the 2,392 observations (about 3% of observations), the number of loan covenants
included in the loan is 0. To create a ratio variable without undefined values, I drop these
72 of observations. The number of bonds with 0 covenants is far higher so I do not use the
inverse of this ratio. As a quick placebo test to ensure that dropping these observations is not
materially affecting my results, I consider the counterfactual where these 72 observations are
instead set equal to the next closest discrete value of 1 and find very similar results. After
making this cut I am left with 2,320 to 709 firms.
I then merge the data with the Capital IQ database. Capital IQ is a database that
tracks the composition of debt in a firm’s debt capital structure. After doing this merge I
am left with 1,696 observations for 523 firms. I then further clean the bond data by dropping
secured, convertible and non-publicly issued bonds. This leaves me with 1,340 observations
for 393 firms. Finally, I drop micro-cap firms (market capitalization less than 300 MM). This
leaves me with a final sample of 1,283 bond-loan pairs issued to 359 firms.
One important thing to note is that I do not perform any explicit cuts on the security
level of the loan. Effectively, I am assuming that all loans in my sample are secured.35 The
reason for this is because of the inadequacy of the existing data on whether or not loans are
secured and the safety of the assumption given the legal details of how exactly bank loans
are actually secured. To elaborate, the majority (55%) of observations for whether or not a
34
I also keep track of the absolute difference (in days) between the issuance days as well as a binary variable
indicating if the loan was issued before the bond and include them as controls in all of my regressions. These
are frequently denoted as “Match Controls” and are rarely significant. Results are always robust to either
including or excluding them so I report all results with them included.
35
Schwert (2020) also makes this same assumption.
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facility is secured in LPC DealScan are empty. And of those that are populated, the vast
majority (76%) are accounted as secured. However the fact the most observations are empty
is unsurprising because repeat secured loans, if they are extended by the same creditor,
can be implicitly secured by a previous security interest. So called, ‘Dragnet’ clauses, are
the common technique to legally accomplish this. These are included in previous security
agreements (which can be, and are frequently, distinct document from the publicly available
credit agreements) and state that the currently considered security interest can be used to
secure any of the secured party’s future (or occasionally, past) claims against the debtor.
This is true even if it is not explicitly stated in the second contract.36 By this method, in
bankruptcy, a security interest in a given piece of collateral can secure any of the secured
party’s claims against the borrower. Conversations with legal experts on secured lending
account that the use of dragnet clauses is a relatively common practice for corporate bank
lending.37 For this reason, I assume in my data that senior bank loans are secured, either
explicitly in the security agreement or implicitly via a previous (or future) dragnet clause.
Matched bond-loan sample characteristics
Table 2 reports the summary statistics for the sample of matched bonds and loans. Generally
speaking, my sample is composed of larger, publicly traded firms than the average firm. This
is because the main source of my data for loan contracts is SEC filings and also because firms
which issue bonds are larger than the average firm (even among publicly traded firms). The
average firm in my sample has a market capitalization of 20.6 billion dollars with about
7 billion dollars of total (long-term plus short-term) debt outstanding. The average loan
facility in my sample has a face value of about 1.2 billion and the average bond in my
36

Conversations with representatives at DealScan confirm that credit agreements and newswire releases
are the primary sources of data they use. Because of this it is likely that, unless the security level of the
loan is also mentioned in a newswire, that the contract itself is source of DealScan’s data on whether or not
the loan is secured.
37
The legal nuances of how security interests attach also has important implications for the question of
why bank loans are ‘sticky’ in the sense that firms rarely change their lenders and pay a premium when they
do so, especially in DIP lending. The fact that security interests attach to the lender and not the loan itself
seems to be a reasonable explanation for this stickiness we observe.
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sample has a face value of 500 million dollars.
Consistent with the fact that bonds typically have longer maturities than bonds, the
average bond in my sample has a maturity of 138 months or 11.5 years while the average loan
has a maturity of 56 months or 4.6 years. As an alternative, it is possible to match bonds and
loans on closest maturity (Schwert (2020) does this) which might close this gap. However,
doing so would necessarily come at the expense of matching to the closest issuance. Since
debt maturity is an observable characteristic of the debt which can be directly controlled
for, I choose to prioritize matching on issuance date. This ensures that I control for as much
of the unobservable variation in agency concerns as possible.38
In terms of covenants, loans tend to use covenants more intensively on average than
bonds. The average loan uses 5.7 covenants while the average bond uses 3.4 covenants (out
of a possible total of 16). In terms of credit spreads (compared at the day of the loan
origination), the average loan in my sample has an All-in-Drawn spread (over LIBOR) of
164 basis points while the average bonds has a proxied bond swap spread spread of 214 basis
points (over LIBOR). Already in the aggregate summary statistics, one can see a general
pattern emerging. Loans, which are have priority, typically use higher levels of protections
and have lower levels of credit spreads. Bonds, which are do not have priority, have lower
levels of covenant protection and modestly higher spreads. This is a fact which will be
established rigorously later on in the paper.
Table 3 compares the summary statistics of my matched bond-loan sample against the
component datasets which were used to construct it. From this, I can conclude that my
sample is in the ’middle’ of the sample of bonds from Mergent and the sample of loans from
my historical dataset. In terms of firm characteristics, firms in my sample have characteristics
that makes them look bigger than the average loan issuer and marginally smaller than the
average bond issuer. This is consistent with Rauh and Sufi’s (2010) conclusion that firms
with a tiered capital structure are relatively medium-low quality compared to the average
38

As an additional desirable characteristic, not matching on maturity helps my sample of bonds better
reflect the average maturity of bonds in the general population.
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bond issuer.

1.4.2

Measuring relative covenant protections

To construct a measure of the relative covenant protections between bonds and loans, the first
step is to collect data on the historical universe of both loan covenants and bond covenants.
For bond covenants, Mergent FISD provides relatively detailed and complete data on the
historical universe of covenants employed by public debt. For loan covenants, the existing
available data is either incomplete in 1) scope or 2) history. The most commonly used
database on covenant protections for loans is LPC DealScan. While the historical coverage
for LPC DealScan is quite good, the scope of covenants it relatively covers is primarily
limited to the financial covenants. As Ivashina and Valle (2019) note, “studies looking at
credit agreements have a narrow coverage of contractual provisions”. For the most commonly
used databases (including LPC DealScan), “the variables on contractual provisions exhibit a
majority of missing values, creating the risk of significant composition effects”. Another set
of data commonly used by practitioners but less so by academics is the FactSet Current Bank
Loans dataset. While this data reliably captures the universe of covenants, it is only available
for currently active loans which significantly limits the sample. While the limitations of these
datasets make them unsuitable for the scope of this project, they do serve as useful checks
to verify the accuracy of my data I collect. As is seen in Figures 8 and 9, the data I collect
compares well with both FactSet and DealScan where they overlap.
For the two reasons mentioned above, I collect my own data on loan covenants which
is historical and more universal in scope by applying a novel machine learning technique
(detailed in the next section) to scraped credit agreements from SEC EDGAR. This technique
allows me to gather the universe of covenants employed by bank loans. In fact, instead of
gathering just covenants, this technique actually gathers the universe of all clauses used
by bank lending contracts. However, for this paper, I only focus on the covenants since
the question under consideration is one of relative covenant protections between bonds and
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loans.
Loan covenants
Data on the historical universe of loan covenants is collected via a novel application of a
common machine learning technique to scraped credit agreements from SEC EDGAR. The
steps of the process can be summarized as follows. First, I scrape the loan credit agreements
from SEC EDGAR. Second, I use an adaptive algorithm39 to parse each lending agreement
text into its component subsections. Third, I vectorize these subsections, transforming them
from text snippets into numerical vectors. Fourth, I cluster the numerical vectors together
using an off-the-shelf K-means algorithm but I choose to deliberately over-cluster. This will
create overly-small or overly-specific clusters which will them be recombined using contextual
information from the contract in the next step. And fifth, I recombine clusters which have
the same modal title. Since each component subsection in a contract comes with a title
attached, I find the most common title inside each cluster and then recombine clusters with
the same modal title. The result is a dataset of all possible clauses or subsections which
might be included in a lending contract and if each lending contract contains that clause.
This is coded as a 1-0 binary variable. I call this entire technique Title Recombination KMeans (TRKM). I discuss the economically important insights from this method here while
relegating a discussion of the technical details to Appendix A.
Importantly, I verify the quality my data out of sample and find that the results output
from this technique compare very favorably against the covenant datasets previously mentioned. Figures 11 and 12 show how my data compares (where it happens to overlap) with
data from 4 sources.40 In both comparisons, my covenant data seems to capture the broad
moments (Figure 11) and co-movements (Figure 12) of their publicly available counterparts
for almost all covenants. In the few covenants categories where there exists a discrepancy,
39

Created via a combination of Python and Regex.
Ganglmair and Wardlaw (2017) do not provide data on the composition of their covenants and so I
cannot compare my data against theirs as I do others.
40
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it can generally be explained by the way each dataset chooses to categorize and aggregate
potentially different covenants together as one category.
Remark: How does this compare to what has been done before?
Before moving on, it is important to note that the spirit of this exercise is very similar to
what has been done in past literature, albeit on an entirely different scale. Exploiting the
structure and relatively standardized language of legal contracts to extract information is
hardly new. Perhaps the first paper to do at scale this is Nini and Sufi (2009) which uses
text parsing techniques to identify contracts which contain Capital Expenditures restrictions. Their analysis is possible because the same basic set of words is used in most capital
expenditures restrictions covenants. Many other papers have performed a similar manual
exercise to identify small numbers of covenants in which they have a particular interest. The
process can be roughly boiled down to two steps; 1) reading a large number of contracts to
identify key phrases which can, in turn, be used to identify a given covenant with a minimum
of error and, 2) writing code to parse the text looking for these key phrases. At its core, the
idea depends on the relatively standardized nature of legal language.
The machine learning technique which I use in this paper can be simplistically viewed
as a formalization of this two step process. My technique can also be expressed in two
basic steps; 1) take each subsection in a contract and express it numerically (as a vector) in
such a way that the words (and groups of words) which are relatively more common in that
subsection are highlighted and, 2) group together subsections based on these highlighted
words which are common to the subsection but uncommon to the rest of the corpus. The
connection to the manual technique is that the process of finding words (or groups of words)
which are common to one subsection and uncommon to the rest of the corpus is very similar
in spirit to the process of manually finding key phrases to recognize specific covenants. The
technique I use in this paper simply formalizes what is typically an ad-hoc, manual process
in a more reproducible way.
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Bond covenants
Bond covenant data comes from Mergent FISD. Unlike the available datasets for loans,
Mergent FISD is both complete in scope and historical. The data from Mergent FISD is
structured similarly to my own. Like my own data, binary variables indicate if a given
covenant is present or not in each bond indenture.
Though Mergent tracks a total of 31 covenants41 for both the parent and its subsidiaries42 ,
I only use covenant data which applies directly to the parent. After applying this restriction
I get a total of 16 restrictive covenants from Mergent FISD. I match each bond covenant
category to its loan covenant counterpart.
Remark: Loan covenants protect secured assets while bond covenants protect
unsecured assets
In Figure 1 I compare the average incidence of bond covenants against the incidence of loan
covenants for my sample of matched observations. Consistent with the findings in aggregate,
I find that for 12 of the 16 covenant categories, loans use the covenant more intensively than
bonds. The 4 covenant categories which do not conform to this are Fixed Charge Coverage
Ratio (albeit weakly), Consolidation and Mergers, Sales Leasebacks, and Sales of Assets.
The common theme which unites the last three is that these are actions which the firm
can take which quickly extract value from the firm by disposing of or moving unencumbered
assets out of the reach of unsecured creditors. In contrast, the covenant categories used more
intensively by loans are more concerned with issues of monitoring or the value or safety of
secured claims. As banks finance more of the firm’s debt, they broaden the scope of covenants
they use to also increasingly include covenants that protect unsecured assets as well.
41

These are found in the “Additional Issuer Information” file of Mergent FISD.
An example might be a restriction on the parent issuing dividends vs. a restriction on the subsidiary
issuing dividends.
42
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1.4.3

Relative covenant intensity index

Using the previously described data on the universe of bond and loan covenants, I construct
a matched set of covenant categories that are common to both loans and bonds. To do
this, I first consider each bond covenant in Mergent FISD and then hand-match each bond
covenant to its loan analogue in my own data.43 One covenant in Mergent FISD can match to
potentially multiple covenants in my own dataset.44 In total, I match 16 covenants between
Mergent FISD and my own dataset.45
Then, after constructing a matched set of covenants, I construct an index of relative
covenant intensity for each bond-loan pair. I define this as the ratio of the number of
covenants included in the bond over number of covenants included in the loan.
P16
BCi
BC/LC = Pi=1
16
i=1 LCi
Where i indexes the category of covenant and BCi and LCi indicate if the category of
covenant i is present in the bond or loan, respectively.
The exercise of creating an unweighted index which counts the number of covenants
included in a contract follows Bradley and Roberts (2015) who construct a similar covenant
intensity index for loans using the covenants found in LPC DealScan.46 Though it might be
possible to construct a weighted index which might better capture the degree of protection
offered by each covenant, I use a simple unweighted index for the same reason as Bradley
and Roberts. As they note, “this approach is both transparent and reproducible. It also
43

12.

For full details of the exact way in which I hand-match covenants between bonds and loans, see Table

44

As an example, I hand-match the Mergent FISD covenant ‘Assets Sale’ to the “Sale of Assets” and
“Disposition of Assets” covenants (among others) in my own dataset, as a disposition is a commonly used
legal term for a sale.
45
In order of frequency of use (by loans) the matched covenant categories are; liens, indebtedness, consolidations and mergers, transactions with affiliates, dividends related payments, sale of assets, investments,
leverage ratio, restricted payments, interest coverage ratio, sales and leasebacks, maintenance of net worth,
fixed charge coverage ratio, senior debt issuance, subordinated debt issuance and funded debt.
46
Billet et al. (2007), Demiroglu and James (2010) and Lou and Otto (2018) also construct similar types
of holistic measures
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facilitates interpretation of the results and avoids any judgment regarding the efficacy or
wealth effects of any of the covenants.”
Remark: Debt-equity agency concerns cannot explain all variance in relative
covenant intensity
As can be seen in figure 4, for pairs of debt contracts issued by the same firm at about the
same time, relative covenant intensity for bonds and loans can vary dramatically. Figure 4
plots the density histogram of bond-loan covenant ratios in my sample. This is defined as
the covenant intensity of the bond over the covenant intensity of the loan. At the extremes,
there are a small number of contracts where the comparable bond uses up to 3 times the
number of covenants that the loan does; there is also a significant mass where the bond uses
no covenants at all and the loan uses some non-zero amount.
Further examination shows that this variation is not random but heavily correlated with
the credit quality of the firm. As Panel A in Figure 2 shows, when firms are very far
from default, bond and loan covenant intensities are about equal (4.2 vs 3.3) with a slight
advantage for loans. However, this gap expands significantly as firms approach default.
Firms who are close to default protect their loans much more intensely than their bonds (7.7
vs 4.5, respectively).
The above results suggest that credit quality, or something correlated to it, is a driver of
variation in relative protections. Since the credit quality of the firm is one potential proxy
for the amount of agency concerns between debt and equity this result may initially seem
consistent with the idea that relative protections are driven by agency concerns. It is however
important to remember that the sample is constructed so that the default risk for both debt
claims should be virtually identical. Thus, what this result is actually showing is that there
is some other source of risk which differentially affects creditors and which is also correlated
with credit quality.
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1.4.4

Measuring relative credit spreads

To construct a measure of relative credit spreads between bonds and loans, one first needs to
find a comparable type of credit spread that can be compared between the two types of debt.
For both types of debt, this spread will be defined as the annual spread (in basis points)
that the borrower pays above LIBOR to borrow. For loans this is simply defined as the
All-In-Drawn spread (as reported in LPC DealScan). While this exactly meets the definition
of a credit spread, this measure is really only valid around the date of issuance for the loan.
As Roberts and Sufi (2009) and Roberts (2015) show, loans frequently renegotiate both
the price (interest rates) and non-price (covenants) terms of their credit agreements. These
renegotiations are not tracked by DealScan. Conversely, the coupons of bonds are almost
never renegotiated47 so their interest rates do not suffer from this immediacy problem but
it is more difficult to impute what the appropriate spread above LIBOR would be for a
bond. Schwert (2020) accomplishes this by using proprietary data on Bond Swap Spreads
from Bank of America Merrill-Lynch (BAML). He defines the Bond Swap Spread as the
option-adjusted bond yield minus the maturity matched LIBOR swap rate.
Since I do not have access to this proprietary dataset from BAML, I construct an proxy
of Schwert’s Bond Swap Spread measure using publicly available data. I do this by taking
bond yields (in basis points)48 and subtracting the sum of 1) the maturity-matched treasury
swap rate and 2) the 3-Month TED spread (defined as the difference between the 3-month
LIBOR and a 3-month treasury note). Bond yields to maturity are collected from WRD’s
Bond Returns, Maturity Matched Treasury Swap Rates are from Chicago FRB and 3-Month
TED spreads are from FRED. If the time to maturity of the bond (in months) is T , then
47
Their indentures typically require every bondholder to consent to such a renegotiation which is effectively
impossible.
48
Importantly, since the overwhelming majority (99.7% percent) of bonds in my sample are callable, I do
not do any sort of options adjustment on my yields. The reason for this is that most loans are effectively
callable as well due to pre-payment clauses. For this reason, the comparable credit spread for a callable loan
is actually the credit spread for a callable bond. This implies that for the purposes of comparing with loan
spreads, one should perform an option adjustment for the non-callable bonds. However, since non-callable
bonds are such a minute part of the sample I do not perform any specific correction for these. In tables that
available on request, the main results of this paper are robust to the exclusion of the non-callable bonds.
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this approximation can be written,

BSS_P roxyT = Y ieldT oM aturityT − T reasury_SwapT − T ED_Spread3
The obvious departure with this approximation is that the TED spreads are not matched
to the maturity of the yield and the treasury swap. It is worth asking how this affects the
results. In Appendix C, I consider the term structure of the TED spread and find that before
the 2009 Financial Crisis there is virtually no discernible term structure.49 Thus, before this
period, the error inherent in my approximation is likely to be small. I also compare my data
against Schwert’s BAML data and find that my data exhibits less variance over the cross
section of credit quality. This would suggest that my relative spread variable understates
the actual magnitude of the spread differential which would be a bias50 against finding any
results.
Using my bond swap spread proxy and the all-in-drawn spread from the loan, I define
the relative spread ratio as the ratio of these two variables. Since the loan spread is only
current on the date of issuance, this ratio is calculated on the day that the loan is issued in
the bond-loan pair. For consistency with the above-defined covenant intensity ratio, I define
the ratio with the bond spread in the numerator and the loan spread in the denominator.

BS/LS =

1.4.5

BSS_P roxy
All_in_Drawn

Test variables

Finally, I construct two potential test variables to see if either can explain the patterns of
variation I find in relative protections as well as the patterns that Schwert finds with relative
49

Interestingly, this roughly corresponds with the time period in which the LIBOR price-fixing cartel was
most active.
50
Assuming variance in the cross-section of credit quality is representative of variance in the cross-section
of debt capital structure.
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spreads. The two variables I consider are the credit quality of the firm as well as the debt
capital structure of the firm.
Distance-to-Default
Credit quality is proxied for by Bharath and Shumway’s (2008) measure of distance-todefault. As in their paper, I construct distance to default as,

DtD =

ln(V /D) − (r − .5σ 2 )T
√
σ T

Where V is market cap, D is short term debt plus half of long-term debt, r is the trailing
one-year stock return, and σ is the one-year asset volatility and T = 1. This variable can
roughly be interpreted as how many standard deviations a firm is away from defaulting
within one year.51
Debt capital structure
Debt capital structure is proxied for by the percentage of total drawn debt that is financed via
bank loans, as reported in S&P CapitalIQ. The reason I use bank debt percent as opposed to,
bond debt percent, is that bank loans are assumed to be at the top of the priority structure.
Because of this, it is always clear what a change in bank debt percent implies for the debt
capital structure of the firm. Though I do not explicitly consider them, certain forms of debt
(such as commercial paper) come in even lower on the priority structure than bonds and so
observing a shift away from bonds (in isolation) implies an ambiguous change in the total
debt capital structure of the firm.
51

Under the implicit assumption that default happens when the value of the firm falls below the face
value of debt.
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1.5

Results

The argument that the allocation of recovery risk between creditors is driver of covenant
inclusion in contracts rests on three bodies of evidence. The first body of evidence establishes
the stylized fact that for pairs of debt contracts with the almost the exact same levels of debtequity agency conflicts, relative covenant intensity can vary immensely. This implies that the
absolute level of agency conflicts between debt and equity cannot be the sole determinant of
covenant inclusion in debt contracts. The second body of evidence establishes that the debt
capital structure of the firm, which proxies for the distribution of recovery risks between
creditors, is a key driver of both absolute and relative covenant inclusion in contracts. The
third body of evidence establishes that more relative protections for the loan are correlated
with higher relative credit spreads for the bond. When combined with the second result,
this generates the intriguing result that when firms are mostly financed by bond debt, their
bond indentures and loan contracts look broadly similar. In contrast, when firms are mostly
financed by bank debt, contractual terms massively diverge.
The results from first body of evidence are discussed at various points above, mainly in
the data description section. The results from the second and third bodies of evidence are
primarily discussed in this section.
To facilitate exposition, the regression results can roughly be divided into three steps of
a proposed chain of causality. This chain is described below in the Included Figure 2. The
first step in this chain is that firms which are closer to default finance more of their debt
with banks. This is represented by link 1 in the figure below. Second, firms that finance
more of their debt with bank loans protect their loans (relatively) more. This is represented
by link 2 in the figure below. And third, firms that protect their loans (relatively) more have
higher (relative) spreads for bonds in equilibrium. This is represented by link 3 in the figure
below.

31

Rauh and Sufi (2010)

4 Relative
Protections

(Loans)

2

4 Firm

1

Credit Quality

4 Debt
Capital Structure

3

×
4 Relative
Schwert (2020)

Spreads

(Bonds)

Included Figure 2: Proposed Chain of Causality
In the above included figure, the dashed and dotted lines show which relationships have
been established by two previous papers in this space. The dotted lines represents connections noted by Rauh and Sufi (2010) and the dashed lines represent connections noted
by Schwert (2020). While Rauh and Sufi (2010) note pieces of the story I lay out in the
unidentified aggregate, they do not make the connection that changes in the debt capital
structure are the mechanism by which changes in credit quality affect relative protections.
Consistent with Schwert (2020), I also find no meaningful relationship between the debt
capital structure of a firm and its relative spreads. As Schwert (2020) notes, “The weak
correlation between debt structure and loan spreads is puzzling, given the importance of
seniority for determining payoffs in default.” My results give some additional context to this
result by showing that changes in debt capital structure only matters for relative spreads
inasmuch as they impact relative protections. If the changes in debt capital structure do
not impact relative covenant protections, then it is most likely because the changes in debt
capital structure did not impact relative recovery rates. In this case, it makes sense that
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there should also be no impact on relative spreads.

1.5.1

General regression specification

To test each step in this chain, I regress the outcome variable on the proposed test variable
while trying to control for as many of the inter-contractual differences as possible. As a quick
reminder, since I am examining a relatively clean setting where each matched debt contract
is subject to the same level of debt-equity agency concerns, I do not attempt to explicitly
control for these agency concerns (which are largely unobservable to the econometrician) in
my regressions. My regressions take the following general functional form:

Outcomei,t,l,ind,f irm = β1 T esti +
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Where B is a matrix of bond-specific controls (seniority, amount, maturity, spread), L is a
matrix of loan-specific controls (amount, maturity, spread), M is a matrix of match-specific
controls (loan before and difference in days) and C is a matrix of controls for firm credit
quality (distance-to-default, log market capitalization and S&P institutional credit rating).
Variables l, τ, ξ, η capture loan type, year, industry and firm-level fixed effects, respectively.
Each presentation of results will report come combination of these factors.52 I also only
include the credit quality controls for the firm-level regressions since (as I will show) these
credit quality variables are related to the outcome variables in the cross-section but do not
explain within-firm variation in the outcomes.
I present three sets of results corresponding to these three steps. The first set tests
how the credit quality of firms impacts their debt capital structures. The second set tests
52

For example, when including firm-level fixed effects, these subsume industry-level fixed effects and so
the latter are omitted.
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how variation in debt capital structure (which proxies for inter-creditor conflict) explains
variation in relative protections. The third set tests how relative protections trade-off with
relative spreads in equilibrium.

1.5.2

Step 1: Credit quality and debt capital structure

In Figure 7 I show that, in the cross section, lower quality firms finance themselves more
with bank debt than their higher quality counterparts. Panel A tests this in-sample inside
my dataset and Panel B tests this out of sample in a sample of firms with access to the bond
market.53 In both figures the pattern is confirmed. The fact that this pattern is stronger
in-sample likely reflects the fact that my sample is a sample of firms on the cusp of issuing
both a bond and loan. It is reasonable to expect such firms have more flexibility to optimally
adjust their debt capital structure in response to their current credit conditions. This can
be seen as a confirmation of the results of Rauh and Sufi (2010), albeit at a more granular
level.

1.5.3

Step 2: Debt capital structure and relative covenant protections

As a first pass to see if debt capital structure might explain relative protections, in Panel B
of Figure 2 I plot the results from a non-parametric regression of relative protections on debt
capital structure. Covenant protections respond to changes in debt capital structure and
changes in credit quality in very similar fashions. Firms which have all of their debt financed
by bonds look like higher credit quality firms and have about equal covenant protections for
bonds and loans. On the other hand, when firms have all of their debt financed by loans,
loans contain a little less than twice as many covenants as bonds (8 vs. 5, respectively).
To test this is more than mere correlation, I regress relative protections on the firm’s
53

Access to the private bank lending market is implicitly assumed and generally a necessary condition for
access to public bond markets.
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debt capital structure. I also include multiple proxies of credit quality including the firm’s
Distance-to-Default, the market capitalization of the firm and its S&P institutional credit
rating of the firm prior to issuance as additional controls to ensure that the treatment explains
variation independent of credit quality.
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The results of this regression are reported in Table 4. I find that the debt capital structure
of a firm is a significant predictor of both cross-sectional and within-firm variation in relative
protections and this is true even in the presence of controls for credit quality. Unlike Distanceto-Default (results in Table 7), the results are still significant when including various levels of
fixed effects. Comparing relative covenant usage to absolute covenant usage (in Table 5), one
notable difference is that contractual observables such as maturity, size and spreads/coupons
are extremely related to absolute covenant usage but not relative covenant usage. This
suggests that the strategy of matching bonds and loans by firm and time is at least somewhat
successful at controlling for unobservable confounding variables (normally assumed to be
related to credit quality) which might simultaneously drive both covenant inclusion and the
spread of the loan.
In terms of magnitudes, the effect is economically significant as well. A two standard
deviation shock in Bank Debt Percentage implies a .56 decrease in relative bond protections.
As both panels in Figure 2 show, relative protections range from about .5 on the low end of
the cross-section to about 1 on the high end of the cross-section. In light of this, a .56 change
in relative protections is extremely economically significant. Within firms, a one standard
deviation increase in bank debt percent implies a .37 standard deviation decrease in relative
protections.
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This result is suggestive of the following story. We know from the toy model above that
that the primary effect of changing the debt capital structure is on the expected payoffs
of each class of creditor in bankruptcy. It is reasonable to assume creditors are aware
of the impacts of these changes as well. A hypothetical creditor who sees their expected
recovery rate change as a result of changes in the debt capital structure of the borrower
might demand/allow other contractual concessions to make up for this loss/gain.
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this way, relative contracting reflects the debt capital structure of the firm. In the next
section, I examine how the other aspects of relative contracting trade off in equilibrium and
describe how this can be a potential explanation of the bank premium found in Schwert
(2020).
Can relative covenant protections also be explained by credit quality?
The following robustness tests check to see if variation a firm’s credit quality can also explain
within-firm variation in its relative protections,
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The results of this regression are reported in Table 8. I find that firms which are closer
to default have less relative protections for bonds and more relative protections for loans.
However, this relationship only holds in the most general cross-section. Adding any sort of
fixed effect controls makes the relationship insignificant. Not only does this relation, not
hold jointly within firms and years, it does not even hold within years. This implies that
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A simple way this might work in reality is to assume that each class of creditor has some desired level
(or minimum threshold) of expected payoffs in bankruptcy that they would prefer to maintain. Popularly
used Value-at-Risk type metrics do this implicitly.
55
The trade off between covenant protections and default thresholds (which obviously map to expected
recoveries) is the key assumption at the heart of Black and Cox (1976)
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firms which are close to default are the same types of firms which protect their loans more
but that this is a mere correlation.
As an additional robustness test to make sure that some other measure of credit quality might actually explain within-firm variation, I test to see if relative protections can be
explained by many of the typical ‘suspects’ used to proxy for credit quality. These include,
(log) Market Capitalization, S&P Institutional Credit Rating, Tangibility, Sales, Profitability, Cash Holdings, Asset Maturity, Firm Uniqueness, Market and Book Leverage, Cash
Flow Volatility and Capital Expenditures. Table 9 shows the results of these tests. I individually regress each of these on relative protections and I find that, of these measures, only
(log) Market Capitalization and S&P Institutional Credit Ratings are significantly related
to relative covenant in the cross section. However, like Distance-to-Default, these variables
are only significant in the absence of industry or firm-level fixed effects. Furthermore, none
of these variables are significant when considered all together. From this, I conclude that
borrower credit quality is only spuriously correlated with relative protections and that some
latent variable is driving the covariation of both of these variables.

1.5.4

Step 3: Relative protections and relative spreads

In the above section I document that when firms finance themselves mostly with bank loans,
then loans have a substantial ‘protection premium’ relative to bonds. In this section I will
show that this protection premium (for loans) is negatively related with the spread premium
(for loans) documented by Schwert (2020).
It is helpful to think about these results as equilibrium results. Relative protections do
not ‘cause’ relative spreads so much as they are simultaneously determined as part of the
negotiation process with equity holders. To this author’s best knowledge there is no explicit
negotiation that happens between creditors. Rather the mechanism is more likely that when
senior creditors find that their expected rate of recovery is reduced, they demand more
covenants in their contract. This reinforces the recovery rates of senior creditors but since
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recovery is a zero sum game between creditors (holding constant the total amount recovered),
this also incentivizes junior creditors to demand higher credit spreads from equityholders at
issuance.56 While there is an equilibrium trade-off between creditors, it is achieved by both
parties negotiating with equityholders.
To test this, I regress relative spreads on relative protections with year, industry and firm
fixed effects. At its strictest specification, the regression can be thought of as comparing two
pairs of debt contracts for the same firm at the same time. The test is to take these two
pairs of debt contracts and see if a change in the protection premium for the loan implies a
change in the spread premium for the bond. The regression specification I consider is the
following,
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The results of this regression are in Table 5. I find that firms which have larger protection
premiums (for loans) also have smaller spread premiums (for loans). Protection premiums
even explain within-firm variation in spread premiums and they do so in the presence of
multiple controls for credit quality.
From this, I conclude that 1) firms with larger protection premiums are the same types of
firms that have smaller spread premiums and 2) that within a bond-loan pair, higher spreads
for the bond imply more protections for the loan. One obvious implication of these results
is that bondholders are somehow disadvantaged by increases in loan protections. If this is
true, then it is not surprising to see bond spreads rise.
This result can potentially explain the puzzling credit spread patterns found in Schwert
(2020). The credit spread disparities he documents exactly correlate with countervailing
56

Or for already issued bonds, drives down the price of the bond which drives up yields.
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disparities in covenant protections. Due to data limitations, I cannot estimate how much
of the bank premium he documents is due to the superior covenant protections of bank
loans but I do note that these effects are economically large. This can perhaps best be seen
graphically in Figure 6. In panel A of Figure 6, I graph the average protection premiums (of
bonds) and the spread premiums (of bonds) along the axis of Distance-to-Default. Panel B
does the same along the axis of Debt Capital Structure. The strong negative relationship
is seen clearly in both panels. When the spread premium for bonds is high, the protection
premium for bonds is low, and vice-versa. For firms that have most of their debt financed
by bank loans, the spread premium for bonds is 2X while the protection premium for bonds
is 0.5X. For firms that have most of their debt financed by bonds, both premiums are close
to 1X, or equality.

1.5.5

Addressing potential confounding variables

It is important to note that the changes I observe in debt capital structure are not truly
exogenous shocks. Thus, I cannot conclusively rule out the possibility that the relations I
observe are not actually driven by some confounding variable. While I do not claim that the
results are immune from such a criticism, here I describe three ways in which the empirical
design at least somewhat addresses this concern.
First, I consider relative, rather than absolute, contracting. If changes in the potential
confounding variable are equally reflected in the observable characteristics of each contract
then the results will not suffer from this problem. Since this is unlikely to be hold completely,
my second remedy is to also include explicit controls for the credit quality of the firm. The
most important potential confounder is the credit quality of the firm which should proxy for
the extent of debt-equity agency concerns, so this eliminates such explanations. Finally, I
also include year and firm-level fixed effects in all of my regressions. This lets me be sure
that systematic biases in the way each firm relatively contracts is not driving my results.
Effectively, I am comparing relative contracting within the same firm and year.
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Thus any potential confounder variable would have to, 1) be asymmetrically reflected in
the bond and loan contract, 2) be unrelated to credit quality and 3) explain within-firm and
time period variation in relative protections and relative spreads. To further economically
motivate my results, in Section 4, I turn to theory to establish that changes in debt capital
structure are a plausible mechanism for inducing changes in relative contracting.

1.6

Robustness check: Cross-default and Cross-acceleration

An alternative story one might tell to explain the above results is the following. If junior
bonds are protected by cross-default provisions (which force the bond into default if any other
debt contract by the same firm defaults), then the relative weakening of their protections
as firms approach default is wholly unsurprising. If senior loans increase their protections,
then junior bonds do not need to do the same because cross-default provisions will let them
reap the benefits of the senior protections. On the face of it, this assumption seems plausible
enough and it has some history of being employed in the literature.57 The logic, if true, is
sound. If bonds and loans contractually enter default at the same time, then the question
of which contract actually contains the covenant that triggers default is irrelevant.
However nice theoretically it might be to assume, this assumption does not hold up to
empirical scrutiny. In practice, junior debt frequently eschews true cross-default protections
for the much weaker cross-acceleration protections. Only 12% of the bonds in my sample
contain cross-default clauses while 72% contain cross-acceleration clauses. To see the difference between the two, I first note that cross-acceleration provisions in bonds state that
the bond only defaults if the some other debt contract from the same firm accelerates 58 .
Acceleration is virtually always concurrent with bankruptcy and so the difference between
the two lies in the difference between entering default and declaring bankruptcy. Not all
57

Both Schwert (2020) and Duffie and Singleton (1999) make this assumption to preclude considering
different covenant protections between bonds and loans.
58
Acceleration is a legal term meaning that the lenders demands full and immediate repayment of the
loan
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firms which default actually declare bankruptcy. This is because banks have wide latitude
to renegotiate, forgive and waive defaults.59 Thus, from a legal standpoint, eschewing true
cross-default protections for cross-acceleration protections is equivalent to ceding authority
to decide when the firm enters bankruptcy to the senior lenders. Viewed in this way, crossacceleration provisions can be reasonably viewed as little better than the automatic stay
imposed for all creditors when a debtor files a petition for bankruptcy.
As evidence that this theoretical legal distinction is economically meaningful, I show that
firms with cross-default provisions contract very differently than firms with cross-acceleration
provisions. Tables 10 and 11 show this. As expected, bonds which include cross-default provisions use marginally less covenants in their contracts. Bonds with cross-default provisions
however, use significantly more covenants in their contracts. Intuitively, bonds with crossacceleration provisions seem to hedge their bets.
This difference holds even more strongly if one considers overlapping covenant protections. The idea behind this measure is that, if cross-default protections are really helping the
bond, then there is no benefit for the bond to ‘double up’ on covenants already included in
the loan. This measure is constructed by counting the number of covenants which are cover
the same risk and are in both contracts. An example might be a capital expenditures clause
found in both contracts. Similar to above, I find that bonds with cross-default provisions
have significantly less overlapping covenants. I find no evidence of this relation however for
cross acceleration provisions. In fact the result goes significantly in the opposite direction
again.
From this, I conclude that true cross-default protections for junior debt are relatively
rare60 and cross-acceleration provisions, don’t provide nearly the same level of protection.
This is true from a legal standpoint and also seems to hold in the data. By revealed pref59

Hassabelnaby (2006), Griffin, Nini and Smith (2019) and Chodorow-Reich and Falato (2019) all discuss
waivers of default where a firm can enter technical default but does not enter bankruptcy.
60
As another potential reason why bonds eschew cross-default provisions, Li, Lou and Vasvari (2012) note
that, “ borrowing firms can repurchase the bond via an open market tender or an exercise of a call provision
to make the default clauses ineffective.”
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erence, bonds which include cross-acceleration provisions don’t seem to have much faith in
them.

1.7

Conclusion

This paper makes a number of contributions to the literature. Perhaps most importantly, I
examine a clean comparison of covenant usage between comparable bonds and bank loans,
a first in the literature. The data I use to identify loan covenant protections is novel to
the literature, created using a new machine learning method which is new to this paper
and especially well-suited to the task of classifying contracts. The resulting data is of high
quality. It tests well out-of-sample against existing data sources and it is larger in both scope
of covenants covered and history than any previous attempt.
Using this data I show that, even between debt contracts which should theoretically have
the same level of debt-equity agency concerns, relative covenant usage is extremely variable.
This implies that perhaps not all covenant usage is driven by agency concerns between debt
and equity. I interpret this unexplained variability as a response to the relative recovery
risk each creditor bears as a result of tranching the debt capital structure. The larger the
size of the senior tranche, the lower the expected recovery rate (per dollar invested) of both
classes of creditor. Senior bank lenders, seeing this decrease in recovery rates, include more
covenants in new debt issuances to protect themselves. Junior bondholders, who are less
concerned with recovery rates, demand higher equilibrium credit spreads to compensate.
As evidence of this story, I test empirically how the way a firm finances itself with debt
affects the way it contracts with debt. I show that when the size of the senior tranche
increases, bank loans demand more protections (in equilibrium) and bonds demand higher
credit spreads (in equilibrium). The economic size of these effects is large. Firms which are
mostly bond financed have bond and loan contracts which look almost identical (along the
dimensions of credit spreads and covenant intensity). Meanwhile firms that are mostly bank
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financed have wildly divergent contracts. For such firms, covenant intensity for the loan is
twice that of the comparable bond and credit spreads are twice as high for the bond as they
are for the loan.
Since the propensity to subordinate debt is heavily correlated with credit quality, I examine a battery of proxies for the credit quality of the firm and show that none of them can
explain the variations I find in relative contracting. I also show that the these patterns of
covenant usage cannot empirically be explained by the inclusion of cross-default provisions
in bond contract. The fact that covenants and credit spreads trade-off between debt contracts also provides evidence that the changes in relative contracting I document are due
to a redistribution of value between creditors rather than between debt and equity. This
is much more consistent with a subordination explanation than a credit quality or agency
concerns explanation.
The results of this paper suggest that the canonical way of thinking of debt covenants –
as a mechanism to resolve agency conflicts between equityholders and one monolithic class
of debtholder – misses important interactions that also happen between different classes of
debtholders. As tranched debt capital structures are extremely common in finance and since
the relationships between debtholders are important for understanding even unconditional
covenant inclusion, these results suggest the importance of considering the debt capital
structure of the firm when considering why firms include covenants. It also suggests that
papers which only consider one type of debt contract in isolation (notably loan contracts)
may be missing part of the economic story.
Looking forward, this paper provides a number of interesting avenues for further research.
One very plausible interpretation of these results is that the economic efficiencies of tranching
(avoiding the lemons’ problem and the creation of money-like assets) are easiest to capture
when junior debt makes up a large portion of the debt capital structure. Thus the additional
covenant inclusion I observe potentially reflects the need to add more complexity into the
contract to make up for structural shortfalls in the senior-junior debt arrangement. It would
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be interesting to explore this with other measures of contractual complexity apart from
covenants. Additionally, while this paper only looks at newly issued debt, the same forces
which drive covenant inclusion in newly issued debt should also drive existing loans to include
new covenants in renegotiations. Finally, the new source of data I use in this paper captures
not just covenants but all types of clauses included in syndicated lending contracts. This
rich dataset can be used to examine other non-covenant features of the debt contract to see
if these are actually salient feature of the contract or only perfunctorily included out of legal
necessity. In future papers, I hope to explore all of these avenues of research.
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Figures:
Figure 1: Difference in Covenant Package Composition for Bonds and Loans (Loans-Bonds)
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Figure 2: Absolute Covenant Intensity
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Figure 3: Relative Bond Covenant Intensity
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Figure 4: Histogram of Relative Bond Covenant Intensity
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Figure 5: Non-Parametric Regression of Bond Swap Spreads (Public Proxy) on
Non-parametric regression of
Distance-to-Default
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Figure 6: Negative Relation between Relative Protections and Relative Spreads
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Figure 7: Debt Capital Structure and Credit Quality
Panel A: In-sample Bank Debt Usage by Quintile of Distance-to-Default
(In-sample: Public Firms Close to Issuing both a Bond and Loan)

Panel B: Out-of-Sample Bank Debt Usage by Quintile of Distance-to-Default
(Out-of-Sample: Any Firm with Access to Bond and Loan Markets)
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Figure 8: Loan Covenant Incidence by DataSource
This figure shows incidence of 16 classes of loan covenants as reported by 4 data sources. Incidence is measured as the percentage
of loan contracts in each respective database containing a given covenant. With the exception of the Historical database, not
all covenants appear in all databases. Historical denotes a historical database of the universe of loan covenants constructed as
described in Section 2. Factset Current Loans denotes a sample of loans taken from the data provider Factset. This includes
a sample of currently active loans issued to firms (excluding financials and utilities) from the years 2012-2020 (with most of
the observations being in the later years). Ivashina and Vallee (2019) mirrors data as reported in Figure 1 of their 2019 “Weak
Credit Covenants” paper. Their data is from a sample of highly leveraged loans obtained from the industry source Street
Diligence. My sample of loans is toward the safer end of the spectrum. This as well as difference in aggregation∗ explain some
of the large discrepancies seen by Ivashina and Valee (2019) in a minority of covenant classes. DealScan includes covenant
data as reported in DealScan and matched to the same set of loans as my Historical database. Classes of covenants are hand
matched between each set of data as described in Table 12.

∗ Because Ivashina and Vallee’s covenant classes are slightly more aggregated than what is reported in my Historical data,
FactSet Current Loans and Mergent FISD, a bit of care needs to be taken to compare these covenant classes. Where possible,
and supported by their own words, I split their categories between two of my own to better match the classes used by most
datasets.
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Figure 9: Comparing Historical Loan Covenant Dataset with DealScan
This figure shows yearly incidence of seven classes of financial loan covenants∗ which are common to both my Historical dataset
and LPC DealScan for the same set of loan contracts. Incidence is measured as the yearly percentage of loan contracts in
each respective database containing a given covenant. For each covenant in DealScan, its covariance with every covenant in
my historical database is measured, and the covenant in my database with the highest correlation is chosen as its match. This
shows how much of the covariance of the DealScan covenants can be explained with just the first best match in my database.
The boxed graphs show that this exercise can be improved by hand-matching and considering potentially multiple covenants
in my database which might match to the same DealScan covenant.

∗ Only

ten covenants appear with any regular frequency in DealScan (>.5%). Of those, there are seven DealScan covenants
(plotted) which are not obvious amalgams of multiple covenants. Excluded are the DealScan Leverage Ratio, Debt to EBITDA
and Senior Debt to EBITDA covenants. Berlin, Nini and Yu (2017) also document deficiencies in early DealScan data which
could account for large gaps in DealScan data seen early in the sample (Capex and EBITDA).
∗∗ These

are hand-matched composite variables which are the sum of all subsection clusters which mention any sort of net worth
to debt ratio/debt service coverage ratio. This suggests that some discrepancies with DealScan may not be due to missing data
but simply found in multiple subsections.
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Tables:
Table 1: Sample Construction
This table explains the details of my dataset construction and the amount of available observations at step. I begin with two
sets of data, a dataset of bonds from Mergent FISD and loans from my own historical dataset which is merged with LPC
DealScan. I use these two datasets to match up bond-loan pairs which meet two criteria, 1) from the same borrower and 2)
concurrently active. Before this point, an observation is a single bond or loan. After this point, an observation is a matched
bond-loan pair. To make sure that the bond and loan are truly comparable, for my results I only consider bonds and loans
which are issued within one year of each other. The statistics of this restricted sample are in the left column while the statistics
of the complete sample are in the right column.

Step 1: Preparing Bond and Loan Data

Bonds:

FISD

Loans:

Historical

Obs

Firms

Obs

Firms

Starting count
Dropping observations with no covenant data
Sample period: 1996-2016
Dropping financials and utilities

434810
33865
28047
18305

13301
8767
7820
5158

10204
10204
9586
7705

Step 2: Matching Bond and Loan Pairs

Sample:

≤ 1 Year

Sample:

All

Obs

Firms

Obs
Matching bonds and loans
(same firm and concurrently active)
Step 3: Cleaning Merged Bond-Loan Pairs

Firms

4535
4535
4353
3615

2392

721

10904

Sample:

≤ 1 Year

Sample:

All

Obs

Firms

Obs

Firms

1053

Dropping with 0 Loan Covenants (3% of sample)
Merge with CapitalIQ
Dropping secured bonds
Dropping convertible bonds
Dropping non-public issued bonds
Dropping micro-cap firms (≤ 300 MM)

2320
1696
1622
1390
1340
1283

709
523
501
402
393
359

10558
6913
6708
5748
5480
5227

1036
779
753
595
586
526

Final Data Set

1283

359

5227

526

Step 4: Adding Optional Extra Data

Sample:
Obs

Matches to a bond swap spread (public proxy)

970

59

≤ 1 Year
Firms
320

Sample:

All

Obs

Firms

3911

469

Table 2: Summary Statistics from Matched Bond-Loan Sample
Matched Bond-Loan Sample is a dataset of matched bonds and loans issued by the same firm, active at the same time and
issued within one year of each other. Dataset excludes financials and utilities and only includes firms which match to the
CRSP/Compustat merged dataset. Sample period covers the years 1996 - 2016. Firm characteristics data obtained from
CRSP/Compustat Merged database and matched within the one year previous to the minimum of the bond and loan offering
dates.

Matched Bond-Loan Sample Summary Statistics
Mean
Std 10% 50%
90%
Loan Credit Agreement:

Obs.

-Facility Amount (MM)
-All-in-Drawn Spread (bp)
-Loan Maturity (months)
-DealScan Covenants (count)
-Affirmative Covenants (count)
-Matched Loan Covenants (count)

1441
137
57
1.32
4.47
5.24

1821
101
12
1.07
2.56
3.09

200
40
36
0.00
1.00
2.00

1000
112
60
1.00
4.00
4.00

2790
275
60
3.00
8.00
10

1283
1283
1283
1283
1283
1283

557
485
522
139
3.67

454
193
216
109
1.55

200
230
230
60
2.00

425
496
530
120
3.00

1000
704
787
360
6.00

1283
884
1283
1283
1283

25429
8560
1.32
0.26
0.04
0.08
0.20
0.27
0.31
0.01
0.03
0.04
0.01
0.32
0.75
178

42478
19107
0.75
0.20
0.04
0.10
0.40
0.17
0.16
0.02
0.05
0.04
0.01
0.25
0.43
97

1211
485
0.69
0.09
0.02
0.01
0.00
0.09
0.14
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.00
0.05
0.00
62

8770
2632
1.08
0.21
0.04
0.05
0.00
0.23
0.30
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.01
0.26
1.00
158

62030
14847
2.27
0.48
0.06
0.18
1.00
0.51
0.51
0.02
0.07
0.09
0.02
0.73
1.00
289

1281
1214
977
1283
1254
1283
1283
1213
1214
1266
1282
1195
508
1255
1283
465

Bond Prospectus:
-Offering Amount (MM)
-Offering Yield (bp)
-Coupon (bp)
-Bond Maturity (months)
-Matched Bond Covenants (count)
Firm Characteristics:
-Market Cap. (MM)
-Total Debt (LT + ST, MM)
-M/B
-Sales
-Profitability
-Cash Holdings
-Uniqueness
-Market Leverage
-Book Leverage
-Cash Flow Volatility
-Capex
-Advertising
-R and D
-Tangible
-Dividends Flag (-1 year)
-Firm Age (months)

60

Table 3: Comparing Sample Means from Matched Bond-Loan Dataset with Component
Datasets
Comparison of sample means from 4 datasets. All datasets exclude financials and utilities and only include firms which match to
the CRSP/Compustat merged dataset. Sample period covers the years 1996 - 2016. FISD Bonds contains bond data obtained
from Mergent FISD. DealScan Data contains loan data obtained from LPC DealScan. DS+Historical Loans is the subset of
DealScan loans for which complete contract data is available is available from the Historical database. Bond-Loan Matched a
dataset of matched bonds and loans issued by the same firm and active at the same time. Firm characteristics data obtained
from CRSP/Compustat Merged database and matched within one year previous to the offering date (bonds), first deal active
date (loans) or the minimum of both (bond-loan merged).

Sample Means Comparison: Component Datasets
FISD
DealScan
DS + Hist.
Bonds
Loans
Loans
Loan Credit Agreement:

Bond-Loan
Matched

-Facility Amount (MM)
-All-in-Drawn Spread (bp)
-Loan Maturity (months)
-DealScan Covenants (count)
-Affirmative Covenants (count)
-Matched Loan Covenants (count)

1441
137
57
1.32
4.47
5.24

391
215
47
1.40

320
200
52
1.90
5.13
7.07

Bond Prospectus:
-Offering Amount (MM)
-Offering Yield (bp)
-Coupon (bp)
-Bond Maturity (months)
-Matched Bond Covenants (count)

592
512
538
135
3.11

557
485
522
139
3.67

Firm Characteristics:
-Market Cap. (MM)
-Total Debt (LT + ST, MM)
-M/B
-Sales
-Profitability
-Cash Holdings
-Uniqueness
-Market Leverage
-Book Leverage
-Cash Flow Volatility
-Capex
-Advertising
-R and D
-Tangible
-Dividends Flag (-1 year)
-Firm Age (months)
N

31299
7554
1.69
0.22
0.03
0.12
0.20
0.28
0.35
0.01
0.04
0.05
0.02
0.33
0.61
138
8841

5486
3416
2.12
0.26
0.03
0.08
0.18
0.31
0.35
0.02
0.03
0.06
0.01
0.31
0.44
98
45419
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3028
888
1.53
0.33
0.03
0.09
0.23
0.26
0.28
0.02
0.04
0.07
0.01
0.30
0.36
100
7705

25429
8560
1.32
0.26
0.04
0.08
0.20
0.27
0.31
0.01
0.03
0.04
0.01
0.32
0.75
178
1283

Table 4: Relative Covenant Intensity for Bonds and Debt Capital Structure
Regression of relative covenant intensity for bonds on debt capital structure. One observation of the outcome variable represents
the relative bond protections of a comparable bond-loan pair issued by the same firm at about the same time (less than one
year difference). Higher values of this variable can be interpreted as better protections for the bond as compared to the loan.
This variable is defined as the number of covenants in the bond (max 16) divided by the number of covenants in the matched
loan. The main explanatory variable is the firm’s debt capital structure as measured by the percentage of the firms total debt
which is financed by bank loans (prior to issuance) as reported by CapitalIQ. Sample period covers the years 1996 - 2016
and is constructed as described in Table 1. Also included are controls for the specifics of the loan and bond being considered,
additional controls for credit quality as well as controls for the matching procedure to account for any systematic bias this might
introduce. Loan type, year, industry and firm-level fixed effects are included as indicated. All standard errors are clustered at
the loan level.

Bank Debt Percent

(1)
-0.006∗∗∗
(0.001)

Distance-to-Default

0.019∗
(0.009)

Bond-Loan Covenant Ratio
(2)
(3)
(4)
-0.004∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.001)

(5)
-0.010∗∗
(0.004)

0.010
(0.011)

0.014
(0.011)

0.006
(0.013)

0.029
(0.022)

-Senior Bond

-0.056
(0.123)

-0.039
(0.123)

-0.078
(0.110)

-0.241
(0.214)

-log(Bond Offering Amount)

0.043
(0.066)

0.019
(0.072)

-0.068
(0.074)

-0.113
(0.060)

-Bond Maturity (months)

0.000
(0.000)

0.000
(0.000)

0.000
(0.000)

-0.000
(0.000)

-Bond Coupon (bp)

-0.000∗
(0.000)

-0.000
(0.000)

-0.000
(0.000)

-0.000
(0.000)

-log(Loan Package Amount)

0.060
(0.040)

0.080∗
(0.036)

0.147∗∗∗
(0.043)

0.102
(0.077)

-Loan Maturity (months)

-0.003
(0.004)

-0.002
(0.004)

-0.005
(0.004)

-0.013∗∗
(0.005)

-Loan All-in-Drawn Spread (bp)

0.001
(0.001)

0.001
(0.001)

0.001∗
(0.000)

-0.000
(0.001)

Bond Controls:

Loan Controls:

log(Market Cap.)

-0.203
(0.124)

S&P Instituional Credit Rating

-0.052
(0.050)

Match Controls

X

Loantype FE

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Year FE
2-Digit SIC FE
Firm FE
N
1114
R2
0.050
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001

X
1112
0.079

62

1112
0.146

1107
0.275

X
948
0.682

Table 5: Absolute Bond and Loan Covenant Intensity and Debt Capital Structure
Regression of absolute covenant intensity for both bonds and loans on Bank Debt Percent. One observation of the
outcome variable represents the unweighted sum of covenant protections in either a bond or loan (in my sample of
matched bonds and loans). A total of 16 potential covenants are hand matched between the bond and loan databases
to ensure that covenants cover the same set of risks. The main explanatory variable is the firm’s debt capital structure as measured by the percentage of the firms total debt which is financed by bank loans (prior to issuance) as reported by CapitalIQ. Sample period covers the years 1996 - 2016 and is constructed as described in Table 1. Also
included are controls for the specifics of the loan and bond being considered, additional controls for credit quality as
well as controls for the matching procedure to account for any systematic bias this might introduce. Loan type, year,
industry and firm-level fixed effects are included as indicated. All standard errors are clustered at the loan level.

Bond Covenants
(1)
(2)
(3)
0.004
0.005
0.003
(0.003)
(0.003)
(0.007)

Loan Covenants
(4)
(5)
(6)
0.030∗∗∗
0.026∗∗∗
0.035∗
(0.007)
(0.007)
(0.014)

-0.105∗∗
(0.039)

-0.159∗∗∗
(0.039)

-0.034
(0.057)

-0.293∗∗∗
(0.069)

-0.320∗∗∗
(0.067)

-0.050
(0.133)

-Senior Bond

-0.307
(0.189)

-0.218
(0.228)

0.408
(0.387)

-log(Bond Offering Amount)

-0.236
(0.130)

-0.333∗∗
(0.117)

-0.164
(0.124)

-Bond Maturity (months)

-0.004∗∗∗
(0.001)

-0.003∗∗∗
(0.001)

-0.001
(0.001)

-Bond Coupon (bp)

0.004∗∗∗
(0.001)

0.004∗∗∗
(0.001)

0.000
(0.000)

-0.602∗∗∗
(0.147)

-0.594∗∗
(0.196)

-0.086
(0.407)

-Loan Maturity (months)

0.035∗
(0.017)

0.034∗
(0.017)

0.076∗∗
(0.025)

-Loan All-in-Drawn Spread (bp)

0.002
(0.002)

0.001
(0.002)

0.000
(0.002)

Bank Debt Percent
Distance-to-Default
Bond Controls:

Loan Controls:
-log(Loan Package Amount)

Match Controls

X

X

X

X

X

X

Year FE

X

X

X

X

X

X

2-Digit SIC FE

X

X

Loantype FE
Firm FE
N
560
R2
0.420
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001

553
0.528

63

X
440
0.838

X

X

X

558
0.435

551
0.573

X
437
0.882

Table 6: Relative Bond Spreads and Relative Bond Protections
Regression of relative bond spreads on relative bond covenant intensity. One observation of the outcome variable represents the
relative credit spreads (above LIBOR) of a comparable bond-loan pair issued by the same firm at about the same time (less
than one year difference). Credit spreads for the loan are defined as the All-In-Drawn spread as reported by LPC DealScan.
Credit spreads for the bond are defined as BSS_P roxyT = Y ieldT oM aturityT − T reasury_SwapT − T ED_Spread3 or
the bond’s yield-to-maturity in basis points (of maturity T months) minus the rate of a maturity matched treasury swap
minus the 3 month TED Spread. This credit spread is a public approximation of the proprietary bond swap spread data
(from Bank of America Merrill-Lynch) used by Schwert (2020). Relative bond spreads are defined as the ratio of these
two credit spreads as measured on the date of the loan’s issuance. The main explanatory variable is relative covenant protections of the bond which is defined as the unweighted sum of covenants in the bond (max 16) divided by the number
of covenants in the matched loan. Sample period covers the years 1996 - 2016 and is constructed as described in Table
1. Also included are controls for the specifics of the loan and bond being considered, additional controls for credit quality as well as controls for the matching procedure to account for any systematic bias this might introduce. Loan type,
year, industry and firm-level fixed effects are included as indicated. All standard errors are clustered at the loan level.

Bond-Loan Covenant Ratio

Bond-Loan Spread Ratio
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
-0.234∗∗ -0.175∗∗ -0.165∗∗
-0.156∗
(0.075)
(0.059)
(0.051)
(0.071)

Bond Controls:
-Senior Bond

-0.578∗∗
(0.176)

-0.597∗∗
(0.191)

-0.685∗
(0.273)

-log(Bond Offering Amount)

-0.181∗
(0.087)

-0.281∗∗
(0.093)

-0.117
(0.103)

-Bond Maturity (months)

0.002∗∗∗
(0.000)

0.003∗∗∗
(0.000)

0.003∗∗∗
(0.001)

-log(Loan Package Amount)

-0.047
(0.050)

-0.029
(0.052)

0.014
(0.061)

-Loan Maturity (months)

-0.013∗
(0.006)

-0.009
(0.006)

-0.004
(0.005)

Loan Controls:

log(Market Cap.)

-0.050
(0.149)

S&P Instituional Credit Rating

-0.081
(0.055)

Match Controls

X

X

X

X

Year FE

X

X

X

Loantype FE

X

X

X

2-Digit SIC FE

X

Firm FE
N
970
966
R2
0.015
0.288
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001

64

961
0.380

X
806
0.623

Table 7: Correlation between Bond Covenant Intensity and Loan Covenant Intensity
(3 measures)
This regression shows the degree of correlation between bond covenant intensity and three measures of loan covenant intensity.
One observation of the outcome variable represents the unweighted sum of covenant protections in either a bond (in my sample
of matched bonds and loans). A total of 16 potential covenants are hand matched between the bond and loan databases to
ensure that covenants cover the same set of risks. Potential explanatory variables include, the analogous unweighted sum of 16
loan covenants, the unweighted sum of financial covenants as recorded by LPC DealScan and the unweighted sum of affirmative
covenants (which relate to monitoring) which are features of loans but are typically excluded by bonds. Sample period covers
the years 1996 - 2016 and is constructed as described in Table 1. Loan type, year, and industry-level fixed effects are included
as indicated. All standard errors are clustered at the loan level.

Loan Covenants Measure

Bond Covenants Measure
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
0.179∗∗∗
0.170∗∗∗
(0.022)
(0.026)
0.265∗∗∗
(0.065)

Dealscan Covenants (Count)
Affirmative Covenants (Count)

0.122
(0.066)
0.0688∗∗
(0.025)

-0.00915
(0.027)

-0.000762∗
(0.000)

-0.000645
(0.000)

-0.000642
(0.000)

-0.000727
(0.000)

-0.0444
(0.080)

-0.0250
(0.082)

-0.0388
(0.084)

-0.0441
(0.080)

Year FE

X

X

X

X

Loantype FE

X

X

X

X

X
1276
0.318

X
1276
0.307

X
1276
0.381

Match Diff. (Days)
Loan Before

2-Digit SIC FE
X
N
1276
R2
0.377
Standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001

65

66
X

Loantype FE

Firm FE
N
719
717
R2
0.043
0.227
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001

2-Digit SIC FE

X

Year FE

X

Match Controls
X

X

Bond-Loan Controls

711
0.375

X

X

X

X

X

X
571
0.850

X

X

X

X

719
0.035

X

717
0.144

X

X

X

X

711
0.295

X

X

X

X

X

0.003
(0.039)

X
571
0.782

X

X

X

X

-0.006
(0.005)

-0.097
(0.059)

0.007
(0.025)

Distance-to-Default

-0.001
(0.025)

-0.007
(0.006)

-0.021
(0.022)

-0.201∗
(0.082)

0.046
(0.204)

S&P Instituional Credit Rating

-0.012
(0.204)

Overlapping Cov. (scaled)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
0.063∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗∗
0.033
(0.018)
(0.018)
(0.017) (0.023)

-0.004
(0.021)

-0.164
(0.204)

(4)
0.322
(0.232)

-0.234
(0.206)

-0.531∗∗
(0.183)

Overlapping Cov.
(2)
(3)
0.863∗∗∗ 0.781∗∗∗
(0.199)
(0.187)

log(Market Cap.)

Bond Cross-default Clause

Bond Cross-acceleration Clause

(1)
0.831∗∗∗
(0.196)

This table shows how the inclusion of cross-default/acceleration clauses in the bond impacts the number of overlapping covenants used by the bond, the loan and the relative
covenant protections of the bonds. The outcome variable counts the number of overlapping or scaled overlapping protections in a bond-loan pair (issued by the same firm within
one year of one another). An example might be a capital expenditures clause found in both contracts. If this was the only class of covenant which simultaneously appeared in
both contracts then the overlapping covenants measure would be 1. The scaled overlapping measure just divides this number by the total unweighted sum of covenants used by
both contracts. Cross-default or cross-acceleration is a binary indicator variable which denotes the presence of such a clause in the bond. Sample period covers the years 1996 2016 and is constructed as described in Table 1. Loan type and year-level fixed effects are included as indicated. All standard errors are clustered at the loan level.

Table 8: Cross-Default/Acceleration Protections and Overlapping Covenant Intensity
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Consld Merger

Div Payment
Funded Debt Issuance
Indebt
Invest
Lien
Net Worth | Tangible Net Worth
N/A
Sale Leaseback Trans
Asset Sales

Senior Debt Issuance
Subord Debt Issue
Trans w/ Affiliates
Interest Coverage
Fixed Charge Coverage
Leverage

Consolidation Merger

Dividends Related Payments

Funded Debt
Indebtedness
Investments

Liens

Maintenance Net Worth
Restricted Payments

Sales Leaseback

Sale Assets

Senior Debt Issuance

Subordinated Debt Issuance
Transaction Affiliates
Net Earnings Test Issuance
Fixed Charge Coverage
Leverage Test

Historical

leverage ratio | total leverage ratio | maximum leverage

fixed charge coverage ratio | fixed charges ratio | fixed charge coverage

interest coverage ratio

transactions with affiliates | affiliates | unrestricted subsidiaries | restricted investment

subordinated debt | subordinated notes | subordinated indebtedness

senior indebtedness | designation as senior debt | senior notes | senior debt ratio | designated senior
indebtedness | senior debt to capital base

sale of assets | limitation on sales and leasebacks | sales, etc | merger, consolidation, acquisition and sale
of assets | notices of asset sales and/or acquisitions | consolidation, merger, purchase or sale of assets, etc |
sales, | mergers, consolidations, sales | mergers, consolidations, sales of assets and acquisitions | asset sales
| limitation on sale of assets | disposition of collateral | disposition of property | dispositions | disposition
of assets | dispositions permitted by | asset dispositions | sale and leaseback transactions | sale or lease of
assets | restrictions on intercompany transfers | merger, consolidation, transfer of assets

sale leasebacks | sale and leaseback | sales and leasebacks | limitation on sales and leasebacks | sale and
leaseback transactions | leases, | sale or lease of assets | lease obligations | sale and lease-back transactions
| sales and leasebacks | capitalized lease obligations | payment of subordinated obligations

restricted payments | restricted junior payments | restricted payments; certain payments of indebtedness |
restrictions on intercompany transfers | merger, consolidation, transfer of assets | payment of subordinated
obligations

net worth | tangible net worth | minimum net worth

liens | liens and encumbrances | limitation on liens | liens, etc | liens securing | liens pursuant to any loan
document; | restrictions on liens | prohibition on liens | liens securing indebtedness permitted under

investments | advances, investments and loans | investments and acquisitions | investments, loans, advances,
guarantees and acquisitions | loans and investments | limitation on investments, loans and advances |
restricted investment

indebtedness | debt | restrictions on indebtedness | indebtedness to total capitalization

funded debt | funded debt to ebitda ratio | funded debt to cash flow ratio

dividends | dividends and distributions | limitation on dividends | dividends, distributions | distributions;
investments | distributions; | distributions; capital change; restricted investments | clauses restricting
subsidiary distributions | distributions | restricted payments; certain payments of indebtedness | restricted
payments

mergers, etc | acquisitions | consolidation, merger, purchase or sale of assets, etc | dissolution; merger
or consolidation | merger, consolidation | consolidation, merger, etc | mergers, consolidations, sales |
mergers or acquisitions | consolidations and mergers | mergers | mergers, consolidations, sales of assets and
acquisitions | consolidation and merger | consolidation; merger | merger | merger, consolidation, acquisition
and sale of assets | merger, consolidation, transfer of assets | consolidation, merger, purchase or sale of
assets, etc | dissolution; merger or consolidation | investments, loans, advances, guarantees and acquisitions
| acquisitions | permitted acquisitions | make acquisitions | notices of asset sales and/or acquisitions |
investments and acquisitions | acquisition of property | restrictions on intercompany transfers

Loans

1. This table shows 16 common bond covenants from Mergent FISD and their hand-matched loan covenant counterparts from two data sources, FactSet Current Bank
Loans (as of Aug. 2020) and a novel Historical database of loan covenants created for this paper. The Historical database is significantly more granular than either
Factset or Mergent FISD, so it is possible for many Historical loan covenants to match to the same bond covenant. For example, both ’mergers, etc’ and ’aquisitions’
match to the ”Consolidation Merger’ covenant in Mergent FISD. Also, since one type of Historical covenant might refer to two different risks as idenitified by Mergent
FISD, it is possible that the same Historical covenant matches to multiple Mergent FISD covenants. As an example, the Historical covenant ”consolidation, merger,
purchase or sale of assets, etc”, matches to both the ”Consolidation Merger” and ’Sale Assets” covenants in Mergent FISD. Historical covenants listed in order of the

Notes:

FactSet Current Loans

Mergent FISD

Bonds

Bond and Loan Covenant Matching

This table shows 16 bond covenants from Mergent FISD and their hand-matched loan covenant counterparts from two data sources, FactSet Current Bank Loans (as of Aug.
2020) and a Historical database of loan covenants created for this paper. The Historical database is significantly more granular than either Factset or Mergent FISD, so it
is possible for many Historical loan covenants to match to the same bond covenant. For example, both ’mergers, etc’ and ’aquisitions’ match to the ”Consolidation Merger’
covenant in Mergent FISD. Also, since one type of Historical covenant might refer to two different risks as identified by Mergent FISD, it is possible that the same Historical
covenant matches to multiple Mergent FISD covenants. As an example, the Historical covenant ”consolidation, merger, purchase or sale of assets, etc”, matches to both the
”Consolidation Merger” and ’Sale Assets” covenants in Mergent FISD. Historical covenants listed in order of the frequency with which they appear in the corpus.

Table 9: Bond and Loan Covenant Matching by Hand Glossary

Appendix A: Title Recombination K-Means Methodology Description (TRKM)
To facilitate the explanation of the TRKM methodology, I divide the process into 5 steps
which I detail below.
1. I scrape the universe of available lending credit agreements from SEC EDGAR from
1996-2016. These are frequently included as materially relevant information as exhibits
at the end of 8K and 10K filings. With small exceptions, the scraping procedure is
virtually identical to the technique used by Roberts and Sufi in their papers. The output of this step is a corpus of about 30K text documents, each one a credit agreement
contract from a bank loan given to a public corporation.
2. I algorithmically parse the text of the contracts to separate each contract into its
component parts. To explain how this works, it is important to take a quick detour
and explain the hierarchical organization of a typical lending agreement. The typical
contract is organized into two hierarchical levels, I call these the ‘supersection’ and
the ‘subsection’. As the names suggest, each supersection typically contains a number
of subsections. For example, the ‘Negative Covenants’ supersection might contain the
‘Liens’, ‘Investments’ and ’Mergers and Acquisitions’ subsections. As a helpful analogy,
the structure is roughly analogous to that typically employed academic papers. Since
each contract might have its own way of designating subsections and supersections, I
write an adaptive script which intelligently parses each contract and divides it along
these two dimensions. First each contract is divided into a number of supersections
which are then further subdivided into a number of subsections. Though the exact
details of how this parsing script functions are beyond the scope and length of this
paper, the guiding principle for defining subsections is finding clauses that have the
following basic format.
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Section 6.2 Capital Expenditures Restriction [Body of text]
The three important pieces of a subsection are 1) a section numbering of any sort,
2) a title and 3) a body of text (longer than some cutoff threshold). This is by far
the most common paradigm of contract construction found in the data (though others
exist). The guiding principle of the parsing algorithm is that, if a subsection meets
these three criteria, it should be designated as a separate subsection. One final note
is that algorithm also tracks what part of the subsection is the number/title/body, a
detail that will be important in the fifth step.
3. The text subsections are vectorized. Vectorization follows the commonly used bag-ofwords methodology first popularized in finance by Hanley and Hoberg (2012). Effectively, each snippet of text is transformed into a numerical vector, where each element
of a vector represents intensity of use for a specific word. I also consider bi-grams
and tri-grams of words which both massively increase the dimensionality of the vectors. Since these numerical vectors can frequently be quite large, multiple tricks are
used to cut down the size of the vectors. The most common tricks include eliminating
so-called ‘stop-words’ as well as eliminating words which are either overly common or
rarely seen in the corpus. Finally, once all subsections have been parsed and vectorized,
a transformation is applied to the entire vector space which re-weights vector elements
proportional with their inverse frequency. Effectively, the more uncommon a word is
in the entire corpus, the more weight it gets.
4. Vectors are clustered together using an off-the-shelf implementation of the K-Means
algorithm. In machine learning nomenclature, the K-Means algorithm is classified as
an unsupervised learning technique. The advantage of this unsupervised technique is
that, as opposed to other commonly used machine learning techniques (for example
neural nets), the researcher does not need to pre-train the algorithm with ’supervised’
or labeled data showing what a good cluster looks like. Clusters are approximately
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chosen by finding a set of clusters for the subsections such that the (euclidean) distance between vectors inside a cluster is minimized. The main drawback of K-Means
clustering is that it is far from obvious what the choice of K, or the number of clusters
should be. Though some heuristic methods exist for solving this ’choosing K’ problem,
I exploit the extra data available to me to sidestep this problem entirely. My method
relies on deliberately over-clustering the data and then exploiting the extra data available to me to recombine the overly-small clusters ex-post. For this method, I choose
a ’K’ of 10,000, or 10,000 clusters. This value of K should hopefully be larger than
any reasonable prior of the true total number of types of clauses included in lending
contracts.
One final note for the details of the clustering is that I define distance between two
clauses in terms of euclidean distance instead of the popularly used cosine similarity.
Intuitively, what this means is that I am placing a premium on clauses not only having
the same proportional distribution of words, but also the same absolute numbers of
words as well. Such a premium might be undesirable in a setting (i.e. news) where
one wants to connect clauses with the same types of words or topics, regardless of
length (for example a news article setting). However in a contracting setting, where
language is relatively standardized, it makes more sense demand that the lengths be
the similar amongst clauses in the same cluster. Mathematically, difference can be
roughly thought of as the difference between taking the covariance (euclidean) and
correlation (cosine) of two vectors.61
5. I use the previously collected data on the title of the subsections to assess which clusters
are overly-small and need to be recombined with another cluster. I call this part titlerecombination. The process is relatively straightforward. For each cluster I find the
modal, or most common, title in the cluster. This is set as the title of that cluster. If
61

Another added advantage of using euclidean distance is that it speeds up the convergence of K-means
algorithm.
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another cluster has the same modal title, I combine the clusters together. In this way
I am exploiting the extra data available to to me to verify the accuracy of the clusters.
Finally, these recombined and named clusters are mapped back to each contract. If the
contract contains a subsection which is in a the cluster titled X, then the contract is
said to contain X. In this way I establish a universe of about 3K potential subsections
which may or may not be in a contract and assign binary 1-0 variables to each to say if
the subsection is in a given contract. As a final step, subsection clusters are assigned a
supersection by seeing which supersection the elements of the cluster most commonly
fall into.

Comparison with Topic-Modeling Techniques
One could reasonably argue that the above approach is much more suited to the task
of classifying contractual data than an approach based on topic modeling techniques.
Topic models work best in settings such as news (Kelly, et al (2019)) where there are
a small number of fundamental topics and each article has a distribution of words
which cover these topics. Legal clauses in contracts are almost the exact opposite
of this. There are a large number of potential topics and each clause typically only
deals with only one topic. When a clause does contain multiple topics, these typically
have their own subsections inside the clause and they can be easily picked up by an
intelligent scraping script (as I do in my paper). Generally speaking, in contracts,
the tendency of lawyers to taxonomize their thoughts obviates the need for a machine
learning technique to do so.
Ganglmair and Wardlaw (2017) use topic modeling techniques to create a covenant
database similar in spirit to the one I create in this paper, however their approach
and resultant data suffers from some key drawbacks compared to my technique and
data. First, my data is more precise. My technique generates unique labels for each
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cluster which directly correspond to the covenant names that one would search for
in public databases. This is valuable because allows me to verify the quality of my
data out of sample. This is something Ganglmair and Wardlaw do not because their
technique does not allow them to be confident that their clusters only represent one
covenant.62 Second, my dataset is larger in scope. While Ganglmair and Wardlaw
use 50 topics in their topic model which they hope each capture a unique class of
covenant, my technique finds hundreds of distinct clusters of covenants which are
uniquely identified and easily comparable with other covenant databases. Where it
overlaps, I compare my covenant data against publicly available sources and find that
my results compare well with the publicly available data.63 Third, my database is also
simply larger in the number of observations available and covers a longer time period.
For their sample of contracts, Ganglmair and Wardlaw mainly use the same sample
of about 3,000 contracts scraped by Nini et al (2009). I scrape my more than 30,000
contracts directly from EDGAR and consider about 10,000 contracts which all match
to LPC DealScan.
62

As an example of this, Ganglmair and Wardlaw implicitly define clusters in terms of the most common
words used in that cluster. Accordingly, they only use the top ten best clusters (according to psuedo-R2 )
for their results.
63
As mentioned, Ganglmair and Wardlaw do not provide data on the composition of their covenant
clusters and I cannot compare my data against theirs.
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Appendix B: From Security to Priority - A Legal Mechanism
Schwert (2020) notes that, “From a credit risk standpoint, the key difference between loans
and bonds is that banks are senior [or have priority] to bondholders in bankruptcy”. While
this characterization is indeed accurate, it is based on empirical evidence from realizations
of recovery in bankruptcy and sidesteps the fundamental question of why bank loans have
priority to bondholders in bankruptcy? This is especially confusing as the preponderance
of bonds and virtually all loans are both equally designated as ‘senior’ debt. Since the vast
majority of loans are senior secured debt and the vast majority of bonds are senior unsecured
debt, it stands to reason that the key difference between bonds and loans is that loans are
secured by collateral and bonds are typically unsecured.
To better understand the legal interplay between designations of seniority and security
and how security interests can generate a priority structure between debtholders, in this
section I consider four toy examples. I imagine a firm entering bankruptcy with two lenders
(bank lenders and bondholders) and I consider three different arrangements of seniority and
security interests, each progressively establishing a weaker form of priority in bankruptcy.
The assumptions that need to hold to create a priority structure from security interests are
very light and frequently satisfied in the data (indeed, it is always in the secured lender’s
interest to ensure they are satisfied).

Explicit seniority
First I consider the (relatively rare) arrangement that loans are explicitly senior over bonds
(and both types of debt are unsecured). Legally, this is referred to as a subordinated claim.
Explicit seniority stipulates that, in the event of bankruptcy, junior bondholders cannot
receive any payout until the senior bank lenders have been made whole. If senior creditors
cannot be made whole, then junior creditors receive nothing and senior creditors retain the
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full residual value of the firm.
To fix ideas, imagine a firm entering bankruptcy with 15 million dollars in total debt, 10
million dollars in explicitly senior bank loans and 5 million dollars in junior bond debt. If
the liquidation or reorganization value of the firm is, say, 7 million dollars then only senior
creditors will receive a payout of seven million dollars. Junior creditors will be wiped out.
If the liquidation or reorganization value of the firm is higher, say 12 million dollars, then
bank lenders will be made whole and bondholder will receive a payout (or equivalent value
in the reorganized firm) of 2 million dollars. In this case, the recovery rate of the banks is
100% and the recovery rate for bonds is 40%.

Over-secured security interest
Now consider the arrangement where loans and bonds are equally designated as senior debt64
but now the bank loan has taken an security interest in the firm’s collateral while the bond
is unsecured. This describes the preponderance of multi-tiered debt arrangements.65 In this
case we will assume the amounts of debt are the same as above but we will assume that
the security interest is on the firm’s inventory and the market value of this collateral at
the time of declaring bankruptcy is 12 million dollars. If the firm enters bankruptcy under
this arrangement, the outcome looks very similar to the case of explicit seniority. The bank
lender will be made whole and the bondholder will recover 40% of it’s debt claim. This is
the same exact outcome as above.
Importantly, two assumptions need to hold in order for security interest to generate
priority. The first is that the security interest must be over-secured, a legal term meaning
that the value of the collateral is more than the face value of the debt claim. Just as shortterm loans in the commercial repo market and other areas demand a haircut on collateral
in order to lend, commercial bank lenders also typically demand to be over-secured when
64

This designation is actually not even strictly necessary as security trumps seniority when determining
the priority of payoffs in bankruptcy. I.e. a properly secured junior claim will be payed out before a senior
unsecured claim.
65
This is documented by Schwert (2020)
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lending.66 This is further reinforced by the fact that security interests are ‘lumpy’ in the
sense that one cannot take a fractional security interest in some class of collateral; it is either
all or nothing. The second key assumption is that the security interest is ‘perfected’, a legal
term referring to legal process which ensures the collateral cannot be claimed by another
party.67 Since it is always within in the secured lender’s interest and power to do so, security
interests are nearly always perfected.68

Under-secured or unsecured security interest and dragnet clause
Third, it should be noted that loans can be cross-collateralized via what are commonly
called ‘Dragnet’ clauses. These allow a security interest in one debt claim to secure another,
distinct, debt claim. Dragnet clauses can be implemented either ex-ante or ex-post of the
issuance of the secondary loan. By this method even a loan which is ostensibly unsecured
(or under-secured) can be implicitly secured even if it does not mention as such in the credit
agreement or security agreement of the unsecured loan. An example of a Dragnet clause
in a credit agreement between Silicon Valley Bank and Shockwave Medical, Inc. (Dated,
February 26, 2018) follows:
Borrower acknowledges that it previously has entered, and/or may in the future
enter, into Bank Services Agreements with Bank. Regardless of the terms of
any Bank Services Agreement, Borrower agrees that any amounts Borrower owes
Bank thereunder shall be deemed to be Obligations hereunder and that it is the
intent of Borrower and Bank to have all such Obligations secured by the first
priority perfected security interest in the Collateral granted herein (subject only
66

To this author’s best knowledge, no comprehensive databases on the value of secured claims currently
exists. Databases which do exist typically only cover the value of one class of secured claims (i.e. industrial
equipment).
67
For most types of collateral this typically involves filing a UCC financing statement but other methods
of perfection include, physically owning or somehow controlling the collateral
68
As an added bonus, over-secured creditors can frequently collect on unpaid interest payments, a privilege
normally not afforded to other types of creditors, even senior ones. https://www.abi.org/abi-journal/shouldan-over-secured-creditor-be-entitled-to-post-petition-interest-at-the-default .
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to Permitted Liens).
The mathematical example for this case works in a similar manner as above assuming
that the collateral value of the first security interest is enough to over-secure both the secured
and unsecured debt claims.

Under-secured security interest and DIP financing
A final way that a secured lender might gain priority from a security interest, even if they
are under-secured, is via extension of debtor-in-possession (DIP) financing. DIP financing,
which is normally extended by the firm’s existing bank lenders69 , allows the firm to take on
additional debt in bankruptcy, even while protected by the automatic stay. DIP financing
is typically super-senior to all other claims as it has a claim on the post-petition assets of
the firm (the legal entity which exits bankruptcy, not the one that enters it). Additionally,
DIP financing is frequently secured by the the unencumbered assets of the firm and crosscollateralized with existing debt. What this means is that, in practice, an under-secured
lender can become an over-secured lender by virtue of extending DIP financing.
To see an example of this in action, consider the same example as above but now the
value of the inventory collateral is 7 million dollars. Since the bank extended a 10 million
dollar loan, it is under-secured by three million dollars. If we also imagine that the firm has
5 million dollars in accounts receivable that are unencumbered, then the bank can extend an
additional 2 million dollar loan of DIP financing taking the accounts receivable as collateral.
This makes the lender whole again. It is important to note that this sort of transaction is
not without its controversy as it obviously disadvantages the unsecured creditors. However,
such transactions are frequently approved by bankruptcy judges in the interest of keeping
the firm operating as a going concern.70
69

Eckbo, Li and Wang (2019) note that, “lead prepetition lenders .. supply nearly 75% of the DIP loans
in our sample.”
70
Eckbo, Li and Wang (2019) note that, “Junior claimants often contest DIP-loan terms in court ... to
little avail”
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These arrangements cannot cover the myriad number of ways in which creditors can gain
priority in bankruptcy via security interests.
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However these last three examples provide

a simple framework for thinking about the common ways in which bank loans can use their
security interests to gain something priority over unsecured creditors in bankruptcy. Since
secured loans are virtually always perfected and/or (in the case in which they are undersecured) because they can always extend DIP financing or include dragnet clauses, bank
lenders have many paths available to transform a secured claim into a priority claim.
71

An increasingly common tactic in recent years uses loans to subsidiaries to silo risk
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Appendix C: Bond Swap Spread Approximation
In this appendix I consider the size and directions of potential errors introduced by my
approximation of bond swap spreads using non-proprietary data. My proxy for bonds swap
spreads is defined as,

BSS_P roxyT = Y ieldT oM aturityT − T reasury_SwapT − T ED_Spread3
Since, in theory and assuming no arbitrage, the price for a Libor swap of maturity T
would equal,

Libor_SwapT = T reasury_SwapT − T ED_SpreadT
Then the usage of the 3 month Ted Spread instead of a T month Ted spread is the
primary source of error in this calculation. This would affect the results most there if is a
strong term structure to the TED spread.
As results from FRED show, before 2009 there is no discernible term structure (for tenors
ranging from 3 months to 12 months, the longest maturity for which LIBOR is available) to
the TED spread. After 2009 there develops a monotonic term structure in the TED spread
that persists before disappearing again in 2018. In the period from 2009 to 2018, the average
difference between a 12-Month TED spread and a 3-Month Ted Spread is about 25 bps. In
the period outside of this time range, it is close to 0. Since only 30% percent of my data
falls within this period in which there exists discernible term structure to the TED spread,
I conclude that there is a small but negligible bias that comes from using the 3-Month TED
spread in my calculations.
As an additional check, when I compare my approximated spreads with Schwert’s, I find
that my proxy exhibits the same general dynamics of Schwert’s variable (at least along the
cross-section of distance to default). The main noticeable bias is that my relative spreads
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variable is slightly attenuated compared to Schwert’s and exhibits less variance over the
cross-section of credit quality. To test this, I split my data (as Schwert does in his paper) on
the dimension of distance-to-default and see how my proxied variable compares to Schwert’s
actual data for different levels of distance-to-default. Schwert finds that when firms are
extremely close to default, bonds have spreads that are 2-2.5 times the spreads of loans.
As firms get further away from default, this difference shrinks before achieving parity about
where distance-to-default equals 10. As Figure 4 shows, when firms (in my data) are very
close to default, bonds have spreads that are a little more than 2 times those of loans.
As firms get further away from default, the difference exhibits the same shrinking pattern
before reaching parity about where distance-to-default equals 6. From this, I conclude that
my proxy exhibits the same general dynamics of Schwert’s variable (at least along the crosssection of distance to default). This means that my relative spread variable will tend to
understate the actual magnitude of the spread differential which would be a bias against
finding any results as compared with the true data.
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Appendix D: Additional Figures And Tables
Figure D1: Priority Payoff Structure (Imperfectly Secured)
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Total Claim

Chapter 2
A Theory of Subordinated Debt
Contracting
2.1

Introduction

This model seeks to capture the incentives that senior and subordinated debtholders have
to include covenants into their contracts. These incentives will importantly depend on the
amount of the debt capital structure each party finances. The structural model I will examine
in this chapter is an extension of the workhorse Merton model of expected recovery in default
with two salient features, 1) junior and senior debt and 2) a variable default threshold. The
first feature is borrowed from Schwert (2020) while the inclusion of the second feature is a
contribution of this paper.
The reason I use a model of valuation to explain covenant usage in debt contracts instead
of a more traditional agency model is because I am comparing two debt contracts written
on what is essentially the same exact risky asset. When the underlying credit risk of the
borrower is exactly the same for both contracts, then the agency concerns which are normally
pointed to to explain covenant usage should theoretically be the same for both contracts as
well. Under this scenario, the only factor which should impact relative covenant usage is
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the relative payoffs of each class of debtholder. Hence the use of a valuation model. As
Schwert (2020) notes, “the key difference between loans and bonds is that banks are senior
to bondholders in bankruptcy”. This model seeks to understand how this tranching of the
debt capital structure between bonds and loans affects the incentives of each party to include
covenants in their contract.
As readers familiar with the Merton model of default might note, neither the Merton
model nor the extension of Schwert’s paper provide any explicit accommodation for covenant
protections. I include covenants in my model by assuming that demand for covenant protections (or potentially other contractual concessions) is proxied for by the default threshold
of the debt contract. This same assumption was also used by Black and Cox (1976) in their
seminal paper on covenants and contracting. Effectively, a firm’s default threshold will be
used as a proxy for the number of concessions a creditor should demand in their contract.
In this model, for simplicity, I will assume that these concessions take the form of more
covenant protections, i.e., higher default thresholds imply higher levels of covenant usage.1
This assumption from Black and Cox (1976) is a good one because, in reality, debt
covenants are the main contracting lever that contract writers can use to determine where
and when a borrower defaults on its debt. Though virtually all debt contracts include
nonpayment of scheduled interest as an event of default, insolvency per-se is often insufficient
to protect debtholder’s interests because there are a myriad of actions that an unrestricted
borrower can take to remain solvent at the expense of the debtors.

2

3

For a firm with

deteriorating credit quality, all else equal, more covenants imply that default will happen
sooner and less covenants imply that default will happen later. Financial covenants explicitly
1

The results from the first Chapter point out the empirical fact that bonds tend to demand concessions
in the form of increased credit spreads while loan concessions take the form of more covenant protections.
This means that, in reality, some of the increased covenant demand I note for bonds might actually be
absorbed by higher credit spreads for bond.
2
This intuition is found in the construction of the Murfin (2012) measure.
3
Griffin, Nini, and Smith (2019) Find that the recent development of cov-lite led to a 70% drop in the
proportion of firms reporting a covenant violation. Freudenberg, Imbierowicz, Saunders and Steffen (2013),
show that firms who violate covenants are significantly more likely to default and each marginal covenant
increases the total likelihood of violation.
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accomplish this objective by ensuring that if a firm falls below some proscribed level or ratio
that the firm will enter default. Capital restrictions covenants accomplish this indirectly by
limiting the scope of actions an increasingly desperate firm might be more likely to take as
it gets closer to insolvency.

4

The key contribution of the model is to give a framework for thinking about how the
inclusion of covenants impacts the expected payoffs of junior and senior debt. Since the only
material difference between junior and senior debt issued on the same firm is their priority of
payoffs in bankruptcy, then it is reasonable to think that for two classes of debt issued within
the same firm and time, covenant intensity should be a function of expected recoveries for
each class of debt. Simply put, for each class of creditor, there is a trade-off in the model
between covenant intensity and expected payoffs in bankruptcy. Figure 1 shows how this
trade-off is different for each class of creditor.5 The derivation of the lines plotted in Figure
1 is detailed in the following sections.

2.2

Expected recovery rates

Calculation of expected recovery rates for junior and senior debt closely follows that of
Schwert (2020) with the addition of safety covenants in the spirit of Black and Cox (1976).
In this model, adding or removing debt covenants is equivalent to contractually adjusting the
percent of face value at which default occurs. The intuition is, if a firm has many covenants
in its debt contract, default can occur well before the value of the falls below the face value
of debt.
The value recovered in default depends on the seniority of the debt claim. Let KJ equal
the face value of a junior debt claim and KS equal the face value of a senior debt claim.
Then Ktotal = KJ + KS is the total face value of all debt.6
4

Many of the actions prohibited by capital restrictions (such as asset sales or taking on additional
indebtedness) allow firms to theoretically stave off bankruptcy by selling unencumbered assets until there is
no value left inside the firm for unsecured debt-holders to collect on.
5
Under assumptions of an average firm.
6
Ktotal will be normalized to 1 whenever not explicitly stated otherwise.
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To begin, I will start by examining the classic Merton (1974) model of default. Under
this model, the value of the firm is distributed log-normally:




1 2
2
ln(VT ) = N ln(V0 ) + r − δ − σ T , σ T
2
Where, V0 is the starting value, r is the growth rate, δ is the coupon payout and σ is
yearly volatility, and T is the maturity of the debt in years. A key assumption of the Merton
model is that a firm will default if the value of the firm is less than the face value of its debt.
I generalize this assumption in the spirit of Black and Cox (1976) by assuming that default
occurs at some percentage ρ of the firm’s face value of debt. Following this assumption and
using the distribution of firm values, we know that the risk-neutral probability of a firm
defaulting by time t is,




ln(ρKtotal ) − ln(V0 ) − r − δ −
√
P (Vt ≤ ρKtotal ) = Φ 
σ t

σ2
2



t)




Here, the variable ρ ∈ (0, ∞), determines percentage of Ktotal at which default occurs.
I will assume that KS is value of senior debt claim, KJ is value of junior debt claim, and
KS + KJ = Ktotal .
Using probabilities of the above form, one can define the expected recovery rates for
junior and senior creditors given default as,

E[RJt |D] =

P (I0J ) · 0 + P (IJ ) · E [πJt |IJ ] + P (WJ ) · KJ
P (D) · KJ

and,

E[RSt |D] =

P (IS ) · E[πSt |IS ] + P (WS ) · KS
P (D) · KS

Where the the events I and W denote the events in which a class of creditor is made
whole or impaired and D denotes the event of default. For impaired senior creditors, there
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will always be some non-zero payoff, no matter how small. For junior creditors, impairment
includes the real possibility of being completely wiped out and recovering nothing. This
is captured by the event I0. Derivations of the probabilities of these events are defined in
the following section. Recovery values are constant (with respect to the default threshold)
outside of the region in which a creditor is impaired. Outside this region they either recover
their full investment (KJ or KS ), or they receive nothing.
Each expected recovery rate function can be thought of as a weighted sum of two recoveries, the recovery when impaired and the recovery when made whole. The weights are
the probabilities of these two states. Figure 1 plots expected recoveries against covenant
intensity (which is proxied for in the model by default threshold) both junior and senior
debt. The figure shows that, as one would expect, senior creditors recover more than junior
creditors everywhere. The model also shows that contracts with more covenants have higher
recoveries.

2.3

7

Derivation of probabilities and expected recovery
rates

This section describes the derivation of the probabilities used in the expected recovery rates
for junior and senior creditors as well as the expected recoveries when impaired. These
derivations follow heavily from those of Schwert (2020) with the important change that each
probability and expected recovery is generalized to be function of the default threshold ρ.
7

S
As can be seen in Figure 1, these expected recovery functions each have a concave ’kink’ at ρ = KK
total
(for the senior creditor) and ρ = 1 (for the junior creditor). These values of ρ each respectively denote the
first value for which the expected probability of being made whole in default is greater than 0. The intuitive
reason for this kink is that creditors cannot recover more than the face value of their debt claim. Though
firms get some benefit in expected recovery from setting the default threshold higher, the marginal benefit
is much lower above the face value of each creditor’s debt claim.
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Probabilities of impairment and being made whole in bankruptcy
Given a realization of default (VT ≤ ρKtotal or D), there are only two possible states of the
world (with respective probabilities) for the firm; the state in which the creditor is made
whole (W) and the state in which the creditor is impaired and loses money (I). These will
be different for each class of creditor. For senior debt, they will be impaired if the terminal
value of the firm at maturity is less than the face value of senior debt (0 ≤ VT ≤ KS or IS )
and they will be made whole in the complementary state where the terminal value of the
firm at maturity is greater than the face value of senior debt (KS ≤ VT ≤ ρKtotal or WS ).
For junior debt, they will be impaired if the terminal value of the firm at maturity is less
than the face value of total debt (0 ≤ VT ≤ Ktotal or IJ ) and they will be made whole in the
complementary state where the terminal value of the firm at maturity is greater than the
face value of total debt (Ktotal ≤ VT ≤ ρKtotal or WJ ).
Probability that senior debt is impaired is,

P (0 ≤ Vt ≤ min [ρKtotal , KS ]) = P (0 < Vt ≤ ρKtotal ) − P (KS ≤ Vt ≤ max [ρKtotal , KS ])
or,
P (IS ) = P (D) − P (WS )
And the probability that junior debt is impaired and has a non-zero payoff is,

P (min[KS , ρKtotal ] ≤ Vt ≤ min[ρKtotal , Ktotal ]) = P (0 < Vt ≤ ρKtotal )
−P (Ktotal < Vt ≤ max [ρKtotal , Ktotal ]) − P (0 < Vt ≤ min [KS , ρKtotal ])
or,
P (IJ ) = P (D) − P (WJ ) − P (I0J )
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Though the max functions slightly complicate the above notation, it is necessitated by
the variable default threshold to ensure that these probabilities are never negative. Note
that the First probability is equal to 0 if ρ ≤

KS
.
Ktotal

And the second probability is equal to

0 if ρ ≤ 1.

Expected Recovery Rate for Senior Debt
The expected raw payoff to senior debt conditional on the firm defaulting and senior debt
being impaired is,

eln(V0 )+(r−δ)t Φ
E[πSt |IS

≡ (Vt ≤ min [ρKtotal , KS ])] =




 
2
ln(min[ρKtotal ,KS ])−ln(V0 )− r−δ+ σ2 t
√
σ t

P (0 ≤ Vt ≤ min [ρKtotal , KS ])

And the expected recovery rate of senior debt conditional on the firm defaulting is,

E[RSt |D]

P (IS ) · E[πSt |IS ] + P (WS ) · KS
=
P (D) · KS

Expected Recovery Rate for Junior Debt
The expected raw payoff to junior debt conditional on senior debt being made whole and
junior debt being impaired is,



E πJt |IJ ≡ (min[KS , ρKtotal ] ≤ Vt ≤ min[ρKtotal , Ktotal ]) =
"
eln(V0 )+(r−δ)t Φ


 !
2
ln(min[ρKtotal ,Ktotal ])−ln(V0 )− r−δ+ σ2 t
√
σ t

−Φ


 !#
2
ln(min[KS ,ρKtotal ])−ln(V0 )− r−δ+ σ2 t
√
σ t

P (min[KS , ρKtotal ] ≤ Vt ≤ min[ρKtotal , Ktotal ])
And the expected recovery rate for junior debt, conditional on the firm defaulting is,
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−KS

E[RJt |D]

2.4



P (I0J ) · 0 + P (IJ ) · E πJt |IJ + P (WJ ) · KJ
=
P (D) · KJ

Linking recovery rates and covenant usage

Fixing the rest of the variables in the model, the expected recovery functions can be thought of as
a mapping between expected recoveries and selected features of the debt contracts. I will consider
three features of the debt contract which might affect expected recoveries, covenant intensity ρ,
starting leverage V0 (which is the model proxy for distance-to-default) and senior debt percent KS
(which is the model proxy for bank debt percent).
Treating as constant all variables in the model except ρ and V0 , we can write:

E[R] = f1 (ρ | V0 )
Similarly, treating as constant all variables in the model except ρ and KS , we can write:

E[R] = f2 (ρ | KS )
Then I will consider what happens if we fix the expected recovery to some value E[R]. This
implies that, given V0 or KS , there is some value of ρ which solves the equation. Because of
the nature of the normal CDF, it is impossible to derive an analytical solution of the following
¯ V0 ). It is possible however to solve numerically for the value ρ∗
hypothetical form ρ = F1 (E[R],
which solves the equation given V0 and KS . 8 ,

E[R] = f1 (ρ∗ | V0 )
and,

E[R] = f2 (ρ∗ | KS )
8

Since f1 and f2 are strictly increasing functions of ρ for all values of V0 and KS , there is a unique value
of ρ which always satisfies this equation.
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The final missing piece for this exercise is to decide what value to use for E[R]. The values
I use for each class of creditor are the historical expected recovery rates for each respective class.
These come courtesy of Schwert (2020) and are E[RS ] = .84 for senior creditors and E[RJ ] = .38
for junior creditors. As I will discuss later, the results are relatively sensitive to the values of E[R] I
choose so this is one of the more important assumptions I will make. Because of this, it is important
to use historical values which directly correspond to the variable in question.
Figure 4 shows a graphical depiction of this solution exercise. In Figure 4, expected recoveries
are plotted against default thresholds (which correspond to covenant intensity). Then, given an
historical expected recovery rate, there is a default threshold ρ∗ which is consistent with this. Panel
A plots the ρ∗ for junior and senior creditors for a firm which is very levered, V0 , at a rate of 1-1.9
Panel B shows the same for a firm which is less levered at a rate of 1-10. Figure 5 repeats the
exercise but with debt capital structure, KS . Panel A depicts the solution ρ∗ for a firm with a
15-85 mix of senior and junior debt. Panel B shows the opposite.

2.5

Model predictions and conclusion

From these graphs, two important predictions emerge. First is that both leverage and debt capital
structure induce large changes in absolute covenant usage but only debt capital structure seems to
induce changes in relative covenant usage. These conclusions are confirmed in Panel B of Figures 2
and 3 which perform a more rigorous comparative statics exercise. The strongly downward sloping
line in the Panel B of Figure 3 contrasts with the essentially flat line in Panel B of Figure 2.
For an average firm in this model, only changes in debt capital structure drive changes in relative
protections. Changes in leverage create only negligible changes in relative protections.
Second, these results are sensitive to the chosen recovery rates of each class of creditor. The
reason in this model why senior creditors are much more sensitive (compared to junior creditors)
is because they expect to recover more in default. Note the kink in each graph. Senior creditors
expectation of recovering 84 cents on the dollar in bankruptcy means that most of their contracting
happens in the region above this kink. This is the same region where the marginal impact of
9

Average firm leverage is about 30% or approximately 1-3
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an additional covenant is much lower. Conversely, in the model, the majority of contracting for
junior creditors happens in the region where the marginal benefit of an additional covenant is high.
Because of this, they do not need to use as many covenants to achieve their expected historical
rate of recovery. In total, this structural model, combined with assumption of higher historical
recovery rates for senior creditors, is enough to generate the same patterns of relative covenant
usage I observe in the data.
In conclusion, I use an adjusted structural model of subordinated default in the spirit of Merton (1974) to show that the debt capital structure of the firm is an important driver of relative
protections between creditors. An important assumption in this model is the assumption of higher
recovery rates for the senior trance. This assumption is consistent with bank lenders’ documented
preference for recovery of principal over interest payments and this is what generates the increased
covenant sensitivity of senior creditors that I also document in the data. Importantly, in the model
as well as the data, covenant packages are only sensitive to changes in debt capital structure,
not distance-to-default. The specific mix of debt a firm uses to finance itself turns out to be an
extremely relevant factor in the way it chooses to contract as well.
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Figures:
Figure 1: Expected Recovery Rates as a Function of Covenant Intensity
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Figure 2: Comparative Statics - How does changing leverage change relative protections?
(Assuming Historical Recovery Rates)
Panel A: Comparative Statics of Absolute Protections

Panel B: Comparative Statics of Relative Protections
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Figure 3: Comparative Statics - How does changing debt capital structure change relative
protections? (Assuming Historical Recovery Rates)
Panel A: Comparative Statics of Absolute Protections

Panel B: Comparative Statics of Relative Protections
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Figure 4: Recovery Rates Under Two Leverage Scenarios
Panel A: Scenario 1 - Levered 1-10

Panel B: Scenario 2 - Levered 1-1
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Figure 5: Recovery Rates Under Two Debt Capital Structure Scenarios
Panel A: Scenario 1 - 15% Bank Debt

Panel B: Scenario 2 - 85% Bank Debt
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Appendix A: Model Calibration
Where parameters of interests systematically differ between bonds and loans, I split the
difference between them. I calibrate the model as follows:
• T = 7.5, Average bond maturity ≈ 10 years and average loan maturity ≈ 5 years.
• r = .05, Average market risk premium 2011-2020 ≈ 5.6%.
• δ = .02, Average All-in-Drawn loan spread = 164 bps. Average bond swap spread =
214 bps.
• σ = .35, Average yearly asset volatility in data = .32.
• Variables of interest
– Leverage: V0 = 2. If KJ + KS = 1, equal to inverse leverage ratio, historically V0 ≈ 3.
– Senior Debt Percent: KS = .5. For firms entering bankruptcy KS = .48. Average in
matched sample KS = .21.

• ρ, Left as free variable to generate predictions about covenant usage.
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Chapter 3
Affirmative Covenants and
Information-first Monitoring
3.1

Introduction

Syndicated lending contracts typically contain two broad classes of covenants, negative
covenants which restrict the actions the firm can take in some states of the world and
affirmative covenants which stipulate actions the firm must take in all states of the world.
The importance of negative covenants is relatively well understood. These are commonly
presumed to act as ‘tripwires’ which alert lenders to potential problems with their borrowers.
On the other hand, the role that affirmative covenants play in contracts is generally much
less understood and written about. In this paper I address this gap in the literature using
data on the way that affirmative covenants are included in contracts as well as data on the
way in which they are subsequently renegotiated.
The reason this gap in the literature persists can perhaps mostly concisely be attributed
to a simple lack of data. LPC DealScan, a commonly used source of data for syndicated
lending covenants in the academic literature, does not track affirmative covenants at all.
Even papers which hand-collect data on covenants tend to ignore affirmative covenants.
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Freudenberg, et al. (2011) who attempt to hand collect data on the universe of covenants,
note that, “We do not include affirmative covenants such as punctual payment of interest and
principal, delivery of financial statements, property and equipment maintenance, compliance
to accounting standards, or paying insurance and taxes...” It is not an overstatement to say
that papers about lending covenants which even acknowledge the existence of affirmative
covenants are in the minority. When affirmative covenants are mentioned, papers typically do
so in passing and tend to either de-emphasize their importance or emphasize the similarities
with negative covenants.1
This ignorance of one entire class of covenants from the entire literature on debt covenants
is somewhat surprising. Affirmative and negative covenants each respectively make up about
make up about 10% of the text in an average lending contract.2 . Furthermore, there is
great variability in the intensity of affirmative covenant usage in the average contract3 and
this variability is strongly related to the credit quality of the firm issuing the debt.4 This
implies that affirmative covenants are not a perfunctory inclusion into contracts but rather
a deliberate feature whose importance increases as the firm gets closer to default.
If affirmative covenants are not a rote or haphazard inclusion into contracts, then it begs
the question, what role do affirmative covenants play in the average contract? Do they
perform the same role as negative covenants or do they play a different role? I use two novel
sources of data to answer this question. The first source of data is a comprehensive database
of the contents of syndicated lending agreements. This database attempts to categorize all
clauses that one might potentially find in a lending contract and is created by applying
simple machine learning techniques to original lending contracts scraped from SEC filings.
I test this data extensively out-of-sample where it overlaps with existing databases and
show that my data matches the moments and co-movements of the existing data quite
1

Griffin, Nini and Smith (2019) note that,“Affirmative and negative covenants minimize incentive conflicts by contracting directly on certain events, such as the purchase of insurance or the distribution of
dividends.”
2
See Figure 8
3
See Table 1.
4
See Table 6.
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well. For ease of interpretation, I aggregate this data into ten broad ‘supersections’ that
correspond to the most important sections that one might expect to find in a contract. One
of these 10 ‘supersections’ corresponds to negative covenant usage and another corresponds to
affirmative covenant usage. The second database is a database of contractual renegotiations
which also breaks down the content of the renegotiation into one of these ten ‘supersection’
categories.
This paper has two main findings, the first is that the main role affirmative covenants play
in syndicated lending contracts is that of a monitoring technology which helps banks stay
current on the state of their borrowers. Virtually all affirmative covenants can be roughly
divided into one of two categories. Affirmative covenants ensure that the information banks
have about the borrower is either 1) available in a timely manner to the lender or 2) accurate
to the current state of the firm. Taking the popular covenants as a ‘tripwire’ analogy to heart.
Setting the tightness of the negative covenant package can be analogized to determining the
position of the tripwire while setting the tightness of the affirmative covenant package can
be analogized to setting the sensitivity of that same tripwire. If the affirmative covenant
package is set too loose, firms may be able to significantly cross tripwires without actually
triggering a default.
The second main finding of this paper is that bank monitoring of loans happens on an
‘information-first’ basis. Firms can generally always comply with the terms of affirmative
covenants and tightening an affirmative covenant is basically the equivalent of asking for
more or better information from the firm. Because of this, I hypothesize that since tightening
affirmative covenants does not actually put any additional restrictions on the firm, affirmative
covenants have a much lower marginal cost of adjustment than negative covenants (which,
given the large literature on how exactly negative covenants trade-off with credit spreads,
are typically presumed to have a significant cost of adjustment). I test this theory by
examining the way that affirmative and negative covenants are adjusted in renegotiations expost of origination. I find evidence of a pecking order in what gets renegotiated or amended
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first. Relative to negative covenants, affirmative covenants are amended first-in-time, first-indefault and more after minor defaults that do not lead to immediate acceleration/bankruptcy.
These results suggest that affirmative covenants have a lower marginal cost of adjustment
and that the first action banks take when they are worried about a borrower is to ask for
more information before putting more restrictions on the firm.
In terms of contribution, this paper contributes to the existing literature by filling both
a gap in the data and a gap in our understanding of how negative covenant tripwires are
actually monitored and enforced. Of value for future papers, I show that affirmative covenant
intensity can be used as an effective proxy for the demand for monitoring in a loan contract.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 details the construction of the two novel
datasets, one for originations and one for renegotiations. Section 3 uses the data collected
in Section 2 to describe the monitoring role that affirmative covenants play in lending contracts. Section 4 lays out the information-first theory of contractual adjustment and tests
its testable hypotheses using the data from renegotiations. Section 5 concludes.

3.2

Data and summary statistics

In this section I describe the process and technique of assembling of two datasets on the
contents of loan originations and renegotiations. The primary source for both datasets are
syndicated lending contracts and amendments which come attached as exhibits following
SEC disclosures. Both datasets are created in a two step process of 1) scraping the text of
SEC disclosures for the relevant contract and 2) parsing the text of the contract using a combination of algorithmic text parsing and machine learning to categorize the elements of the
text into a manageable dataset. This data is augmented with data from LPC DealScan and
Compustat to provide observables of both the loan and the firm around the events of origination and renegotiation. I first describe the way that I scrape and parse lending contracts
at origination followed by a description of the way that I scrape and parse renegotiations.
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3.2.1

Original credit agreement data

Scraping original credit agreements
The way that I scrape data on original credit agreements is a modified and improved version
of the technique Roberts and Sufi (2008) employed to create their widely-distributed sample.
Like Roberts and Sufi (2008), I scrape the appropriate exhibits of 8-K and 10-K filings
for documents with titles that identify syndicated credit agreements. For 10-K filings, I
search using the pre-cleaned filings available on Bill Macdonald’s website.5 For 8-K filings I
download them directly from SEC EDGAR and clean all XML formatting before searching
them. However, compared to Roberts and Sufi (2008), I make four important tweaks to their
formula that improve the quality and yield of my collected data:
1. The first change I make is that I consider a slightly wider array of possible search terms.
Roberts and Sufi (2008) search for the term ”CREDIT AGREEMENT” in all caps to
indicate a loan contract original. I read through a large sample of credit agreements
and expand the search to also include terms such as ”LOAN AGREEMENT” and
”FINANCING AGREEMENT” to capture a larger sample of contracts.6 Similar to
Roberts and Sufi (2008), I also ensure that the terms are fully capitalized to avoid false
positives.
2. Second, noting work from Nikolaev (2017), I search for contracts in a larger number
of exhibits. Instead of searching for credit agreements in exhibits 4 and 10, I search in
exhibits 1, 2, 4, 9, 10 and 99.
3. Third, Roberts and Sufi (2008) also require that the term ”TABLE OF CONTENTS”
be within 60 lines of the fully capitalized search term, say ”CREDIT AGREEMENT”.
5

Website url: https://sraf.nd.edu/data/stage-one-10-x-parse-data/
The full search list is: ’CREDIT AGREEMENT’, ’TERM LOAN’, ’LOAN AGREEMENT’, ’CREDIT
FACILITY AGREEMENT’, ’LOAN AND SECURITY AGREEMENT’, ’LOAN & SECURITY AGREEMENT’, ’REVOLVING CREDIT AGREEMENT’, ’FINANCING AND SECURITY AGREEMENT’, ’FINANCING & SECURITY AGREEMENT’, ’CREDIT AND GUARANTEE AGREEMENT’, ’CREDIT &
GUARANTEE AGREEMENT’, ’SECURITY AGREEMENT’, ’REVOLVING CREDIT’
6
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This is potentially problematic because (especially in later dated filings that employ
more xml formatting) the process of stripping 10-Ks and 8-Ks of their web formatting
frequently leaves the entire document as one long string with no line breaks. I amend
their technique as follows, instead of searching within 60 lines of ”CREDIT AGREEMENT” for ”TABLE OF CONTENTS”, I search the surrounding 20 words (forward
and backwards) for a date in one of the following two example formats, January 18(th),
2008 or 10(th) day of May, 2010. I make this change for two reasons. First, since later
filings employ more and more xml formatting (which can affect line counts even when
properly stripped), line breaks are an inaccurate measure of distance in a document.
Second, while almost all contracts use the all caps standard (for example, ”CREDIT
AGREEMENT”) to refer to an original document being disclosed, many deviate from
that standard when it comes to the Table of Contents (and many contracts do not
have such a title for their table of contents section even if they do have one).
4. Fourth, I employ a flexible scraping script (using Regex in Python) which attempts to
correct for errors in formatting. For example, instead of considering just ”CREDIT
AGREEMENT”, with one space, my script considers 0 to 8 spaces and/or a line break
between these words as a match as well. The same goes for dates.
Though it is difficult to say how much each of these individual tweaks to the Roberts and
Sufi (2008) formula adds to the yield, the overall result gets a far larger sample of contracts
than Roberts and Sufi (2008) were able to scrape (even after accounting for the fact that I
consider a larger time period).7
Organization of credit agreements
Once the corpus of original credit agreements is scraped, I use an intelligent script to determine how to split each credit agreement into its component parts. Much like academic
7

More discussion on this below.
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papers, lending contracts are generally hierarchically organized as groups of numbered sections. The following excerpt from a lending agreement gives an example.
• SECTION 5. NEGATIVE COVENANTS OF BORROWER

(Supersection)

– 5.1 ASSIGNMENT OF LICENSES AND PERMITS. Assign or... (Subsection)
– 5.2 NO LIENS; EXCEPTIONS. Create, incur, assume or...

(Subsection)

– 5.3 MERGER, CONSOLIDATION, ETC. Except as otherwis...

(Subsection)

In the above example there are three subsections which each represent a covenant inside a broader ‘Negative Covenants’ section. To ensure that these hierarchical levels are
properly disambiguated, I refer to the broader ‘Negative Covenants’ section grouping as a
‘supersection’. It’s subsections I simply refer to as ‘subsections’.
One final note which is important to stress is that there is a large degree of standardization
to these subsections and supersections. The same types of risks need to be addressed by
many types of contracts and so lawyers use broadly similar language to accommodate these
risks in their contracts. I call the relatively standardized language used to refer to one
economic risk as the ‘canonical form’ of that subsection.
Parsing original credit agreements
Having established that contracts are hierarchically organized as groups of subsections inside
supersections, I attempt to construct a database which reflects this organization. The goal is
find the canonical forms of each type of subsection and supersection and classify each part of
every contract inside these canonical forms. To accomplish this, I turn to machine learning
to put each part of a contract into both a subsection bucket as well as a supersection bucket.
The machine learning technique I use to parse the contracts and create a database of the
universe of contractual contents is identical to the technique described in Chapter 1. Details
can be found in the Data section of Chapter 1 as well as in Appendix A. The end result of this
process is a database with a large number of potential subsections which might be included
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in a syndicated lending contract and a 1-0 binary variable indicating if the subsection is
contained within the given contract. For every subsection, I also note the supersection in
which it most commonly appears.
Directly quoting from above, there are three main advantages that my database has
compared to other previous datasets. “First, my database captures the universe of covenants
used by syndicated loans to public borrowers. LPC DealScan, the most commonly used
source used of data on loan covenants, only has accurate data on financial loan covenants
(commonly referred to as tripwires) ... Second, my database is historical in that it covers
the vast majority of time since SEC filings were required to be digital (1996-2016). And
third, my technique is reproducible and assembled from public data ... In total, my database
represents one of the most complete (in terms of both size and scope) databases on loan
covenants ever assembled. My database contains about 41K contracts, each containing
hundreds of potential covenants.”8
Originating contracts data collection yield
The above scraping procedure yields a total of 41,758 original lending agreements. I parse
these agreements according to the procedure detailed above and match them to DealScan
using the Chava-Roberts DealScan linking database. LPC DealScan contains data on loanlevel observables such as All-in-Drawn spreads, maturity dates, syndicate size and security
levels which my scraping procedure does not capture. This leaves me with a sample of
16,269 agreements. Matching this sample to firm observables from Compustat leaves me
with a sample of 10,425 contracts. Finally, after dropping loans to financial firms (SIC code
6000-6999) and utilities (SIC 4900-4999), I am left with a final database of 7,993 original
lending contracts with both firm and loan-level observables as well as contractual contents.
8
The database actually includes the measurable universe of all clauses employed by syndicated credit
agreements but for the sake of simplicity I only focus on the covenants in this paper.
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3.2.2

Renegotiations data

I begin with a brief description of the background of how lending contracts are renegotiated
followed by a description of how I collect my dataset on renegotiations.
Background: How does a contract get renegotiated?
Contractual renegotiations of syndicated lending agreements modify the terms of the original
agreement by way of another (typically smaller) contract that both parties mutually agree
to. Denis and Wang (2014), note that renegotiations are typically initiated by borrowers
and that they are normally used to loosen the terms of the original agreement. The typical
renegotiation can be thought of as a form of reprieve for beleaguered borrowers. Lenders typically extract concessions in exchange for offering such reprieves and borrowers are reluctant
to ask for them unless needed.
Renegotiation contracts of syndicated loans can take one of two general forms. The first
form is that of a fully amended and restated contract. This is a brand new contract which
entirely replaces and supersedes the old one. This form of renegotiation is typically preferred
when there are a large number of changes to the contract such that it would onerous to detail
them all. However, one important complicating fact is this type of contract is also used to
effectively issue new debt under an old name.9 The second form of renegotiation is far more
common. It takes the form of a smaller contract which lists in detail the changes both
parties wish to mutually make to the contract. Since this second type of contract is far
more common, far easier to algorithmically parse and does not come with the ambiguity of
possible referring to new debt, this is the principal source of data I will be analyzing in this
paper.
9
For example, many of the contracts listed by LPC DealScan as new loans actually use amended and
restated contracts from previous debt issuances.
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Examples of amendments
One renegotiation can (and frequently does) contain multiple amendments. From this point
on, to avoid ambiguity, I will refer to the entire renegotiating contract as the renegotiation
and the specific changes made to each section as the amendments. The following two examples each show a subsection from an original credit agreement as well as the text of its
subsequent amendment. The bolded sections are added by the author and indicate parts of
the text which are changed from the original.
(d) Section 6.28 of the Credit Agreement hereby is amended and
restated in its entirety as follows:
SECTION 6.28. Additional Debt. Neither of the Borrowers or any of
their Subsidiaries shall incur or permit to exist any Debt other than
(i) Debt in the amounts listed on Schedule 6.28, (ii) Debt permitted to
be secured by Liens permitted by Section 6.18, (iii) Debt of the types
described in clause (vii) of the definition of Debt which is incurred in
the ordinary course of business in connection with the sale or purchase
of goods or to assure performance of any obligation to a utility or a
governmental entity or a worker’s compensation obligation; (iv) Debt
permitted by the FINOVA Intercreditor Agreement; (v) other Debt not
to exceed an aggregate amount outstanding at any time of $500,000; (vi)
trade payables arising in the ordinary course of business; (vii) Investments in Subsidiaries consisting of Debt excluded under the definition
of ”Restricted Investment”; and (viii) Debt consisting of a Guarantee
by SEDH of SED’s obligations to purchase certain equity interests in
SED Magna such investment amount permitted under the definition of
”Restricted Investment.”

SECTION 6.28. Additional Debt. Neither of the Borrowers or any of
their Subsidiaries shall incur or permit to exist any Debt other than (i)
Debt in the amounts listed on Schedule 6.28, (ii) Debt permitted to be
secured by Liens permitted by Section 6.18, (iii) Debt of the types described in clause (vii) of the definition of Debt which is incurred in the
ordinary course of business in connection with the sale or purchase of
goods or to assure performance of any obligation to a utility or a governmental entity or a worker’s compensation obligation; (iv) Debt permitted
by the FINOVA Intercreditor Agreement; (v) so long as the same is
not Guaranteed by either Borrower, Debt with a maturity date
no later than 6 months after the date of issuance incurred by
Foreign Subsidiaries not to exceed an aggregate amount outstanding at any time of $6,000,000; (vi) other Debt not to exceed an aggregate amount outstanding at any time equal to the
lesser of (A) $500,000 or (B) $6,000,000 minus the outstanding Debt permitted under clause (v) of this Section 6.28; (vii)
trade payables arising in the ordinary course of business; (viii) Investments permitted by Section 6.17 in Subsidiaries consisting of Debt
excluded under the definition of ”Restricted Investment”; and (ix) Debt
consisting of a Guarantee by SEDH of SED’s obligations to purchase certain equity interests in SED Magna such investment amount permitted
under the definition of ”Restricted Investment.”

(b) Amendment

(a) Original

Figure 3.1: Amendment Example 1
6.12. Dealings with Affiliates. The Borrower shall not, and shall not
permit any other Loan Party to, enter into or carry out any transaction
with (including, without limitation, purchase or lease property or
services from, sell or lease property or services to, loan or advance
to, or enter into, suffer to remain in existence or amend any contract,
agreement or arrangement with) any Affiliate of the Borrower, directly
or indirectly, or agree, become or remain liable (contingently or
otherwise) to do any of the foregoing, except:

(f) Dealings With Affiliates. Section 6.12 of the Credit Agreement is
hereby amended by adding at the end thereof a new Section 6.12(e) to
read as follows:
(e) The IDI Mergers.

(a) Execution and performance of contracts, [...]
(b) Directors, officers and employees of a Loan Party may be compensated for services rendered [...]
(c) The SDI Offtake Agreement, the Administration Agreement and the
Tax Sharing Agreement.
(d) Other transactions in the ordinary course of the Borrower’s business
[...]

(b) Amendment

(a) Original

Figure 3.2: Amendment Example 2
As can be seen in the above two examples, each amendment inside a larger renegotiation
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usually has two parts: the preamble which denotes the section in the original contract which
is being modified and text itself which is being modified. The preamble generally follows the
standard format illustrated above while the included text has no unifying format.
I exploit the relatively standard formating of contractual renegotiations to extract data
from them. The standard formatting of the preambles to each amendment allows me to
reliably impute the numbering of the subsection in the previous contract which was amended
but does not always allow me to determine the subject of the amendment. To determine
the subject of the amendment, I turn to the text of the original contract. For instance,
in the first example, the preamble specifies that Section 6.28 of the original contract is
being amended. From my contractual contents database I know that Section 6.28 of the
previous contract falls under the ‘Indebtedness’ subsection classification. This ‘Indebtedness’
subsection classification in turn falls under the ‘Negative Covenants’ supersection. By this
way I can classify each amendment by the supersection in the previous contract it adjusts.
Scraping renegotiations
In addition to finding original credit agreements, the above scraping procedure detailed
in Section 3.2.1 also captures contractual renegotiations which are disclosed as well. This
works because the titles of renegotiations are extremely similar to those of the original
contract. A typical amendment or waiver might have a title that looks like the following:
“AMENDMENT NO. 2 TO THE CREDIT AGREEMENT”, “CONSENT AND WAIVER
AGREEMENT AND AMENDMENT NO. 6 TO LOAN AND SECURITY AGREEMENT”.
Using data from the title of the renegotiation, I classify renegotiations into three categories. A renegotiation can be a waiver of default, a limited amendment of terms or a
complete restatement of the original contract with new terms. Importantly, these categories
are non-exclusive. A waiver of default may also include (and frequently does) a limited
amendment of the terms of the contract so ensure that the firm does not continue to be
in default. The specific terms I search for for each of these categories are ’WAIV’ for a
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waiver,’AMENDMENT’ or ’MODIF’ for an amendment, and ’RESTAT’ for an amended
and restated contract.10
Matching renegotiations to original contracts
To identify the original contract which the renegotiation refers to, I search the renegotiation
for the date of an original contract. By law, written contractual amendments must refer to
the original contract by the date on which it was filed. To identify these previous dates, I
first search following the title and grab all text up to the first stated date. I assume this
first date is the date of the renegotiation11 and then search the next 2000 characters for all
listed dates attempting to find the date of the original contract. If multiple dates are found,
I sort the dates in ascending order (oldest dates first). I then match each renegotiation to an
original contract starting with the first date in the list and working backwards from there.
As an illustrated example, consider the following amendment to a credit agreement. The
date of the renegotiation is March 29, 2000 and the date of the original contract which it
modifies is December 31, 1997. This corresponds to what is recorded in my database for this
contract.
THIS FIFTH AMENDMENT AND WAIVER TO CREDIT AGREEMENT (this
”Agreement”), dated as of March 29, 2000, by and among IRON DYNAMICS, INC.,
an Indiana corporation (the ”Borrower”), the lenders listed on the signature pages
hereof and MELLON BANK, N.A., a national banking association, as agent for the
Lenders under the Credit Agreement referred to below (the ”Agent”).
RECITALS:
WHEREAS the Borrower, certain lenders, the Agent and Mellon Bank, N.A., as
Issuing Bank, entered into a Credit Agreement, dated as of December 31, 1997, as
amended by the Amendment and Waiver, dated as of June 10, 1998, by the Second
Amendment to Credit Agreement, dated as of March 15, 1999, the Third
10

The distinction between a fully amended and restated contract and a “new” credit agreement that
would count as an original contract is an exceedingly nebulous one. In this paper I defer to LPC DealScan
to make this distinction for me. I count an amended and restated contract as an original contract if LPC
DealScan does as well. Conversations with representatives at LPC DealScan reveal that this categorization
is more heuristic than systematic for them as well and that they mostly rely on human judgment to decide
if an amended and restated contract should count as a new loan.
11
Practically speaking, the first line which follows the title is virtually always to the effect of “dated as
of [date]” and this uniquely identifies the date of the renegotiation.
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Amendment and Waiver to Credit Agreement, dated as of June 30, 1999 and the
Fourth Amendment to Credit Agreement, dated as of December 21, 1999 (as so
amended, the ”Credit Agreement”), pursuant to which the Lenders have agreed to
extend credit to the Borrower;

This technique seems to be successful at matching up renegotiations to original agreements. Of all renegotiations I scrape, 81% of them exactly match to an original contract
by the same borrower. Given that I can not collect loan contracts from before 1996 and
many of these renegotiations amend loan contracts older than that, I count this statistic as
a successful validation of the technique. The above process yields a total sample of 36,227
renegotiations to 17,769 loans.
When and how often do contracts get renegotiated?
Since one loan may be sequentially renegotiated multiple times, it is interesting to ask
what the timing of these sequential renegotiations looks like. Figure 1 shows the timing
of renegotiations disaggregated by the number of the renegotiation. This graph serves as
a nice initial check on the quality of the scraped renegotiation data. As expected, higher
numbered renegotiations tend to be renegotiated at later dates from origination. For the
first renegotiation, the average amount of time elapsed since origination is 473 days, or 1.3
years. For the sequentially following renegotiations, the numbers are, 661, 836, 983 and 1120
days, respectively. The average gaps between these renegotiations are about 6-9 months.
This can be seen as a confirmation of Roberts (2014)’s finding that, “the typical bank loan
is renegotiated five times, or every nine months”.
Another interesting dynamic that emerges is a strong preference for renegotiating at
yearly intervals. This suggests that perhaps not all renegotiation is driven by salient credit
conditions but that some level of renegotiation is baked into the contract at origination.
By combining my data of scraped originations (before merging with DealScan) with my
data of scraped renegotiations, I can impute what percent of originations were renegotiated.
I find that I am able to unconditionally find renegotiations for some 35% of the originations
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in my dataset.
The above number might initially seem at odds with the widely quoted finding from
Roberts and Sufi (2009) that, conditionally (on having a maturity of at least 1 year, and
not being censored by their sample period) 90% of debt contracts are renegotiated before
maturity. The conditioning of this statement matters for comparing these numbers. Considering the unconditional number reported by Roberts and Sufi (2009), the percentage of
loans which are renegotiated falls to 65%. This is still a far cry 35% number I report. So
what explains the rest of the difference? The rest of the difference is almost certainly due to
the fact that Roberts and Sufi (2009) count fully amended and restated contracts as part of
their sample of renegotiations while I do not. I do not count fully Amended and Restated
contracts as a renegotiation for my purposes because they are frequently used to issue new
debt under an old name. Indeed, Roberts and Sufi (2009) find that 47% of their renegotiations match to new loan packages in DealScan. This means that 53% of Roberts and Sufi’s
(2008) sample is this smaller form of renegotiation. Multiplying 65% by .53 gives the truly
comparable number of 34% for Roberts and Sufi (2009) which is extremely close to the 35%
I report above. Far from being contradictory with Roberts and Sufi’s (2009) result, my data
strongly confirms their findings but emphasizes the importance of considering the nuance of
what exactly constitutes a renegotiation.
Algorithmically parsing renegotiations
Once scraped and matched to an original contract, each individual renegotiation is then
parsed to find the sections of the previous original contract which it modifies. To do this, I
first search for a numbered section title in the text of the renegotiation. An example would
be “Section 6.28”. I then search the next 20 words for a phrase that indicates some form of
contractual modification. An example would be ‘amend/amending’ or ‘delete/deleting’.

12

Finally, I search for a word that indicates that the updated text follows. An example would
12

The full list of words I search for is: amend, delet, substit, add, insert, replac.

110

be ’follows/following’ or ‘below’.13
By using this technique, for each renegotiation, I can cleanly identify the exact sections
of the previous document which were modified. Quoting from Included Figure 3.1, the text
of such a modification is below:
(d) Section 6.28 of the Credit Agreement hereby is amended and restated in its entirety
as follows:

In this example, I can identify that Section 6.28 of the original document was amended
but the data I collect does not identify the title of clause Section 6.28 refers to.14 To solve
this problem, I use data from the original contract. From the originations database detailed
above, I know that Section 6.28 refers to the ‘Additional Debt’ clause of the original contract.
By merging the renegotiations database together with the originations database, I can infer
the subject of each clause amended in a renegotiation. Finally, I aggregate this data up to the
supersection level for ease of comparison. For example, the ‘Additional Debt’ subsection15
falls under the ‘Negative Covenants’ supersection in my dataset so I simply record that one
of the negative covenants was amended.
Since multiple clauses may be amended by a single renegotiation, the final renegotiations
dataset records how many clauses from each of the 10 supersections were amended by the
renegotiation. For example, in the complete text of the above renegotiation, 4 sections were
renegotiated in the ‘Negative Covenants’ supersection, 1 in ‘Affirmative Covenants’, 2 in the
‘Representations and Warranties’, etc.
After scraping and parsing the renegotiations as describe above, I am left with a sample of
4,279 renegotiation contracts containing a total of 15,339 amendments to 2,243 loan facilities.
The total number of unique borrowing firms in my sample is 1,685.
13

The full list of words I search for is: follow, therefor, thereof, thereto, read, below, foregoing.
The amended text itself which follows the preamble only occasionally restates the title of the original
text so this is an inconsistent manner of gathering this information.
15
Which is actually rolled into the ‘indebtedness’ subsection in my final dataset.
14
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Data limitations
The above process yields a dataset of the amendments of the numbered subsections in syndicated lending agreements. For every subsection in an original credit agreement, I can identify
two things: the subject of the subsection and if and when the subsection was renegotiated.
This data has three important limitations to be aware of.
First, I cannot distinguish between renegotiation towards more restrictive terms vs a
renegotiation towards looser terms. However, previous research suggests that most renegotiations loosen restrictions rather than tighten them. Denis and Wang (2014) note that
“renegotiations primarily relax existing restrictions”. Also supporting this story, Roberts
(2015) examines loan originations and conclude that most credit agreements have the terms
set too tight ex-ante which would suggest that they are subsequently renegotiated down.
Based on this evidence, I will assume in this paper that renegotiations generally loosen
terms or at the very least that the proportion of loosening renegotiations does not differ
between affirmative and negative covenants. Ultimately, the information-first theory I will
present in this paper will be mostly agnostic to the direction of the renegotiation.
Second, I cannot determine the size of the adjustment. To my dataset, an amendment
which completely removes a restriction on future indebtedness looks the same as an amendment which only modifies the amount carved-out of the indebtedness restriction. Both are
contractual easements of the same direction but different magnitudes.
Third, I cannot impute the subject of amendments to the ‘Definitions’ supersection (because I impute the subject of the amendment from the title of the subsection). Most contracts
have such a subsection, usually numbered Section 1.01 or Section 1, which defines the terms
which will be used throughout the contract. Common among these terms are the interest
rate and the maturity date of the loan. If one wishes to amend the maturity date or interest
rate of the loan, one way they can accomplish this is by amending the definition of this term
in the definitions subsection. I only observe such amendments in the most general sense as
an amendment to the definitions supersection of the loan. The following excerpt gives an
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example of such a renegotiation.

(a) Definitions. Section 1.01 of the Credit Agreement is hereby amended by amending
the definitions of ”Financial Covenant Date” and ”Revolving Credit Maturity Date”
appearing therein to read, in each case in its entirety, as follows:

As can be seen above, this excerpt modifies the definitions of the maturity date of the
loan and the date used to measure compliance with financial covenants. Since these definitions are used variously in multiple parts of the loan, it is difficult to identify all the sections
of the contract that might be impacted by this definitional amendment. A modification to
”Financial Covenant Date” might modify all of the covenants subsections while a modification to ”Revolving Credit Maturity Date” might implicitly adjust almost all subsections of
the contract.
For this reason, I focus my results on the sections where I can affirmatively identify that
only one subsection has been modified and do not attempt to parse definitional amendments.
While I think it is quite likely that any supersection categories might potentially be renegotiated via the definitions section, there is little a priori reason to think that one type
of covenant would be more biased to being implicitly renegotiated via definitions. Thus I
view the relative proportions presented in Figure 2 as accurate, especially between covenant
classes which is the main focus of this paper.

3.2.3

Other data sources

Two other data sources used in this paper to supplement the above data are Compustat
and LPC DealScan. LPC DealScan is used for loan observables such as the All-in-Drawn
credit spread and loan maturity. All originated loans in my originations database are also
matched to their corresponding entry in LPC DealScan. Compustat is primarily used for
firm observables and for calculating by Bharath and Shumway’s (2008) measure of Distance113

to-Default. I primarily use this measure to proxy for the credit quality of the firm. As in
their paper, I construct distance to default as,

DtD =

ln(V /D) − (r − .5σ 2 )T
√
σ T

Where V is market cap, D is short term debt plus half of long-term debt, r is the trailing
one-year stock return, and σ is the one-year asset volatility and T = 1. This variable can
roughly be interpreted as how many standard deviations a firm is away from defaulting
within one year.16

3.2.4

Summary statistics

Originations sample summary statistics
Table 1 describes the characteristics of my sample of the contracts of loan originations.
Broadly speaking, my dataset is a sample of syndicated lending contracts from publicly
traded firms and this is reflected in the data.17 In terms of firm and loan observables, the
averages look broadly in line with what one would expect of a large, publicly traded firm.
Average market capitalization is 2.9 billion dollars. Average distance-to-default (DtD) at
origination is 3.88. Thinking of the DtD measure as a z-score of the probability of default
within one year, this number seems reasonable for a sample of healthy firms. Average facility
amount is about 300 million dollars, average All-in-Drawn spread is 201 basis points and
average maturity is close to 5 years. These are all reasonable numbers for a sample of bank
loans to public firms and I conclude that the results from using this sample should generalize
to loans from most public firms.
Contractual contents are aggregated by the 10 most commonly used supersections. For
comparability, within each supersection I find the top 20 most commonly used subsections
16

Under the implicit assumption that default happens when the value of the firm falls below the face
value of debt.
17
My sample is necessarily public because the source of my credit agreements is from public disclosures
in SEC filings.
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inside each supersection and the number I report for a supersection is the sum of subsections
in the top 20. For example, if I report that a specific contract has a reported value of 5
for Affirmative Covenants, that means that the specific contract in question contained 5
affirmative covenants in the top 20 most popular affirmative covenants. For ease of exposition I will generally use this number when describing intensity of use inside a subsection.
The reason for reporting this number instead of the raw count is to preserve comparability
between supersections. This also ensures (assuming that the top 20 most common clauses
are all economically significant) that an extra included subsection is always economically
significant. Below I report the averages of these values.
The results in Figure 1 show that the average loan at origination contains 5.12 affirmative
covenants and 5.92 negative covenants.18 Other intensively used supersections include the
appointments supersection (which describes the syndicate structure and the responsibilities
of the lead arranger), the commitments supersection (which describes the lending commitments the bank makes to the borrower), the events of default supersection (which describes
all events which constitute a default), the notices supersection (which details the notices
that the borrower must provide to the lender) and the representations and warranties supersection (which details warranties that the borrower affirms to the lender before receiving
the proceeds of the loan). While these non-covenant supersections are all interesting in their
own rights, in this paper I will mainly focus on comparing covenant use between affirmative
and negative covenants so I will not focus as much on these supersections going forward.
Renegotiation sample summary statistics
Table 2 describes summary statistics for my sample of renegotiations. One observation is one
full renegotiation contract. For every renegotiation I also count the number of amendments
aggregated by supersection.
18
Technically speaking, the results show that the affirmative and negative supersections contain this many
subsections on average. However, in practice, each subsection in a covenant supersection refers to a unique
covenant so the above characterization is accurate.
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Comparing the sample of originations to the sample of renegotiations I find that the
loans which are eventually renegotiated tend to be smaller (313MM vs 223MM) and to
much smaller borrowers (2921 MM vs 1268MM). The sample of renegotiated and originated
loans are virtually identical in maturity (52 months) and loans which are renegotiated are
held (on their books vs. selling off their share) a bit more intensely by banks (46% vs 40%).
Compared to the same firm at origination, at renegotiation firms are of slightly lower credit
quality (as measured by DtD, 3.88 vs. 3.44). Finally, the average time in days from an
origination to a renegotiation (any number) in my sample is 587 days.
Examining the content of these renegotiations, I find that the average renegotiation
amends .91 negative covenants and .43 affirmative covenants. The next most common supersections to be amended are the commitments (.24), events of default (.23) and representations
and warranties (.19). Figure 2 shows this proportionally. About 27.5% of non-definitional
amendments are related to negative covenants while about 12.5% of non-definitional amendments are related to affirmative covenants.

3.3

Affirmative covenants as a monitoring technology

In this section I describe the respective roles that affirmative and negative covenants play
in lending contracts. I first discuss the existing literature on negative covenants, specifically
financial covenants, and how these types of covenants serve as protective tripwires which
alert the lender to any potential problems with the borrower. I then discuss the way that
affirmative covenants constitute a monitoring technology used by banks to monitor their
creditors. Finally I describe how these results help contextualize the way that affirmative
covenants fit into the popular covenants as a tripwire analogy.
The Included Figure 3 previews the basic taxonomy of debt covenants I will describe in
this section. Covenants can be divided into the broad categories of affirmative and negative
which can then be further subdivided by their specific role in the contract.
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Included Figure 3: Classification of Debt Covenants
Debt Covenants

Negative Covenants

Affirmative Covenants

Financial

Capital Restrictions

Information

(Maintenance)

(Incurrence)

Extraction

3.3.1

Information Accuracy

Negative covenants

Negative covenants in lending contracts restrict the firm along two main dimensions, the
capital actions it might wish to take (capital restrictions covenants) and the financial ratios
it must maintain (financial covenants). An example of a capital restrictions covenant might
be a restriction on future M&A activity by the borrower to less than a certain dollar amount.
Ivashina and Vallee (2019) note that capital restrictions covenants frequently contain ’carveouts’ allowing borrowers to engage in a limited amount of the restricted action. On the
other hand, an example of a financial covenant might be a limit on the ratio of total debt
to a firm’s EBITDA. Becker and Ivashina (2016) point out that this distinction financial
and capital restrictions covenants corresponds to the way covenant violation is measured in
each category. In financial covenants, violation is typically maintenance-based whereas in
capital restrictions covenants violation is incurrence-based. This means that, absent taking
any other actions, a firm can find itself in violation of a financial covenant while the same is
not true for a capital restrictions covenant.
What both types of covenants have in common is that they act as tripwires which allocate
control rights between lenders and borrowers via ex-post renegotiation. Griffin, Nini and
Smith (2019) note that financial covenants, “transfer control rights to lenders only when
financial ratios drop below contractual thresholds”. Control rights are transferred to the
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lender because violation or imminent violation of a covenant allows (but does not obligate)
banks to accelerate the loan and demand immediate payment in full. This threat brings
borrowers to the table to renegotiate their loans. This normally happens at less-favorable
terms to the borrower. On the other hand, capital restrictions covenants allocate control
rights by essentially giving banks a veto power on certain actions of the firm. Imagine a firm
with a covenant restriction on mergers or acquisitions above 15 million dollars (the amount
of the carve-out). In this case, the same firm wanting to undertake a very large acquisition
of, say, 200 million dollars would first have to consult with their lender and renegotiate their
loan. In both cases, potential covenant violations bring the borrower to the renegotiation
table to amend the terms of their contract. By this way, both classes of negative covenants
act as tripwires which let banks know about material changes or potential changes to the
ability of the firm to repay its loan.
Table 3 details the top 20 most commonly used negative covenants in syndicated lending
contracts along with their frequency of use, if they are also found in DealScan, and the percent
of my sample whose text includes any numerical restrictions.19 Of these 20 covenants, 12 are
capital restrictions covenants (indicated below by ‘carve-out’) while 8 are financial covenants
(indicated below by ‘limit’).
Figure 3 examines negative covenant usage through time. This figure splits negative
covenants into the two categories mentioned above, financial and capital restrictions covenants.
I note that using my data, capital restrictions covenant usage has been flat or slightly increasing over time while financial covenant usage has been falling. This is consistent with
the cov-lite findings of Becker and Ivashina (2016). They note that cov-lite originations
reached peaks at 2015 and 2007. I find the same results below using my data. Another
interesting trend that emerges is the growth (especially compared at negative covenants) of
affirmative covenant usage in contracts. Affirmative covenant usage grew from an average
of 4.7 covenants per contract in 2007 to close to 5.75 in 2016. This closely mirrors the drop
19

Numerical is the proportion of covenants which contain a numerical restriction in one of the following
forms: dollar amount ($100,000), ratio (2:1 or 2 to 1) or percent (50%).
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in financial covenant usage from 1.5 average covenants per contract to near 0.5 in 2016. In
total, these results suggest that both categories of affirmative covenants have been growing in
popularity over the sample period. Meanwhile, of the two categories of negative covenants,
capital restrictions covenant usage has remained steady while financial covenant usage has
fallen sharply since 2007.

3.3.2

Affirmative covenants

Analysis of the text used by affirmative covenants reveals that affirmative covenants in
lending contracts serve as a monitoring technology which helps lenders stay abreast of any
material changes to the borrower’s credit condition. Affirmative covenants accomplish this
by ensuring that the information that the banks have on the borrower is 1) obtainable and
2) accurate. As seen in Figure 4, of the top 20 most frequently used affirmative covenants
I document, 19 fit neatly into one of these two categories. Nine of the top twenty most
commonly used affirmative covenants are devoted to helping banks extract information from
their borrowers while ten of the top twenty affirmative covenants are devoted to ensuring that
information collected by the banks (both with and without the borrowers’ help) is accurate.
(One miscellaneous covenant deals with reassignment of security interests.) I call the former
‘information extraction’ covenants and the latter ‘information accuracy’ covenants
Information extraction covenants help banks extract information from their borrowers
either cooperatively or unilaterally. Gustafson, Ivanov and Meisenzahl (2016) note that 50%
of loans are monitored on a monthly basis and these covenants are the section of the lending
contract that binds borrowers to disclose this information that would otherwise not be disclosed in public filings. Examples of cooperative extraction include the following covenants:
1) other information, 2) certificates; other information, 3) annual financial statements and
4) compliance certificates 5) notice 6) leases. These covenants all require the borrower to
send copies of materially important documents (i.e., any public statements, 10-Ks, 8-Ks,
new agreements or changes in leases) at some specified frequency to the lender. These are
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frequently accompanied (moreso in recent years) by a “certificate” from the CFO affirming
the accuracy of the statements and explaining the details of the calculations, if any. These
covenants are unified in the sense that they require some cooperation on the part of the
borrower to extract information. Other examples of information extraction covenants which
do not require cooperation include: 7) inspection rights and 8) inspection. These covenants
typically allow the lender to unilaterally inspect the firms premises as it desires (usually
with a minimum of notice, a few days). Besides perhaps nominally having an agent present
open the premises, these do not require the cooperation of the borrower to be effective. Finally, 9) the further assurances covenant ensures that borrowers will “execute any and all
further documents that may be required” to execute the loan. This extracts information
from the borrower by forcing them to return any needed documents in a timely matter, on
the pain of default if they do not. This covenant is similar to the first group in that it depends on borrower some cooperation but it can also be seen as a way of enforcing borrower
cooperation.
Examples of information accuracy covenants include the following, 1) insurance, 2) use
of proceeds (of the loan), 3) compliance with laws, 4) maintenance of properties, 5) payment
of obligations, 6) books and records, 7) compliance with laws, etc, 8) additional subsidiaries,
9) compliance with environmental laws, 10) maintenance of insurance. Each covenant refers
(in a largely self-explanatory manner) to a specific information set that the bank want to
ensure is always current. It is important to note that these covenants do not represent offequilibrium paths for the firm but are actions (i.e. maintaining current insurance coverage,
complying with laws, keeping good accounting records, not making less-than-arms-length
deals with subsidiaries and so forth) that one would typically expect a responsible firm to
take. With this in mind, these covenants serve not to change the behavior of the firm but
to ensure that the actions of the firm are consistent with what the lender would expect of
a good borrower. These covenants also serve the purpose of ensuring that the borrower is
aware of the state of its own affairs and is not lax or lacking in information about them.
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Explicit examples of this include the maintenance of properties and the books and records
covenants but all of the above covenants perform this function to some extent. By ensuring
that the borrower is current on its own information and that it is in compliance with best
business practices, these covenants ensure that the information that is subsequently reported
to the bank is as accurate and current as possible.
Like capital restrictions covenants, violation of an affirmative covenant is almost entirely
incurrence based. This means that if the firm so chooses, they should always be able to
comply with such a covenant. Thus the value of affirmative covenants arises not from the
potential for violation per-se but from the information the bank gains by knowing the firm
is in compliance.
Testing affirmative covenants as a monitoring technology
In this section I test the hypothesis that affirmative covenants serve as a type of monitoring
technology in lending contracts. First, I compare how the usage of affirmative covenants
co-varies with two popularly accepted proxies of monitoring intensity in contracts. Lee and
Mullineaux (2004), Sufi (2006) and François, Missonier-Piera (2007) all negatively associate
the size of the syndicate with the demand for monitoring and uncertainty about the loan.
The general argument is that smaller, more concentrated syndicates have better incentives
to monitor well and that the smaller size of the syndicate makes these highly-monitored
loans easier to renegotiate. In a similar vein, Ivashina (2009) associates the percent of the
loan which is retained by the lead bank as a proxy for equilibrium monitoring demand in the
loan. I test how both of these proxies covary with affirmative covenant usage by estimating
the following general regression using my dataset on loan originations.

monitoring_proxyi,t,l,b = β1 affcov_origi +β2 negcov_origi +β3 AiDspread_origi +β4 maturity_origi
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+β5 DtD_origi +

14
X

βj Oji + li,l + τi,t + ηi,b + i,t,l,b

j=6

The outcome variable is either the number of members in the syndicate or the percent
of the loan which is retained by the lead bank. The key test variable is the number of
affirmative covenants included in the lending contract at origination. I also control for the
number of negative covenants as well as the other 8 supersections of the contract (captured
in the matrix of control variables O), the All-in-Drawn loan spread, the maturity of the loan
and the Distance-to-Default of the firm at origination. I include year (τ ), lender (l) and
borrower (b) fixed effects variously as indicated below. Finally, I cluster all standard errors
at the borrower × year level.
The results in Table 5 show that more affirmative covenant usage is associated more
monitoring as measured by both of these proxies. More affirmative covenants in a lending
contract imply both smaller syndicates and higher lead arranger shares. This is consistent
with the idea that affirmative covenants are a monitoring technology in bank loans.
Table 6 shows the results from running the same regression as above but with the firm’s
Distance-to-Default at origination as the outcome variable. The results of this regression
show that affirmative covenant usage in lending contracts is significantly and negatively
correlated with the credit quality of the firm at origination. This is also consistent with
the affirmative covenant monitoring hypothesis as lower quality firms would be expected to
require more monitoring on their loans.
Interpretation: Affirmative covenants are the sensitivity of the tripwire
Taken together, the two classes of covenant paint a more complete picture of the way that
lenders solve the moral hazard problem inherent in lending. Negative covenants attempt
to solve the moral hazard problem problem by pre-determining a threshold where control
shifts from equityholders to debtholders but affirmative covenants are the means of actually
determining if that threshold is crossed. To extend the analogy of covenants as a tripwire,
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negative covenants determine the line where the tripwire is placed but affirmative covenants
determine the sensitivity of the tripwire. If the tripwire is sufficiently insensitive, an object
crossing the wire may be able to make it significantly past the specified point without eliciting
a response.
Bringing the analogy back to reality, a firm whose loan contains very lax monitoring
covenants may be able to spend months below some pre-specified financial ratio before the
bank is made aware of any problem. By that point, the firm may have already lost a
significant amount of the value that the covenant was supposed to protect. Another way
this may work is that loans that do not mandate compliance certificates, or assurances from
the CFO that the firm is in compliance with its negative covenants, may be able to rely on bad
data or inexperienced employees to report their compliance with their covenant restrictions.
Such a firm might report in a timely manner but report all the wrong numbers, mis-conveying
(either intentionally or unintentionally) the true nature of their financial situation.

3.4

Information-first renegotiation

In this section I use the observations described in the previous section to develop a working
theory of how banks actually use these monitoring covenants in practice. Importantly, this
working theory will have testable hypotheses relating to the way that loans are renegotiated
ex-post of origination.

3.4.1

Optimal renegotiation

Consider the question of a how a bank should first adjust the lending contract in response
to uncertainty about the creditworthiness of the borrower. Under the typical conception of
covenants, the only anticipated response would be to tighten negative covenant packages,
effectively moving forward the placement of the tripwire. The problem with this strategy is
that, as previous literature has shown, tightening covenant packages is costly. No firm enjoys
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being constrained and banks have to give up some amount of interest margin to achieve this
extra level of safety. Another way of achieving the same result is to strengthen enforcement
of the already existing covenant protections (assuming there is some existing level of slack
in the enforcement). One way the bank can do this is by adjusting the affirmative covenants
to increase the frequency, quality or scope of the reporting by the borrower.
Given these two potential dimensions of contractual adjustment–affirmative and negative
covenants–which will the bank reach for first when a firm initially gets into trouble? I propose
that banks opt for what I will call an ‘information-first’ policy, choosing to first step up the
monitoring of loans before taking any action to tighten the negative covenants themselves.
Effectively, when banks sense trouble, they tighten the tripwires they already have before
choosing to put new ones in place. This information-first theory cuts both ways as well. If
affirmative covenants are really the covenants with the lowest marginal cost of adjustment
then one would expect them to also be the first to fall out of contracts when conditions
improve. In this way the theory is largely agnostic to the direction of the adjustment. The
theory merely suggests that, if there is an adjustment to be made, the adjustment with the
lowest marginal cost will be adopted first.
This information-first theory is consistent with the existing theoretical understanding
of how affirmative and negative covenants interact. If one thinks of the true state of the
firm as something that can only be imperfectly observed by the lender (as well as perhaps
the borrower), then affirmative covenants help make this observation process less noisy.
Under the conception of Aghion and Bolton (1992), the magnitude of this noise–or the
disconnect between the observed signal and the actual state of the world–represents the
‘degree of completeness’ possible in any ex-ante contract. Thus by reducing the noise in this
observation process, affirmative covenants complete contracts but they do so by increasing
the accuracy of the contractible signal rather than by pre-specifying action plans in response
to uncertain states of the world (as negative covenants do). Assuming the utility of the
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borrower is not increasing in the incompleteness of the contract20 , the both parties benefit
from increased contractual completeness.
To test this information-first theory in the data, I test four hypotheses related how
borrowers and lenders renegotiate their loans in practice. For each hypothesis, I compare
how affirmative and negative covenants are renegotiated relative to one another. If banks
really operate on an information-first basis, then each of the following hypotheses should be
true.
H1: Affirmative covenants are renegotiated first in time. By comparing how
covenants for the same loan are renegotiated as a function of the time elapsed since
origination, I can test if either class of covenant displays a bias for being renegotiated
sooner than the other. If affirmative covenants display this bias for being renegotiated
early in time, this would lend evidence to the information-first theory.
H2: Affirmative covenants are renegotiated first in default. By testing the marginal
impact of a change in creditworthiness on renegotiation rates, I can see if changes
in creditworthiness elicit differential responses for renegotiation of affirmative and
negative covenants. If affirmative covenants are more sensitive to changes in a firm’s
distance-to-default, this would also lend evidence to the information-first theory.
H3: Affirmative covenants are renegotiated more after technical defaults. Griffin,
Nini and Smith (2019), note that firms frequently experience technical defaults that
they refer to as ‘false positives’. These are defaults that “occur when a firm is not
in danger of financial distress”. Such technical defaults are frequently waived by the
lender along with a small adjustment to the contract however they also represent a
failure of the ex-ante contract. By seeing what types adjustments occur concurrent
with such a waiver of default, I can test whether affirmative covenants are renego20

An example of such a borrower would be one who derives little value from control in the good state
of the world and a relatively much higher value from control in the bad state of the world, when the bank
should have control.
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tiated more after ‘false positives’. Assuming that such adjustments relax existing
restrictions, this would suggest that affirmative covenants are also the first contents
to be loosened if covenants are set too tight.
H4: Affirmative covenants are renegotiated less when firms are very close to
bankruptcy. By examining the content of renegotiations from firms who will declare
bankruptcy within 2 years, I can test if firms who are close to bankruptcy renegotiate
affirmative covenants or negative more. The analogue to the information-first theory
is that more restrictive covenants should be renegotiated second. Firms which are
close to declaring bankruptcy represent these firms who are far past the initial stage
where information-first would apply. We should expect such firms to renegotiate
negative covenants more intensively than affirmative covenants.

3.4.2

Renegotiation hypothesis testing

In this section I present the results of testing the hypotheses developed above. I find that
the results of these tests broadly support the information-first theory of renegotiation.

3.4.3

Affirmative covenants are renegotiated first in time

For this test, I use the dataset of renegotiations discussed above. I test to see if the content
of the renegotiation predicts the timing of the same renegotiation. I measure the timing of
the renegotiation in terms of the time elapsed since the loan was originated. The specific
regression I estimate is,

days_to_renegi,t,l,b = β1 affcov_renegi + β2 negcov_renegi + β3 affcov_origi + β4 negcov_origi
+ β5 dscov_origi + β6 DtD_origi +

15
X
j=7
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βj Rji + li,l + τi,t + ηi,b + i,t,l,b

The outcome of the regression is the number of days elapsed from renegotiation until
renegotiation. The main test variables of interest are affcov_reneg and negcov_reneg which
indicate the number of affirmative and negative covenants amended in the renegotiation.21
The controls affcov_orig, negcov_orig and dscov_orig control for the number of affirmative,
negative and DealScan covenants (financial covenants as reported by LPC DealScan) in the
original contract. Also controlled for is the credit quality of the firm at origination, DtD
is the Distance-to-Default measure of Bharath and Shumway (2008). The matrix R is a
matrix of control variables which represent the other sections of the contract which are also
amended (i.e. representations and warranties, events of default, etc.). I also include year
(τ ), lender (l) and borrower (b) fixed effects as indicated below. Each of these will capture
any systematic propensity that a borrower, lender or year has to renegotiate sooner or later.
Finally, I cluster all standard errors at the borrower × year level.
Table 7 shows the results from this regression. Coefficients should be interpreted as
the marginal impact of amending one covenant on the amount of days it takes for the
renegotiation to occur. There are two potential hypotheses being tested by this regression.
The first is that the coefficient on the affirmative covenant amendment is negative (β1 ≤ 0)
while the coefficient on the negative covenant amendment is simultaneously positive (β2 ≥ 0).
This implies that, consistent with the information-first theory, affirmative/negative covenant
amendments imply that the renegotiation happens sooner/later. The second hypothesis
tested is that these effects are statistically different (β2 ≥ β1 ). The bottom row of Table 7
gives the p-value for this test for each regression.
What these results show is that, for all specifications of this regression, the estimated
coefficient on affirmative covenants is weakly negative while the estimated coefficient on
negative covenants is significantly positive. From this, I find partial support for the first
hypothesis noted above. For all regressions, β2 ≥ 0 holds significantly, while β1 ≤ 0 is
generally estimated in the right direction but not significantly so. I also find that these
21

Results are also robust to using binary variables indicating if any such covenant was amended in the
renegotiation.
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estimates are generally different in a statistical sense. The p-value for the test β2 ≥ β1 is
generally close to 0.01 for all specifications of the regression except the last specification
which includes borrower fixed effects. This implies that some of the effect I observe is driven
by the fact that borrowers who amend affirmative/negative covenants are the same types of
borrowers who renegotiate earlier/later.
In terms of magnitudes, the results above suggest that the average contract which renegotiates an affirmative covenant does so (weakly) about one week earlier while the average
contract which renegotiates a negative covenant does so about 1.5-2 weeks later. In total,
assuming a counterfactual renegotiation which could only amend one type of covenant, one
would expect an affirmative covenant renegotiation to occur anywhere from 1.5 to 3 weeks
before a negative covenant renegotiation.
To confirm that the estimated magnitudes in the above results are reasonable in the
aggregate, in Figure 4 I plot the cumulative distribution of affirmative and negative covenant
renegotiations as a function of time. Considering the difference in days for how long it takes
each class of covenant to reach the same level of the empirical CDF, I find that the magnitude
of 1.5-3 weeks is broadly consistent with the aggregate results. In the empirical CDF of all
amendments, negative covenants lag affirmative covenants by an average of 23 days to reach
the same level. With the exception of the first 50 days, negative covenants amendments
always lag affirmative covenants.
Both of these sets of results concerning the timing of renegotiations support the theory
that renegotiations are information-first. Though I cannot see the direction of the renegotiation (i.e. borrower friendly or creditor friendly), from these results I can conclude that
the first aspect of the contract to get renegotiated is the section which concerns information
collection. There are two ways to interpret these results. The first interpretation is that the
first thing borrowers ask to be removed from their contracts are onerous reporting requirements. Another interpretation is that when banks are concerned about a borrower, they
first ask the firm for more information before putting more concrete restrictions on the firm.
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Unfortunately, my data cannot distinguish between these two stories. They likely both contribute to the effect I observe above. Ultimately though, the direction of the amendment is
mostly irrelevant since the information-first theory depends on affirmative covenants having
the lowest initial marginal cost of adjustment and both of these stories are consistent with
this idea.

3.4.4

Affirmative covenants are renegotiated first in default

For this test I use an augmented version of my renegotiations dataset which tracks each
loan monthly from origination to maturity. The sample of loans and originations used is the
same as described above in the summary statistics but I track the progression of each loan
monthly in an attempt to see how the creditworthiness of the borrower changes the propensity
to renegotiate. One observation in this dataset is a loan-month in which a renegotiation
can either occur or not. As before, I disaggregate renegotiations into affirmative covenant
amendments and negative covenant amendments.
I estimate the following regression to test how a firm’s creditworthiness correlates with
the its propensity to renegotiate:

renegi,t,l,b

15
X
= β1 DtD_renegi +β2 days_to_reneg+β3 maturity_orig+β4 AiD_spread_orig+
βj Oji
j=5

+li,l + τi,t + ηi,b + i,t,l,b
In this regression, the outcome variable is a binary variable indicating if the renegotiation
occurred within the loan-month or not. The main test variable is the contemporaneous
Distance-to-Default of the firm within the same loan-month. I also control for the amount
of time elapsed since origination, the maturity of the loan at origination, the credit spread
of the loan at origination and a matrix (O) of the full contents of the originated contract
(disaggregated by supersection) at origination. I also include monthly (τ ), lender (l) and
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borrower (b) fixed effects as indicated below. Since the possibility exists that the same
borrower might renegotiate multiple loans in the same month and these observations are
likely not to be fully independent, I cluster all standard errors at the month × borrower
level.
The regression results detailed in Table 8 are broken down by three different specifications
of the outcome variable. The first three columns show results for all types of amendments, the
next three show results for just affirmative covenant amendments and the final three columns
show results for negative covenant amendments. In the bottom row of the regression table
I show the base renegotiation rate for each outcome. This can be interpreted as the chance
of a renegotiation happening in any month in which the loan is active.
The results above show that the decision to renegotiate any part of the contract, as well as
both the affirmative and negative covenants is heavily correlated with the contemporaneous
financial health of the firm. In terms of magnitude, the point estimate of the marginal effect
of distance-to-default is about twice as high for negative covenants across all regressions.
However, this is to be expected since negative covenants are unconditionally renegotiated
more than twice as often as affirmative covenants. The bottom row of the table gives the
unconditionally (monthly) rate of renegotiation for affirmative and negative covenants. This
is about 0.3% in any month for affirmative covenants and 0.8% in any month for affirmative
covenants. Multiplying the point estimates by the appropriate base rates, I find that a
one unit increase in Distance-to-Default leads to a -4.8% reduction in the propensity to
renegotiate an affirmative covenant.22 Similarly, I find that a one unit increase in Distanceto-Default leads to a -3.5% reduction in the propensity to renegotiate a negative covenant.23
This supports the information-first theory since the same change in Distance-to-Default has
a larger impact on the conditional probability of renegotiating an affirmative covenant than
it does for a negative covenant.
Interestingly, the point estimate for the marginal effect of distance-to-default flips for
22
23

-.00017/.0035 = -.0485
-.00029/.0081 = -.0354
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all three classes of renegotiation when considering within-loan variation in the propensity
to renegotiate. The correct way to interpret this flip is that when loans are renegotiated,
it is by firms that are worse relative to their peers but better relative to the loan itself at
all points of the time from origination until maturity. Another way of restating this is that
renegotiations anticipate worsening credit conditions for the same borrower going forward.
To confirm this intuition is correct, in Figure 5 I plot an event study of the distanceto-default of renegotiating firms ±2 years around the event of renegotiation (left axis). I
also plot this number but relative to the prevailing average distance-to-default of the whole
market (right axis). Consistent with the regression results above, firms who renegotiate
are of significantly lower credit quality than the market as a whole (right axis). Around
the event of renegotiation, they are on average 2 units of distance-to-default lower than
the prevailing market. This roughly corresponds to being 2 standard deviations closer to
declaring bankruptcy (within one year) than the average firm. The fact that both lines closely
track one another shows that these renegotiations mostly happen when there is no trend to
the average prevailing creditworthiness of the market. Finally, Figure 5 also confirms the
within-loan results of the above regression. Distance-to-Default of renegotiating firms falls
about twice as much in the 2 years after a renegotiation as it does in the 2 years preceding.

3.4.5

Covenant renegotiation around credit events

To test the third hypothesis I consider the how the composition of a renegotiation changes
after a default. The vast majority of such defaults are waived and many represent what
Griffin, Nini and Smith (2019) call ’false positives’ where a default occurs “when a firm
is not in danger of financial distress”. If the information-first theory is correct, then the
first reaction for banks upon seeing a default should be to either increase monitoring of the
loan if the default was a ‘true positive’ or to make monitoring less stringent if the default
was a ‘false positive’. In Figure 6 I examine renegotiations that occur near a default (using
three definitions) and consider how the composition of these default renegotiations differ
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from renegotiations in the general sample. I cannot observe if the default is a true or false
positive but in either case, the information-first theory suggests that the first aspect of the
contract to be adjusted will be the monitoring of the loan.
The results in Figure 6 show that no matter how one defines a default, affirmative
covenants are renegotiated much more than negative covenants after a default. The graph
below compares two samples, the first sample is renegotiations by firms which have recently
experienced a default and the second sample is the remainder of renegotiations. For robustness, I use three types of default events. The first type of default event comes from searching
the titles of my scraped renegotiations for waivers of default. This indicates that the renegotiation is occurring concurrent with a waiver. The second and third types of default event
I note are defaults which occur within one year of a default as noted by either S&P or the
covenant violation database from Roberts and Sufi (2009). The numbers reported below are
the average amendment composition of the default sample minus the average amendment
composition of the remainder sample. For example, if the number below is positive, it implies
that this part of the contract is amended more after default than in the general population
of renegotiations.
In terms of magnitudes, compared to the average non-default renegotiation, default renegotiations amend about 0.065 more affirmative covenants. While this number may seem
small, the average unconditional number of affirmative covenants amended in a renegotiation
is 0.43 so this represents a 15% higher likelihood of amendment for affirmative covenants. On
the other hand, negative covenants are renegotiated about 6% less in default. This pattern
of affirmative covenants being renegotiated more (and negative covenants being renegotiated
less) in default is remarkably consistent no matter how one defines a default. In all three
columns, the default sample amends anywhere from 0.05 to 0.1 more affirmative covenants
while also amending between 0.05 to 0.1 fewer negative covenants. This is consistent with the
information-first theory as this implies that after a default, especially one which is waived,
the first thing to be adjusted is the monitoring of the loan.
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Finally, in Figure 7, I repeat the same exercise but I compare the renegotiations of firms
that are about to enter bankruptcy (within the next two years) with the rest of the population. Consistent with the information-first theory, I find that such firms renegotiate relatively
weakly more negative covenants. This is consistent with the theory since bankruptcy represents a state in which the firm is likely to have already had multiple rounds in which
they would have already adjusted the monitoring covenants. Thus by the time bankruptcy
is imminent, the majority of what is left to adjust is the negative covenants. Finally, it
should be noted that–most likely because the sample of firms who declare bankruptcy is
quite small–these effects are not statistically significant for the covenant categories. Because
of this, these bankruptcy Results should be viewed as mostly complimentary to the results
presented above.

3.5

Conclusion

In this paper I use two novel sources of data to shed light on an under-appreciated class
of covenants commonly used in syndicated lending contracts. Affirmative covenants are
frequently neglected or ignored in the academic treatment of covenants and this paper aims
to fill that gap in the literature.
Using a novel dataset which records the intensity of affirmative covenant usage at origination, I document the role of affirmative covenants in debt contracts as a monitoring
technology. This monitoring technology has two parts, ensuring information is 1) available
in a timely manner and 2) factually accurate for lenders. I document that the inclusion
of affirmative covenants is highly variable and heavily correlated with 2 popular proxies of
monitoring demand (as well as credit quality). In total, the results suggest that the monitoring hypothesis is correct and setting the tightness of affirmative covenants at origination
can be analogized to setting the sensitivity of the negative covenant tripwires.
Using another novel database of the timing and content of contractual renegotiations, I
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show that the way affirmative covenants are renegotiated is consistent with this monitoring
story. I theorize that since tightening affirmative covenants provides some benefit to the
lender without actually putting any more meaningful restrictions on the borrower, that
these covenants have a lower marginal cost of adjustment and so should be renegotiated
first, if possible. I call this idea the “information-first” theory of contractual adjustment. I
test it in the data and find that affirmative covenants are renegotiated first in time, first in
default and first after technical or waived defaults. The frequent adjustments of affirmative
covenants I document in this paper almost certainly reflects a response of banks to the
evolving information asymmetry that develops over the life of the loan.
In total, the results suggest that this frequently-overlooked aspect of contracts has an
important role to play in syndicated lending contracts. By better understanding the technology that banks use to monitor their loans, we can better understand how they fulfill one
of their most important functions. For future papers, these results suggest that affirmative
covenant intensity might be a useful proxy used for measuring the monitoring demand of a
loan. Future papers might also consider the intensive margin of affirmative covenant usage
and the specific directions in which they are amended in the data.
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Figures:
Figure 1: Unconditional time to renegotiation
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Figure 2: Renegotiation Composition by Amendment Type
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Figure 3: Growth in Affirmative Covenant Usage
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Figure 4: CDF of total renegotiations by covenant type
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Figure 5: Firm Distance-to-Default around renegotiation event
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Figure 6: Covenant renegotiation by category around credit events
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Figure 7: Covenant renegotiation for firms that will declare bankruptcy within 2 years
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Figure 8: Visualizing Supersection Composition
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Tables:
Table 1: Origination Data Summary Statistics
Origination Sample Summary Statistics
Mean

Std

10%

50%

90%

Obs.

Firm Details:
-Distance-to-Default
-Market Cap (MM)

3.88
2921

2.92
10521

0.73
30

3.51
488

7.64
5908

7282
7671

Loan Details:
-Facility Amount (MM)
-All-in-Drawn Spread (bp)
-Maturity (Months)
-Bank Allocation (Pct.)
-Syndicate Members (Count)

313
201
52
0.40
3.40

580
132
20
0.36
6.40

12
60
29
0.08
0.00

125
175
60
0.24
0.00

750
350
74
1.00
12

7993
7822
7993
7647
7647

Contents by Supersection (Count/Top 20):
-Affirmative Covenants
-Amendments and Waivers
-Appointment
-Commitments
-Events of Default
-Negative Covenants
-Notices
-Payment of Expenses, etc
-Representations and Warranties
-Taxes, Yield Protection and Illegality

5.12
1.08
2.77
5.09
2.76
5.92
6.10
0.92
6.75
1.66

2.65
1.73
2.47
2.98
2.49
2.92
3.14
1.33
3.13
3.59

2.00
0.00
0.00
1.00
0.00
2.00
2.00
0.00
2.00
0.00

5.00
0.00
2.00
5.00
2.00
6.00
6.00
1.00
7.00
0.00

9.00
3.00
6.00
9.00
6.00
10
10
2.00
11
4.00

7993
7993
7993
7993
7993
7993
7993
7993
7993
7993
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Table 2: Renegotiation Data Summary Statistics
Renegotiation Sample Summary Statistics
Mean

Std

10%

50%

90%

Obs.

Renegotiated Sections (Count):
-Affirmative Covenants
-Amendments and Waivers
-Appointment
-Commitments
-Events of Default
-Negative Covenants
-Notices
-Definitions and Other*
-Payment of Expenses, etc
-Representations and Warranties
-Taxes, Yield Protection and Illegality
-Sum Total

0.43
0.04
0.02
0.24
0.23
0.91
0.09
1.27
0.03
0.19
0.13
3.58

1.19
0.34
0.20
0.83
0.95
1.65
0.47
2.30
0.30
0.77
0.69
3.79

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
1.00

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
2.00

1.00
0.00
0.00
1.00
1.00
3.00
0.00
4.00
0.00
1.00
0.00
8.00

4279
4279
4279
4279
4279
4279
4279
4279
4279
4279
4279
4279

At Renegotiation:
-Distance-to-Default
-Days to Renegotiation

3.43
587

2.66
471

0.56
122

3.13
471

6.65
1184

3871
4279

At Origination:
-Distance-to-Default (Orig.)
-Facility Amount (MM)
-All-in-Drawn Spread (bp)
-Maturity (Months)
-Market Cap (MM)
-Bank Allocation (Pct.)

3.31
223
221
52
1268
0.46

2.55
410
119
20
4052
0.37

0.59
12
80
33
25
0.08

3.02
100
200
58
288
0.32

6.27
525
350
82
2643
1.00

3976
4279
4202
4279
4096
4140
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No
No
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No

0.767
0.662
0.587

0.520
0.336
0.324
0.280
0.260
0.259
0.205
0.200

0.169
0.167

0.156

0.149

0.146
0.146
0.140
0.138
0.123

liens
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sale of assets

net worth

tangible net worth

mergers, etc

0.111
0.131
0.076
0.297
0.494

0.839

0.837

0.440
0.477

0.496
0.629
0.528
0.577
0.674
0.621
0.360
0.155

0.286
0.397
0.156

% Num

carve-out
limit
N/A
carve-out
carve-out

limit

limit

carve-out
carve-out

carve-out
limit
carve-out
limit
limit
carve-out
carve-out
carve-out

carve-out
carve-out
carve-out

Type

Restictions on dispositions (sales) of assets

Restriction on paying dividends

“At all times engage only in the business described in SECTION...”

“Borrower shall at all times maintain the following financial ratios and covenants”

Restrictions on mergers

“Borrower will at all times maintain its Consolidated Tangible Net Worth at not less
than...”

“Borrower will maintain at all times a Consolidated Net Worth of at least the sum
of...”

“Borrower shall not sell, lease, transfer, or otherwise dispose of any of its Properties
without the prior written consent of Lender except for:”

Restrictions on additional indebtedness

“Enter into any merger, consolidation or amalgamation, or liquidate, wind up or
dissolve itself..except that:”

Restrictions on acquisitions

“Borrower...may make Capital Expenditures in an aggregate amount not exceeding...”

“Borrower shall maintain a Fixed Charge Coverage Ratio of at least...”

“Borrower shall not permit the Interest Coverage Ratio to be less than...”

Restrictions on payments to equity holders (frequently includes dividends)

“The Borrower shall not, at any time, permit the Leverage Ratio to be greater than...”

Restrictions on investments (typically includes a long list of restricted investments)

Restrictions on affiliate transactions with “terms less favorable than would be obtained in an arm’s length transaction”

Restrictions on additional indebtedness

Restrictions on additional liens

Description

Summary of the top 20 most common negative covenants in syndicated lending contracts (1996-2017). Sample is from 8426
syndicated lending contracts to 3662 borrowers. Borrowers exclude utilities and financial firms. Frequency is the proportion of
all contracts that contain a covenant. DS identifies if the given covenant is also found in LPC’s DealScan database. Numerical
is the proportion of covenants which contain a numerical restriction in one of the following forms: dollar amount ($100,000),
ratio (2:1 or 2 to 1) or percent (50%). Type is the type of numerical restriction. Description provides a brief description of the
covenant, if possible, in the text’s own words.

1. This table is a summary of the top 20 most common negative covenants in syndicated lending contracts (1996-2017). Sample is from 8426 syndicated lending contracts
to 3662 borrowers. All borrowers in this sample match to both Compustat Capital IQ and LPC DealScan. Borrowers exclude utilities and financial firms. Covenant
data obtained by TRKM algorithm parsing of contracts (see paper for details). Names for each covenant chosen independently by TRKM algorithm (unless indicated
by brackets). Frequency is the proportion of all contracts that contain that covenant, as identified by TRKM. DS identifies if the given covenant is also found in LPC’s
DealScan database. Numerical is the proportion of covenants which contain a numerical restriction in one of the following forms: dollar amount ($100,000), ratio (2:1
or 2 to 1) or percent (50%). Type is the type of numerical restriction. These can be carve-outs of blanket restrictions, limits on activity or covenant specific. This
information is hand-collected from a sample of 100 of each covenant and is assigned by seeing which type is most frequently associated with a particular covenant. Type
not calculated for covenants with a Numerical proportion less than 10%. Description provides a brief description of the covenant, if possible, in the covenant’s own words.
Since covenant contents can be highly varible, this is meant to give a general sense of the covenant and not guaranteed to be indicative of every covenant categorized as
such.

Notes:

dispositions

dividends

conduct of business

financial covenants

debt

fundamental changes

acquisitions

capital expenditures

fixed charge coverage ratio

interest coverage ratio

restricted payments

leverage ratio

investments

transactions with affiliates

indebtedness

DS

Freq

Name

Summary of Top 20 most Common Negative Covenants

Table 3: Top 20 Most Commonly Used Negative Covenants

No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No

0.692
0.647
0.512
0.357
0.273
0.260
0.252
0.223
0.206
0.180
0.153
0.143
0.138
0.135
0.124
0.119
0.113
0.107
0.105
0.102

use of proceeds

compliance with laws

further assurances

maintenance of properties

certificates; other information

books and records

annual financial statements
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compliance with laws, etc

compliance certificate

additional subsidiaries

notice

compliance with environmental laws

[delegation of security interest]

maintenance of insurance

0.019

0.039

0.041

0.219

0.392

0.026

0.006

0.018
0.175
0.117
0.041

0.005

0.011
0.040
0.041
0.125

0.068

0.139
0.078
0.009

% Num

N/A

N/A

N/A

specific

specific

N/A

N/A

N/A
limit
specific
N/A

N/A

N/A
N/A
N/A
specific

N/A

specific
N/A
N/A

Type

Borrower will maintain insurance for usual business risks

“Lender may at any time create a security interest in all or any portion of its rights
under this Agreement”

Borrower will not use...Real Estate...for the handling, processing, storage or disposal
of Hazardous Substances”, etc

Defines events under which borrower has to notify lender. *Specific: Refers to financial events for notifying

Stipulations re. subsidiaries. *Specific: Occasionaly requires subsidiaries to become
loan partners if large enough.

Financial statements delivered to lender include certificate from CFO affirming accuracy

Borrower and subsid. will comply with laws and other contractual obligations when
not complying would have a material

“Permit the Lender ... to examine the Borrower’s files, books and records and make
and take away copies”

“Permit representatives...of either Agent to visit and inspect any of its properties”

Lender notified of any changes in leases. Restrictions on leases and assumed leases

Submit current corporate balance sheets to lender once a year

“Maintain books of record and account...in conformity with GAAP...of all financial
transactions”

Similar to above but includes certificate from CFO affirming accuracy and detailing
calculations. *Specific: Financial states in which CFO has to certificate

Borrower sends lender copies of all publicly availible statements

Pay and discharge taxes and other obligations which might incur a lien

“Maintain and keep its property in good repair, working order and condition”

“Execute any and all further documents that may be required... in order to effectuate
the transactions contemplated by the Loan”

Borrower will comply with laws when “not complying would...have a material adverse
effect”.

Specifies how borrower will use proceeds of loan

Maintain insurance on property. *Specific: Frequently 100% of value

Description

1. This table is a summary of the top 20 most common affirmative covenants in syndicated lending contracts (1996-2017). Sample is from 8426 syndicated lending contracts
to 3662 borrowers. All borrowers in this sample match to both Compustat Capital IQ and LPC DealScan. Borrowers exclude utilities and financial firms. Covenant
data obtained by TRKM algorithm parsing of contracts (see paper for details). Names for each covenant chosen independently by TRKM algorithm (unless indicated
by brackets). Frequency is the proportion of all contracts that contain that covenant, as identified by TRKM. DS identifies if the given covenant is also found in LPC’s
DealScan database. Numerical is the proportion of covenants which contain a numerical restriction in one of the following forms: dollar amount ($100,000), ratio (2:1
or 2 to 1) or percent (50%). Type is the type of numerical restriction. These can be carve-outs of blanket restrictions, limits on activity or covenant specific. This
information is hand-collected from a sample of 100 of each covenant and is assigned by seeing which type is most frequently associated with a particular covenant. Type
not calculated for covenants with a Numerical proportion less than 10%. Description provides a brief description of the covenant, if possible, in the covenant’s own words.
Since covenant contents can be highly varible, this is meant to give a general sense of the covenant and not guaranteed to be indicative of every covenant categorized as
such.

Notes:

inspection

inspection rights

leases

other information

payment of obligations

insurance

DS

Summary of Top 20 most Common Affirmative Covenants
Freq

Name

Table 4: Top 20 Most Commonly Used Affirmative Covenants

Summary of the top 20 most common affirmative covenants in syndicated lending contracts (1996-2017). Sample is from 8426
syndicated lending contracts to 3662 borrowers. Borrowers exclude utilities and financial firms. Frequency is the proportion of
all contracts that contain a covenant. DS identifies if the given covenant is also found in LPC’s DealScan database. Numerical
is the proportion of covenants which contain a numerical restriction in one of the following forms: dollar amount ($100,000),
ratio (2:1 or 2 to 1) or percent (50%). Type is the type of numerical restriction. Description provides a brief description of the
covenant, if possible, in the text’s own words.
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Borrower FE
N
6911
adj. R2
0.112
Standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
5747
0.183

X

X

X

-0.0595
(0.0314)

X
5338
0.253

X

X

-0.0428
(0.0502)

6911
0.323

X

X

0.0036∗
(0.0015)

5747
0.489

X

X

X

0.0031∗
(0.0015)

X
5338
0.596

X

X

-0.0029
(0.0018)

-0.0018∗∗∗
(0.0004)

0.0003∗∗∗
(0.0000)

This regression shows how covenant usage co-varies with two popular proxies for bank monitoring. Outcome variable is either
syndicate size or lead arranger share. Syndicate size is the total number of banks in the syndicate for one credit facility. Lead
arranger share is the percent of the loan retained on the lead arranger bank’s balance sheet at origination (averaged for loans
with more than one Lead Arranger). One unit of observation is one credit facility and its corresponding contract. Standard
errors robust to clustering at the Lender × Year level. Sample time period is 1996-2017.

1. This regression shows how covenant usage covaries with two popular proxies for bank monitoring. One unit of observation is one credit facilty and its corresponding
contract. Syndicate size is the total number of banks in the syndicate for one credit facility. Lead Arranger Share is the percent of the loan retained on the lead arranger
bank’s balance sheet at origination (averaged for loans with more than one Lead Arranger). Standard errors robust to clustering at the Lender × Year level. Sample
time period is 1996-2017.

Notes:

X

Year FE
Lender FE

X

-0.0386
(0.0294)

Full Contract Contents

Distance-to-Default

-0.0013
(0.0078)

-0.0031∗∗∗
(0.0003)

0.0135∗∗
(0.0046)

0.0193∗∗∗
(0.0043)

Maturity

-0.0074∗∗∗
(0.0010)
-0.0054∗∗∗
(0.0003)

0.0005∗∗∗
(0.0001)

0.0008∗∗∗
(0.0000)

-0.0112∗∗∗
(0.0009)

-0.0135∗∗∗
(0.0008)

Loan Spread (bp)

-0.0055∗∗
(0.0020)

-0.0033
(0.0017)

-0.0080∗∗∗
(0.0016)

0.0427
(0.0495)

-0.1010∗∗
(0.0362)

-0.1152∗∗∗
(0.0316)

Negative Covenants

Affirmative Covenants

Lead Arranger Share
(4)
(5)
(6)
0.0105∗∗∗
0.0065∗∗
0.0056∗
(0.0020)
(0.0023)
(0.0024)

Syndicate Size
(1)
(2)
(3)
-0.2194∗∗∗
-0.1266∗∗
-0.1786∗∗
(0.0372)
(0.0442)
(0.0580)

Bank Monitoring Proxies and Affirmative Covenant Usage

Table 5: Bank Monitoring Proxies and Affirmative Covenant Usage
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-0.0335∗∗
(0.0104)

-0.0021
(0.0072)
0.0331
(0.0220)
0.0317∗∗∗
(0.0082)
-0.0087∗∗∗
(0.0005)
-0.0002
(0.0024)
X

-0.0361∗∗∗
(0.0089)
0.0074
(0.0039)
0.0062
(0.0075)
-0.0094
(0.0060)
0.0432∗
(0.0173)
0.0304∗∗∗
(0.0060)
-0.0080∗∗∗
(0.0004)
-0.0018
(0.0020)
X

Appointment

Commitments

Events of Default

Notices

Payment of Expenses

Taxes, Yield Protection...

Loan Spread (bp)

Maturity

Year FE

Borrower FE
N
6911
adj. R2
0.255
Standard errors in parentheses
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001

Lender FE
5747
0.279

X

0.0010
(0.0108)

0.0072
(0.0054)

X
5338
0.592

X
4089
0.591

X

X

0.0139∗∗∗
(0.0033)

0.0093∗∗∗
(0.0025)
X

-0.0050∗∗∗
(0.0006)

0.0196
(0.0120)

0.0085
(0.0326)

0.0114
(0.0108)

-0.0093
(0.0128)

0.0088
(0.0063)

-0.0121
(0.0142)

0.0245
(0.0278)

-0.0214
(0.0295)

-0.0044∗∗∗
(0.0004)

0.0237∗∗
(0.0082)

0.0135
(0.0233)

-0.0019
(0.0078)

-0.0027
(0.0095)

0.0080
(0.0047)

-0.0038
(0.0108)

0.0168
(0.0222)

-0.0345
(0.0213)

-0.0825
(0.0642)

(4)
-0.0237
(0.0267)

5464
0.234

X
5145
0.564

X

X
X

0.0030
(0.0024)

-0.0015∗∗∗
(0.0004)

0.0112
(0.0078)

-0.0271
(0.0237)

-0.0067
(0.0078)

0.0066
(0.0095)

0.0052
(0.0049)

0.0133
(0.0114)

-0.0233
(0.0218)

-0.0175
(0.0226)

0.0007
(0.0026)

-0.0072∗∗∗
(0.0005)

0.0226∗
(0.0089)

0.0411
(0.0239)

-0.0039
(0.0082)

0.0044
(0.0107)

0.0065
(0.0061)

-0.0257∗
(0.0116)

-0.0009
(0.0214)

-0.0318
(0.0243)

5439
0.344

X

X

0.0000
(0.0019)

-0.0092∗∗∗
(0.0005)

0.0224∗∗
(0.0078)

0.0237
(0.0193)

-0.0023
(0.0074)

0.0177
(0.0091)

0.0015
(0.0045)

-0.0268∗∗
(0.0093)

-0.0007
(0.0174)

-0.0224
(0.0184)

X
5056
0.599

X

0.0073∗∗
(0.0023)

-0.0059∗∗∗
(0.0004)

0.0122
(0.0080)

0.0116
(0.0217)

-0.0039
(0.0076)

0.0130
(0.0089)

0.0027
(0.0045)

0.0023
(0.0109)

0.0227
(0.0205)

-0.0122
(0.0201)

-0.0801
(0.0460)

-0.1487∗∗∗
(0.0407)

-0.1358∗
(0.0579)
-0.0515
(0.0501)

DTD +1 Year
(7)
(8)
-0.0330
-0.0312
(0.0178)
(0.0180)

DTD -1 Year
(5)
(6)
-0.0605∗∗
-0.0335
(0.0196)
(0.0207)

1. This regression shows how borrower Distance-to-Default varies with the price and non-price terms of a contract. Dependent variable is Distance-to-Default (as found
in Barath and Shumway, 2008) measured at origination and +/- 1 year from origination. One observation is one loan (matched to Compustat Capital IQ and LPC
DealScan) originated between 1996-2017. Explanatory variables include the non-price terms of the contract such as contractual contents and maturity as well as the
price, or spread (in bp), of the loan. Data on contractual contents collected via TRKM algorithm as described in the paper. These contents are separated into the 10
most common supersections. Supersections can be further divided into subsections. The non-price contractual variables in this regression indicate how many of the top
20 most common subsections in a given supersection are present in the contract.

Notes:

0.0043
(0.0189)

-0.0110
(0.0155)

Amendments and Waivers

-0.0377
(0.0224)

-0.0265
(0.0183)

Negative Covenants (w/o DS)

-0.0567
(0.0491)

-0.1169∗
(0.0563)

-0.1057∗
(0.0416)

DealScan Covenants

Affirmative Covenants

DTD at Origination
(2)
(3)
-0.0419∗
-0.0460∗
(0.0197)
(0.0208)

(1)
-0.0521∗∗
(0.0163)

Distance-to-Default around Origination

Table 6: Covenant Usage and Distance-to-Default around Origination

This regression shows how borrower Distance-to-Default varies with the price and non-price terms of a contract. Outcome variable is Distance-to-Default (as found in Bharath and Shumway, 2008) measured at origination and +/- 1 year from origination.
The main test variables of interest are the covenants used in the originated contract. Controls include loan observables as well
as year, lender and borrower fixed effects as indicated. One observation is one loan (also matched to Compustat and LPC
DealScan) originated between 1996-2017. Standard errors robust to clustering at the Lender × Year level.

Table 7: Days to Renegotiation and Renegotiation Contents
This regression shows the relation between renegotiating an affirmative/negative covenant and the timing of the renegotiation.
Outcome variable is number of calender days between origination and renegotiation. Main test variables are the number of
disaggregated covenants amended in the renegotiation. P-value in the bottom row is the p-value from the test of the hypothesis
that the coefficient estimate for affirmative and negative covenants are the same. Controls include the the covenants included in
the contract at origination, the Distance-to-Default of the firm at the time of renegotiation, the full contents of the renegotiation
(i.e. if a renegotiation also amended the Events of Default supersection, etc.) as well as year, lender and borrower fixed effects
where indicated. One observation is one renegotiation of a loan originated between 1996-2017. Standard errors robust to
clustering at the Lender × Year level.

Days to Renegotiation and Contents of Renegotiation
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Affirmative Covenants (Reneg)
-7.332
-5.998
-7.309
-5.887
(5.607) (5.434) (5.687) (5.518)
Negative Covenants (Reneg)

12.00∗∗
(4.380)

14.22∗∗
(4.403)

11.41∗∗
(4.421)

(5)
0.570
(5.891)

13.47∗∗
(4.459)

10.95∗
(5.037)

Affirmative Covenants (Orig)

-9.726∗
(4.682)

-9.619∗
(4.717)

4.989
(19.22)

Negative Covenants (Orig)

-15.44∗∗
(5.558)

-15.67∗∗
(5.553)

-10.54
(20.04)

DealScan Covenants (Orig)

6.226
(10.98)

6.061
(10.94)

-13.62
(49.37)

11.03∗
(4.750)

9.794∗
(4.770)

6.037
(7.085)

X

X

X

10.60∗
(4.736)

Distance-to-Default

9.460∗
(4.757)

Full Contents
Year FE

X

X

X

X

X

Lender FE

X

X

X

X

X

3582
0.379
0.0117

3582
0.386
0.00718

3582
0.383
0.0142

3582
0.389
0.00979

X
3111
0.782
0.199

Borrower FE
N
R2
p-val: H0 (βAffCov(reneg) − βNegCov(reneg) = 0)
Standard errors in parentheses
∗

p < 0.05,

∗∗

p < 0.01,

∗∗∗

p < 0.001

Notes:
1. This regression shows the effect of renegotiating an affirmative/negative covenant on the timing of the renegotiation.
Dependent variable is number of calender days between origination and renegotiation. Independent variables are number
of covenants renegotiated or included at origination. Controls include the Distance-to-Default measure of the borrower
(Barath and Shumway, 2008) at the time of renegotiation, controls for the full possible contents of the renegotiation (i.e.
if a renegotiation also renegotiated from the Events of Default supersection, etc) as well as year, lender and borrower
fixed effects where indicated. Standard errors robust to clustering at the Lender × Year level. Data on covenant inclusion
at origination obtained by TRKM clustering as described in the paper. Data on covenant renegotiation obtained by
scraping renegotiations from from SEC EDGAR, finding the sections listed as being renegotiated and using the previously
mentioned database on originations to identify the content of the section. Full details of this database in paper.
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X
4.161e+05
0.00735
0.00357

X
(subsumed)
X
4.212e+05
0.07633
0.01796

X
X
X
X

X

X

X

Origination Controls

LoanType FE

Year-Month FE

Loan FE
N
4.161e+05
4.161e+05
R2
0.00696
0.02123
Base Rate
0.01807
0.01807
t statistics in parentheses
∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001

Lender FE
4.161e+05
0.00137
0.00357

X

X

X
X

X

0.00001∗∗∗
(4.190)

X

0.00001∗∗∗
(6.040)

4.161e+05
0.01015
0.00819

X
4.212e+05
0.04228
0.00355

X

X

X

0.00002∗∗∗
(5.144)

0.00006∗
(2.456)

-0.00020∗∗∗
(-10.923)

X
4.161e+05
0.00214
0.00819

X

X

X

0.00001∗∗∗
(6.192)

0.00006∗∗
(2.830)

-0.00018∗∗∗
(-11.339)

(subsumed)

X

(subsumed)

(subsumed)

0.00007
(0.434)

X
4.212e+05
0.04190
0.00811

(subsumed)

X

(subsumed)

(subsumed)

-0.00003
(-0.111)

Negative Cov (N = 3428)
(7)
(8)
(9)
-0.00041∗∗∗
-0.00029∗
0.00056∗
(-4.070)
(-2.564)
(2.532)

1. This regression shows how monthly changes in borrower Distance-to-Default measure, as described in Barath and Shumway (2008), correlate with monthly renegotiations.
One observation is one loan-month in which the loan is active. Sample time period is 1996-2017. Dependent variable is an indicator variable which is one if there was a
monthly renegotiation of the stated category and zero if there was no monthly renegotiation of the stated category. Loan Spread and Maturity are also determined at
origination and attempt to help control for borrower quality at origination. Duration is the length of time (in months) at which the renegotiation occurrs. Origination
Controls account for the non-price composition of contract at origination. Regressions 1, 2, 4, 5, 7 and 8 are between-borrower regressions while regressions 3,6 and 9
are within-borrower/loan regressions. To avoid double counting firms which might have multiple concurrent loans outstanding, standard errors robust to clustering at
the borrower × month level.

Notes:
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(subsumed)

(subsumed)

0.00003∗∗∗
(9.938)

-0.00001
(-0.510)

0.00004∗∗∗
(16.376)

Loan Spread (bp)

-0.00002
(-1.456)

-0.00009∗∗∗
(-8.728)

0.00004∗
(2.248)

-0.00008∗∗∗
(-9.607)

0.00002
(1.371)

0.00017
(0.646)

Maturity

-0.00040∗∗∗
(-29.211)

Affirmative Cov (N = 1513)
(4)
(5)
(6)
-0.00014∗∗
-0.00017∗∗
0.00029∗∗
(-2.583)
(-2.714)
(2.721)

-0.00038∗∗∗
(-31.477)

All (N = 7637)
(2)
(3)
-0.00063∗∗∗
0.00035∗
(-7.106)
(2.445)

Duration

Distance-to-Default

(1)
-0.00074∗∗∗
(-9.336)

What drives the choice to renegotiate...

Table 8: Distance-to-Default and renegotiation by covenant type

This regression shows how monthly changes in borrower Distance-to-Default measure, as described in Bharath and Shumway
(2008), correlate with the monthly propensity to renegotiate. Outcome variable is an indicator variable which is one if there
was a monthly renegotiation of the stated category and zero if there was no monthly renegotiation of the stated category.
Loan Spread and Maturity are also determined at origination and attempt to help control for borrower quality at origination.
Duration is the length of time (in months) at which the renegotiation occurs. Origination Controls account for the non-price
composition of contract at origination. Regressions 1, 2, 4, 5, 7 and 8 are between-borrower regressions while regressions 3, 6
and 9 are within-borrower/loan regressions. One observation is one loan-month in which the loan is active. Sample time period
is 1996-2017. To avoid double counting firms which might have multiple concurrent loans outstanding, standard errors robust
to clustering at the borrower × month level.
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